













This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree 
(e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following 
terms and conditions of use: 
 
This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are 
retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without 
prior permission or charge. 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the author. 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the author. 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given. 
 
I M PA I R E D R E I N F O R C E M E N T L E A R N I N G & B AY E S I A N
I N F E R E N C E I N P S Y C H I AT R I C D I S O R D E R S :
F R O M M A L A D A P T I V E D E C I S I O N M A K I N G T O
P S Y C H O S I S I N S C H I Z O P H R E N I A
vincent valton
Doctor of Philosophy
Doctoral Training Centre for Computational Neuroscience





Impaired reinforcement learning & Bayesian inference in psychiatric disorders: from maladap-
tive decision making to psychosis in schizophrenia
Doctor of Philosophy, 2015
supervisors:
Dr. Peggy Seriès, Ph.D.
Prof. Stephen Lawrie, MD(Hons), FRCPsych, HonFRCP(Edin)
Q U O T E S
“The brain does much more than just recollect, it inter-compares, it synthesizes,
it analyses, it generates abstractions. ... [It] is the realm both, of intuition and
critical analysis. It is here that we have ideas and inspirations, here that we read
and write. ... The cortex regulates our conscious lives, it is the distinction of our
species, the seat of our humanity. Art and science live here. Civilization is the
product of the cerebral cortex. [It] is in a way a liberation. We need no longer
be trapped in the genetically inherited behavioural patterns of [our ancestors]. ...
[It] may be the means of ensuring human survival, if we have the wisdom to pay
attention."
— Carl Sagan
“Everything we do, every thought we’ve ever had, is produced by the human
brain. But exactly how it operates remains one of the biggest unsolved mysteries,
and it seems the more we probe its secrets, the more surprises we find."
— Neil deGrasse Tyson
“I think the brain is essentially a computer and consciousness is like a computer
program. It will cease to run when the computer is turned off. Theoretically, it
could be re-created on a neural network, but that would be very difficult, as it
would require all one’s memories."
— Stephen Hawking
“Pure mathematics is, in its way, the poetry of logical ideas."
— Albert Einstein
“I had to make sense, any sense, out of all these uncanny coincidences. I did it
by radically changing my conception of reality."
— Peter Chadwick,
describing his experiences during an episode of paranoid schizophrenia.
“In madness, I thought I was the most important person in the world."
— John Nash
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A B S T R A C T
Computational modelling has been gaining an increasing amount of support from the
neuroscience community as a tool to assay cognition and computational processes in
the brain. Lately, scientists have started to apply computational methods from neuro-
science to the study of psychiatry to gain further insight into the mechanisms leading
to mental disorders. In fact, only recently has psychiatry started to move away from
categorising illnesses using behavioural symptoms in an attempt for a more biolog-
ically driven diagnosis. To date, several neurobiological anomalies have been found
in schizophrenia and led to a multitude of conceptual framework attempting to link
the biology to the patients’ symptoms. Computational modelling can be applied to
formalise these conceptual frameworks in an effort to test the validity or likelihood
of each hypothesis. Recently, a novel conceptual model has been proposed to de-
scribe how positive symptoms (delusions, hallucinations and thought disorder) and
cognitive symptoms (poor decision-making, i.e. “executive functioning”) might arise
in schizophrenia. This framework however, has not been tested experimentally or
against computational models. The focus of this thesis was to use a combination of
behavioural experiments and computational models to independently assess the va-
lidity of each component that make up this framework.
The first study of this thesis focused on the computational analysis of a disrupted
prediction-error signalling and its implications for decision-making performances in
complex tasks. Briefly, we used a reinforcement-learning model of a gambling task
in rodents and disrupted the prediction-error signal known to be critical for learning.
We found that this disruption can account for poor performances in decision-making
due to an incorrect acquisition of the model of the world. This study illustrates how
disruptions in prediction-error signalling (known to be present in schizophrenia) can
lead to the acquisition of an incorrect world model which can lead to poor executive
functioning or false beliefs (delusions) as seen in patients.
The second study presented in this thesis addressed spatial working memory perfor-
mances in chronic schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, first episode psychosis and family
relatives of DISC1 translocation carriers. We build a probabilistic inference model
to solve the working memory task optimally and then implemented various alter-
ations of this model to test commonly debated hypotheses of cognitive deficiency
iv
in schizophrenia. Our goal was to find which of these hypotheses accounts best for
the poor performance observed in patients. We found that while the performance at
the task was significantly different for most patients groups in comparison to con-
trols, this effect disappeared after controlling for IQ in one group. The models were
nonetheless fitted to the experimental data and suggest that working memory main-
tenance is most likely to account for the poor performances observed in patients. We
propose that the maintenance of information in working memory might have indirect
implications for measures of general cognitive performance, as these rely on a correct
filtering of information against distractions and cortical noise.
Finally the third study presented in this thesis assessed the performance of medi-
cated chronic schizophrenia patients in a statistical learning task of visual stimuli
and measured how the acquired statistics influenced their perception. We find that
patient with chronic schizophrenia appear to be unimpaired at statistical learning
of visual stimuli. The acquired statistics however appear to induce less expectation-
driven ‘hallucinations’ of the stimuli in the patients group than in controls. We find
that this is in line with previous literature showing that patients are less susceptible
to expectation-driven illusions than controls. This study highlights however the idea
that perceptual processes during sensory integration diverge from this of healthy con-
trols.
In conclusion, this thesis suggests that impairments in reinforcement learning and
Bayesian inference appear to be able to account for the positive and cognitive symp-
toms observed in schizophrenia, but that further work is required to merge these
findings. Specifically, while our studies addressed individual components such as
associative learning, working memory, implicit learning & perceptual inference, we
cannot conclude that deficits of reinforcement learning and Bayesian inference can
collectively account for symptoms in schizophrenia. We argue however that the stud-
ies presented in this thesis provided evidence that impairments of reinforcement
learning and Bayesian inference are compatible with the emergence of positive and
cognitive symptoms in schizophrenia.
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1
I N T R O D U C T I O N
1.1 schizophrenia
Schizophrenia is a devastating psychiatric disorder with a lifetime prevalence of 0.3-
0.66% (van Os and Kapur, 2009; Bhugra, 2005). This condition manifests itself through
a variety of symptoms across patients, classified into three distinct categories: posi-
tive, negative and cognitive symptoms. Positive symptoms refer to hallucinations (i.e.
visual or auditory) and delusions (i.e. usually involving a bizarre or paranoid con-
tent); negative symptoms include flattened affect, social withdrawal, apathy, poverty
of speech, and anhedonia. Cognitive symptoms cover decreased memory perfor-
mance, attentional and reasoning deficit, which is usually associated with an average
IQ drop of 10 points following the disease onset (van Os and Kapur, 2009; McIntosh
et al., 2005; Bhugra, 2005; Frith et al., 1991; Johnstone et al., 1991). Schizophrenia is
highly debilitating, leading to an average loss of 15 to 20 years of life expectancy in
comparison to the general population (Mangalore and Knapp, 2007; Andrew et al.,
2012). It is argued that unhealthy lifestyles and increased suicidal rates (found to be
about 12 times higher in the schizophrenia; Caldwell and Gottesman, 1990) might ac-
count for this general reduction in life expectancy (World Health Organisation, 1996).
Besides this devastating prospect for patients and their relatives, schizophrenia has
been found to generate a high economical burden on society (Knapp et al., 2004;
Serretti et al., 2009; Mangalore and Knapp, 2007). Recently, the total societal cost
of schizophrenia has been estimated to be around £6.7 to £11.8 billion per year for
England alone (Mangalore and Knapp, 2007; Andrew et al., 2012). This is including
direct treatment costs and indirect societal costs such as loss of employment. In fact,
it has been estimated that around 80% to 93% of patients with schizophrenia remain
unemployed, leading to large societal costs due to loss productivity (Mangalore and
Knapp, 2007; Andrew et al., 2012). Lack of employment is argued to result largely
from cognitive deficits, problems of attention and working memory (Insel, 2010).
There is currently no cure for schizophrenia, mainly due to a poor understanding
of the causes and mechanisms of the disorder. The best treatment to date consists
of managing everyday symptoms through a combination of psychosocial treatments
and anti-psychotic medications. This therapy aims to minimize symptoms, potential
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risks to the patient or others (e.g. hallucinations/delusions leading to self-neglect or
harm), and to avoid the relapse of psychosis. It is estimated that about 45% of patients
recover after one or more episodes, 20% show a gradual worsening of symptoms and
a final 35% exhibit a mix of remission with a worsening of some of the symptoms
(relapsing-remitting; World Health Organisation, 1996).
1.1.1 Debated origins of the disorder
Several studies have identified neuroanatomical differences in patients (e.g. Seeman,
1994; Kreczmanski et al., 2007; Lawrie et al., 2008) as well as susceptible genes increas-
ing the risk of developing psychiatric disorders (e.g. Chubb et al., 2008). However,
while it is well established that high genetic risk factors alone are not sufficient to ac-
count for the development of the disorder (Lawrie et al., 2008); it is widely accepted
that an interaction between genetic (Berry et al., 2003; Chubb et al., 2008; Bertolino
and Blasi, 2009) and environmental risk factors (i.e. stress, traumatic experiences, etc.
Jones et al., 1994; Mortensen et al., 1999; McDonald and Murray, 2000) is necessary
to lead to the emergence of schizophrenia. So far, research in this field has identified
various anomalies in patients, which has led to divergent hypotheses about the ori-
gins of the disorder. First, the Dopamine (DA) hypothesis was established through
the observation of alleviated positive symptoms upon treatment with typical anti-
psychotic drugs (APD), which block dopamine receptors D2 (D2r). Consistent with
this hypothesis, subsequent imaging studies found elevated dopaminergic signalling
(Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2005; Murray et al., 2008; Waltz et al., 2009), elevated presy-
naptic striatal DA synthesis and release, and increased striatal D2 receptor densities
(Howes and Kapur, 2009). More recently studies have also found deregulated D1 re-
ceptor densities in the pre-frontal regions of patients (Howes and Kapur, 2009). The
second hypothesis, the Glutamate (Glu) hypothesis emerged from the observation of
induced psychosis in healthy subjects when exposed to psychoactive drugs, such as
Ketamine and Phencyclidine (PCP), which acts primarily by blocking the glutamate
binding sites of NMDA receptors (Corlett et al., 2007a; van Os and Kapur, 2009).
Post-mortem studies also identified reduced glutamate levels in the pre-frontal areas
of patients (Sherman et al., 1991). It is therefore assumed that reduced NMDA recep-
tor densities or receptor hypo-function can account for the symptomatology observed
in patients (Javitt and Zukin, 1991; Olney et al., 1999; Gilmour et al., 2012). The third
hypothesis, the GABAergic hypothesis is supported by experimental studies report-
ing reduced cortical GABA, dysfunctional activity and reduced markers of inhibitory
inter-neurons in the pre-frontal areas of patients (Lewis and Hashimoto, 2005; Tanaka,
2008; Nakazawa et al., 2012). Finally, the disconnection hypothesis stemmed from
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several findings of reduced cortical volume, abnormal pre-frontal cortical folding, en-
larged ventricles, abnormal synaptic connectivity (Harrison, 1999; Lawrie et al., 2008)
and increased cortical activation during cognitive tasks (Manoach et al., 1999; Win-
terer and Weinberger, 2004). This increased activation is thought to be the result of
a reduced synchrony or disconnection between different cortical areas, therefore re-
quiring exaggerated efforts for completion (Friston, 2005a; Stephan et al., 2009).
As one can probably infer from the short description of the existing hypotheses of
schizophrenia, the origins of the disorder are highly debated. However, researchers
and practitioners alike tend to agree that until reliable biological markers are found,
which can robustly and reliably predict the emergence of schizophrenia and its symp-
toms, the best course of action for current diagnostic purposes is to rely on clinical
interviews and an interpretation of symptoms by trained professionals.
1.1.2 Diagnosis: categorical vs dimensional classification
In the absence of reliable biological markers, diagnosis of mental disorders is pro-
duced from a clinical examination of the symptoms and behaviours expressed by
the patients (World Health Organisation, 1996). Using the diagnostic and statistical
manual of mental disorders (DSM; DSM-IV-TR, 2000) or the international statistical
classification of disease and related health problems (ICD; World Health Organiza-
tion, 2009), psychiatrists can diagnose a patient’s illness as a function of the number
of symptoms present and the extent to which those have been present. Specifically,
for schizophrenia, the current DSM (DSM-5, 2013) diagnosis is met when two or more
criteria are present continuously for a period of one month or more, and had an im-
pact on the patient’s functioning for at least 6 months. The first criteria has to be
either a delusion, hallucination or disorganised speech, while the second criteria can
be negative symptoms, severely disorganised or catatonic behaviour. That is, positive
symptoms are the predominant criteria necessary for the diagnosis of schizophrenia.
Recently however there has been an attempt to bridge the gap between categorical
diagnoses based on the clinical consensus of symptoms and the identification of po-
tential biological markers identified by neuroscience research (Insel et al., 2010). For
example, the research domain criteria (RDoC), aimed to develop a precision (or per-
sonalized) medicine approach to mental disorders based on behavioural and neuro-
biological markers (Insel et al., 2010; Cuthbert and Insel, 2013). More importantly, the
RDoC proposed to cut across the typical categorical boundaries delineating current
mental disorders and instead investigate the variations present in mental illness as
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belonging to dimensional continuum (Cuthbert and Insel, 2013). For example, using
the Peters delusion inventory (Peters et al., 2004), delusions have recently been found
to be present in the general population (Freeman et al., 2008; Corlett and Fletcher,
2012; Schmack et al., 2013), albeit to a milder degree than those present in patients
with schizophrenia. This growing body of evidence has led to suggest that psychotic
experiences might lie on a continuum (van Os et al., 2000; Allardyce et al., 2007; Lin-
scott and van Os, 2010; David, 2010; Corlett and Fletcher, 2012). It is argued however
that such a continuum would be impractical for clinical diagnosis (Lawrie et al., 2010).
Particularly, a recent joint consortium between the American Psychological Associa-
tion (APA), the National Institute for Mental Health (NIMH) and the World Health
Organisation (WHO) agreed that while neurobiological parameters are of high im-
portance for future diagnostic systems, according to the current state of knowledge,
it seems more appropriate for use in research than for immediate clinical use (Insel
et al., 2010).
1.2 computational modelling
While experimental studies provide valuable information to understand the abnor-
mal biological and cognitive processes in schizophrenia, experimental work alone is
often limited by ethical, economic or practical factors. Recently, computational and
mathematical models have shown to be very useful research tools for the exploration
of neural computation, and the understanding of the interaction between neural sys-
tems and functions (Montague et al., 2004, 2012). Specifically, Marr (1982) proposed
that computational models may be used to investigate three distinct although com-
plementary levels of analysis, namely the computational level ("What" does the brain
compute, and "why"?), the algorithmic level ("Which" representations and algorithms
can describe these computations?) and the physical level ("How" are these algorithms
implemented neurally?; Dayan and Abbott, 2005). By integrating data from diverse
experimental studies, models can offer a concise and formal description of a phe-
nomenon, shed light on the underlying mechanisms and make predictions leading to
novel experimental tests and hypotheses (Huys et al., 2011).
1.2.1 Computational psychiatry
Computational psychiatry is a young field in expansion at the intersection between
computational neuroscience and psychiatry (Huys et al., 2011; Montague et al., 2012;
Huys, 2013). This discipline builds on the initial efforts in the 80’s using connec-
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tionist models, but has also evolved to get closer to the physiological substrate and
to more testable predictions (Montague et al., 2012; Huys, 2013). Although psychi-
atric disorders are characterised essentially by their high-level symptoms, following
Marr’s principles, computational models can help formalise symptoms and hypothe-
ses to bridge the gap between neurobiology and psychiatry (Huys et al., 2011). That
is, computational models are able to provide a normative framework to explicitly de-
fine and rigorously test competing hypotheses of mental disorders (Huys et al., 2011),
while providing a link between different levels of descriptions (Huys, 2013).
For example, Maia and Frank (2011) illustrated how modelling using a deductive or
abductive approach can lead to different predictions for psychiatry. That is, using a
deductive approach scientists can start from the premise of known neurobiological
deficits observed in mental disorders, and implement these deficits in a computa-
tional model. The performance of the model is then compared to this of patients. If
the model can account for the performance observed in patients, it provides a mecha-
nistic account to bridge biological abnormalities to behaviour or neural activity (Maia
and Frank, 2011). Using the abductive approach on the other hand, scientists can start
from the premise of a model of normal behaviour and alter the model in multiple
ways to generate distinct novel hypotheses of brain dysfunction. All these models are
then fitted to the performances of patients to find which hypothesis (different mod-
els) accounts best for the performance observed in patients (Maia and Frank, 2011).
The winning hypothesis can then be refined in an attempt to explain the deficits at
lower levels of description, or used to devise new experimental tests that will pre-
cisely assay the dysfunction suggested by the winning hypothesis.
Using these methods, Stephan and Mathys (2014) recently argued that computational
modelling could potentially lead to "model-based assays" used to diagnose mental
disorders (Stephan and Mathys, 2014).
1.3 organisation of the thesis
The aim of this thesis is to use computational modelling to investigate the possi-
ble mechanisms leading to generalised cognitive deficits and psychotic symptoms
in schizophrenia. Specifically, a growing body of evidence suggest that associative
learning, statistical learning and working-memory deficits are associated with pos-
itive symptom severity in schizophrenia, implying that a potential link might ex-
ist between cognitive impairments and delusions. Using reinforcement learning and
Bayesian inference we propose to assess whether these models could collectively ac-
count for the cognitive and positive symptoms observed in the disorder.
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First, we propose to study whether erroneous prediction-error signalling could lead
to maladaptive decision making in complex cognitive tasks, and potentially illustrate
the acquisition of inaccurate internal models of the world leading to false beliefs
(delusions). Secondly, we wish to address which of the most likely hypotheses of
general cognitive dysfunction in schizophrenia accounts best for working memory
deficits observed in patients. Finally, using a psychophysical task known to assay
statistical learning and perceptual inference in healthy controls, we will investigate
whether schizophrenia patients appear to be impaired in the acquisition of expecta-
tions (statistical learning) or in their perceptual inference mechanisms (integration of
expectations and sensory evidence).
1.3.1 Questions and aims
Particularly in this thesis, we present independent projects performed through multi-
ple collaborations over the years that investigated independently associative learning,
working-memory deficits, statistical learning and perceptual inference. Using these
independent projects we will attempt to address the following questions:
a. What predictions have computational models have been able to achieve in
terms of explaining the mechanisms of psychosis and cognitive dysfunction
in schizophrenia? Are there specific hypotheses that have been left relatively
under-investigated?
b. Could deficits in prediction-error signalling lead to maladaptive decision-making
in complex tasks such as the Iowa Gambling Task? Could false beliefs stem from
the incorrect acquisition of an internal model of the world?
c. Can we differentiate working memory deficits in populations that exhibit psy-
chotic symptoms but have different psychiatric diagnoses (i.e. First episode
psychosis, chronic schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, Family relatives of DISC1
translocation carriers)? Using computational models, which of the most com-
monly debated hypotheses of cognitive dysfunction accounts best for deficits of
working-memory in these populations?
d. Can patients with chronic schizophrenia perform statistical learning of visual
stimuli? How do these acquired expectations about the visual stimuli affect
their perception?
A chapter will be devoted to each of these questions. In chapter 2, we present a com-
prehensive survey of the computational literature of schizophrenia. In chapter 3, we
use a reinforcement model of a rodent analogue of the Iowa Gambling Task to address
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whether maladaptive decision-making can arise from abnormal prediction-error sig-
nalling. In chapter 4 we use an optimal inference model of spatial working memory
in an (abductive) attempt to find which hypotheses are most likely to account for a
generalised cognitive deficit in psychosis. In chapter 5, using a novel psychophysics
tasks and Bayesian model of perceptual inference, we investigate whether chronic
schizophrenia patients are impaired in statistical learning or perceptual inference. Fi-
nally, in chapter 6 we discuss whether this thesis support the idea that impairments
of reinforcement learning and Bayesian inference can account for the cognitive and
positive symptoms observed in schizophrenia.
2
L I T E R AT U R E R E V I E W : C O M P U TAT I O N A L M O D E L S O F
S C H I Z O P H R E N I A & P S Y C H O S I S
Schizophrenia is a psychiatric disorder with a debated aetiology. While the age-
related incidence of the disorder and biological evidence point toward the hypothesis
of a developmental disorder, genetic risk factors alone are not sufficient to account
for the aetiology of the disorder. Computational modelling has been used to address:
1) the variety of symptoms observed in schizophrenia using high-level descriptive
models of behaviour; 2) The causes of these symptoms using low-level modelling
of neuromodulation and receptor imbalance in connectionist models. These studies
mostly support competing hypotheses of schizophrenia’s pathophysiology, resulting
in a literature that is not always expanding coherently. The work presented in this
chapter presents a review of the literature of computational modelling for schizophre-
nia and psychosis. This work was performed by myself under the supervision of Dr.
Peggy Seriès and Prof. Stephen Lawrie. The resulting work has been assembled into
a draft for publication as a first author (not included in appendix).
2.1 methodology
To extract an exhaustive bibliography of the computational models in schizophrenia,
our approach was to search within the PubMed and Web of Science databases using
the following search criteria:
Title and/or abstract including: (“schizo*” or “psychos*”) and (“neural?network*” or
“model*”).
where the ‘*’ sign denotes the joker symbol used in regular expressions to search
for a combination of possible word endings, such that: “comput* model*” searches for
“computer model”, “computational models”, “computational modelling”, etc.
Exclusion criteria: We excluded papers that were not in English or peer-reviewed
journals. Conference abstracts and animal models were discarded from this analy-
sis, as well as computational models used for diagnostic purposes, data analysis or
medication interactions. This resulted in a list of articles ranging from 1968 to 2014,
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comprising all levels of description to the psychopathology of schizophrenia (i.e. the
what? how? and why? of Marr’s computational levels of description; Marr, 1982;
Dayan and Abbott, 2005).
2.2 the dopamine (d2) hypothesis
2.2.1 Experimental evidence
The dopamine hypothesis has been popular in the search for aetiological factors of
schizophrenia. This hypothesis emerged from the discovery of first generation of
anti-psychotic drugs (APD) that tend to relieve patients from positive symptoms by
blocking dopamine D2 receptors (D2r). Consistent with this findings, further sup-
port originated from the discovery of several psychotomimetic drugs (i.e., such as
amphetamines) that can induce psychotic-like episodes in healthy individuals by in-
creasing sub-cortical DA levels (Grace, 1991; Jentsch and Roth, 1999; Corlett et al.,
2009a). Over the past decade, the dopamine hypothesis has been supported by vari-
ous neuroimaging studies reporting increased pre-synaptic dopamine synthesis and
storage in the striatum of acutely psychotic patients (Howes and Kapur, 2009; Fusar-
Poli and Meyer-Lindenberg, 2013b; Howes and Murray, 2013). These dopamine levels
were found to directly correlate with the degree of their symptoms (i.e., Cognitive
and Positive; Howes and Kapur, 2009; Howes and Murray, 2013). Additionally, in-
creases in D2 dopamine receptors densities have been identified in the striatum of
patients, together with reduced receptor densities in the thalamus and the anterior
cingulate cortex (Howes and Kapur, 2009), although these effects appear to be rel-
atively small (Howes and Murray, 2013). Recent reviews suggest that the influence
of striatal D3 receptors in schizophrenia are not significant (Howes and Kapur, 2009;
Howes and Murray, 2013), further supporting the role of D2 receptors in psychosis.
Consistent with the DA hypothesis, many of the top genetic risk factors of develop-
ing schizophrenia involve genes directly interacting with the dopaminergic pathways
(Winterer and Weinberger, 2004; Howes and Kapur, 2009; Frank, 2008; Hall et al.,
2009). While it is likely that excessive D2r-activation is directly involved in psychosis,
scientists are still attempting to explain the mechanisms linking dopaminergic dys-
function to positive symptoms (i.e. linking molecular level anomalies to behaviour
and symptoms). It appears however that an increase in striatal dopaminergic D2r
and decline in frontal D1r densities, might more easily transpose to cognitive and
negative symptoms rather than to the positive symptoms of the disorder (Maia and
Frank, 2011).
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2.2.2 Models and support
In the computational literature supporting the dopamine hypothesis, we identified
four main categories of models that support a deficit in dopaminergic transmission,
namely a: decreased signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), inappropriate sensory gating, aber-
rant salience and abnormal prediction error (PE).
2.2.2.1 Signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) models
Early computational models attempted to explain cognitive symptoms in schizophre-
nia through a generalised decline of the signal-to-noise ratio in cortical neurons.
Specifically, in these models DA was thought to function as a signal-to-noise enhancer
that modulates neuronal activity by amplifying the neurons’ signal while reducing
distortions induced by cortical noise.
SNR in connectionist Frameworks
In artificial neural networks (i.e., interconnected feed-forward networks of simple
units), the signal-to-noise ratio can be altered by changing the gain or bias parameter
of neurons (Aakerlund and Hemmingsen, 1998). This directly influences the activa-
tion pattern and the stochastic activity of the units (neurons) in the system. SNR
models traditionally focused on modelling cognitive symptoms using connectionist
frameworks to model the performance of patients in tasks where they usually show
deficits (i.e., Continuous Performance Task, Stroop Task, Rorschach inkblots, Wiscon-
sin Card Sort Test (WCST), Facial Affect — (Cohen and Servan-Schreiber, 1992, 1993;
Jobe et al., 1994; Peled and Geva, 2000; Amos, 2000; Monchi et al., 2000; Carter and
Neufeld, 2007)). In these models, poor performance on cognitive tasks stem from
working-memory deficits in the units representing the prefrontal cortex (PFC).
In such connectionist frameworks, the working-memory of patients is assumed to
be deficient due to a low signal-to-noise ratio, modelled by altering the gain or bias of
the working-memory units. Through a complete exploration of the parameter space
from low to high gain modulation (i.e. hypo-dopaminergic to hyper-dopaminergic
states), the models addressed the validity of different dopamine dysfunctions leading
to the observed reduced performance on cognitive tasks. All these models reached
the same conclusions, namely that prefrontal DA hypo-function was responsible
for the deficient cognitive performances observed in patients (Cohen and Servan-
Schreiber, 1992, 1993; Jobe et al., 1994; Peled and Geva, 2000; Amos, 2000; Monchi
et al., 2000; Carter and Neufeld, 2007). With respect to working-memory, low DA
levels are thought to result in a signal that is easily corrupted by internal cortical
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noise which in turn becomes incapable of transmitting and maintaining meaningful
contextual information about the ongoing task (Cohen and Servan-Schreiber, 1992,
1993). Another theory suggests that DA hypo-function results in a failure to update
task relevant information into WM (Amos, 2000). A deficit in WM updating would
then result in a failure to switch to new contextual information, and lead to perse-
verative behaviour (Amos, 2000). That is, in switching-tasks such as the WCST where
participants are required to infer a sorting rule that changes once it has been correctly
acquired, patients are usually able to infer the first initial rule but consistently fail to
flexibly update these rules once they have been changed (i.e. perseverative behavior).
A possible criticism of these models is that they can only account for poor cognitive
performances following a hypo-dopaminergic state (low SNR). In these models, in-
creasing the gain of neuronal units so as to model hyper-dopaminergic state would
lead to a high SNR, which would not result in a deterioration of cognitive perfor-
mances. While it is consistent with neuroimaging findings in schizophrenia (frontal
hypo-dopaminergia, Howes and Kapur, 2009), it has been shown experimentally that
weak or excessive frontal D1r activation lead to poor working-memory performances
(Vijayraghavan et al., 2007). As a result, these models would normally fail to account
for working-memory deficits following frontal hyper-dopaminergia.
SNR in attractor networks (cortical stability)
Hopfield or attractor networks have also been used to model patients’ behaviour by
adding SNR perturbations. During training, these networks learn specific patterns
of activation (memories) by updating the weights of connections between neuronal
units. After training, the network can recover an entire memory from a degraded or
partial memory input by gradually letting the network flow into the closest pattern
of activation (attractor). All the attractors learnt by that network (memories) collec-
tively form the attractor landscape. Such models have usually been used to explain
the occurrence of spurious memories (hallucinations; Chen, 1994, 1995; Rolls et al.,
2008) or to explain specific aspects of positive symptoms such as the perseverance of
delusions (Rolls et al., 2008).
Early on, Spitzer (1995) argued that in cortical networks a hyper-dopaminergic state
results in a high SNR, leading to strongly anchored activation of high-level constructs
such as "ideas/concepts/meanings" (Spitzer, 1995). Consistent with this hypothesis,
Rolls et al. (2008) argued that the perseverance of delusions could be explained in
terms of deep basins of attractions in the attractor landscape of the network, where
attractors would represent conceptual states, ideas, meanings or an interpretation of
the environment. That is, the depth of the basins of attraction (strongly anchored
state) would prevent unlearning or switching to new attractors (new interpretation),
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leading to a perseverance and an inability to adapt to novel cues from the environ-
ment (Rolls et al., 2008). In Hopfield networks, the SNR is modulated by changing the
temperature parameter of the neurons, which in turn alters their firing probabilities.
A low SNR leads to the inability for the network to recover learnt memories due to a
high amount of noise. A high SNR instead results in recurrent patterns of activation
(irrespective of the original input) or non-existent spurious memories, assumed to
be similar to delusional thoughts or hallucinations (Chen, 1994, 1995). When study-
ing the whole spectrum of temperature changes in these models, Chen (1994; Chen,
1995) predicted an inverted-U response profile, whereby intermediate temperature
levels induced normal behaviour and memory retrieval. High temperature resulted in
positive symptoms (i.e., parasitic foci/spurious attractors: hallucinations, delusions),
while low temperature impeded memory retrieval (i.e., cognitive symptoms). This is
interestingly at least at the physiological level, since the model predicted an inverted-
U response profile with working-memory performance, which was later validated
experimentally by electrophysiological recordings of primates’ PFC neurons during
working-memory tasks (Vijayraghavan et al., 2007; Cools and D’Esposito, 2011).
Recent implementations of attractor networks have reached a high level of biological
and physiological detail using integrate-and-fire spiking neurons together with realis-
tic AMPA, GABA, NMDA and DA pathways (D1r vs. D2r mediated SNR; Rolls et al.,
2008). In these studies GABAergic interneurons inhibit the activity of excitatory neu-
rons that are not encoding the current memory (so as to keep the activated memory
pattern stable), while NMDA receptors modulate the stochastic firing probabilities
of the pyramidal cells. DA modulates the SNR by stabilizing the firing patterns of
NMDA and GABA activity, whereby a D1-dominated state increases excitatory and
inhibitory activity leading to deeper basins of attraction, while D2-dominated states
flatten the energy landscape and facilitates jumps from one attractor to the other. The
reduction of excitatory (NMDA) and inhibitory (GABA) activity leads to an impossi-
bility for the network to keep the firing patterns stable, resulting in random jumps
between attractors. These random jumps have been argued to be responsible for the
positive and cognitive symptoms observed in schizophrenia (Loh et al., 2007; Rolls
et al., 2008).
While these models make interesting predictions regarding the global inhibitory and
excitatory activity of the network, these predictions are difficult to test and validate
using present neuroimaging tools.
2.2.2.2 Sensory Gating Models
Sensory Gating was the very first theory of dopamine function that was tested using
computational models to study schizophrenia (Callaway and Naghdi, 1982; Carr and
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Wale, 1986). This theory postulates that the brain has to gate relevant information to
working-memory and filter-out irrelevant stimuli from all modalities. In these mod-
els, the DA signal is assumed to perform this role (Cohen et al., 1996). This framework
would theoretically enable subjects to flexibly adapt their behaviour to the demands
of particular tasks, favouring the processing of task-relevant information over other
sources of competing information. This process, also known as cognitive control (Co-
hen et al., 1996), is thought to be automatic. In schizophrenia, sensory gating would
be disrupted due to inappropriate phasic and tonic dopaminergic signalling, leading
to deficits in attention and cognition (Grace, 1991). The gating process works by pre-
venting the access to working memory by task-irrelevant stimuli, while maintaining
task-relevant information against distractors. Biologically, the gating of relevant in-
formation is thought to occur through the simultaneous phasic burst of DA neurons
to the presentation of relevant stimuli, while tonic DA is though to be responsible
for the maintenance and protection of working-memory (Tretter and Albus, 2007). In
schizophrenia, this DA gating mechanism is hypothesized to be noisier, leading to
incorrect updates (intrusion of irrelevant stimuli) and maintenance of information
(perseveratory behavior).
Gating models traditionally used connectionist frameworks to reproduce the per-
formances of healthy controls or the perseveratory behavior of patients at the WCST
and CPT, CPT-X tasks (Braver et al., 1999; Braver and Cohen, 1999). In these mod-
els, the DA signal exerts a top-down influence on behaviour by gating task-relevant
information, allowing update, maintenance and protection against distracting stim-
uli (Braver et al., 1999; Braver and Cohen, 1999). These models of working-memory
gating converged to similar conclusions, namely that DA hypo-function was most
likely to be responsible for the cognitive deficits observed in schizophrenia (Braver
et al., 1999; Braver and Cohen, 1999). Several descriptive models (i.e. not formalised
using computational simulations; Javanbakht, 2005, 2006) also argued that a DA hypo-
function would lead to positive symptoms due to a weakened top-down behavioural
control (Javanbakht, 2005, 2006). Finally, using a connectionist framework of facial
affect recognition Carter and Neufeld (2007) attempted to explain a recurrent finding
that is often neglected in the literature, namely: Why are patient with schizophrenia
constantly found to exhibit reaction-time deficits in cognitive tasks? In this model,
inefficient gating of information, led to an overflow of incoming stimuli, resulting in
additional processing for task completion. The increased amount of processing leads
to an escalation of reaction-time, consistent with those observed in patients during
facial affect recognition (Carter and Neufeld, 2007). It is worth noting however that in-
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creased reaction-times are not specific to schizophrenia and have also been observed
in other psychiatric conditions such as depression.
2.2.2.3 Aberrant Salience Model
The aberrant ‘motivational salience’ hypothesis stems from a recent interpretation
of the role of DA as signalling rewards associated to stimuli so as to guide behavior
(Berridge, 1998). An aberrant ‘motivational salience’ is an incorrect assignment of mo-
tivational salience to innocuous stimuli, where DA acts as an indicator of motivation,
desire, or attention attributed to a stimulus (Howes and Kapur, 2009). The theory of
incentive or ‘motivational salience’ was first used to explain drug addiction, where
inappropriate rewards for drug intake gradually increase the motivational drive to re-
lapse and repeat behavior (Berridge, 1998; Redish et al., 2008; Torregrossa et al., 2011).
In schizophrenia, scientists have posited that an aberrant DA signaling would result
in incorrect stimulus-reinforcer associations, attributing inappropriate salience to in-
nocuous stimuli (Howes and Kapur, 2009; Roiser et al., 2009; Anticevic et al., 2011;
Roiser et al., 2013). This inappropriate salience attribution is hypothesized to lead to
an increase and perseverance of delusional thinking, even in the face of opposing evi-
dence (Howes and Kapur, 2009; Corlett et al., 2009b; Anticevic and Corlett, 2012). Re-
cent behavioural and neuroimaging experiments appear to confirm the link between
aberrant salience and DA signalling to the strength of delusions in schizophrenia pa-
tients (Roiser et al., 2009) and patients at ultra-high risk (UHR) of psychosis (Roiser
et al., 2013).
Grasemann et al. and Hoffman et al. (2009; 2011) adapted the aberrant salience frame-
work using a connectionist model of story learning and recall to study thought dis-
order (namely delusions and derailments). This model mimics the multiple stages
of syntax processing, where in each processing stage, artificial neural networks are
trained to recall chains of words and sentences to reproduce a previously learnt story
from a partial original input. The model is trained to learn the sequences of words
and sentences through back-propagation. Excessive DA signaling during learning
(termed hyperlearning by Grasemann et al., 2009; Hoffman et al., 2011), was mod-
elled by increasing the learning rate of the last 500 training cycles of the model. This
manipulation was argued to be consistent with the aberrant salience hypothesis. That
is, since increased DA transmission would lead to an aberrant assignment of salience,
it should eventually result in excessive learning. The authors also implemented vari-
ous alternative mechanisms such as working memory disconnection (loss of synaptic
connections) and hypo-dopaminergic states (as in sensory gating) by altering the
gain and bias of the response curve of neurons. When comparing the performance
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of each model to that of controls and schizophrenia patients, only the hyperlearn-
ing (aberrant salience) and disconnection models provided satisfactory fit to the data.
However, the aberrant salience model (hyperlearning) achieved the best fit to the ex-
perimental data. The hyperlearning model could account for derailments from the
original story through a confusion between the characters of different stories (agent-
slotting errors) leading to delusion-like ideas (Grasemann et al., 2009; Hoffman et al.,
2011). The authors argued that this is similar to what is observed experimentally
in the deluded portion of the schizophrenia subgroup. These studies suggest that
fixed delusions could stem from contaminated memories (e.g. due to misappropri-
ated agents/characters between stories). However, it is difficult to verify whether
‘agent-slotting errors’ genuinely lead to false beliefs (delusions) as the authors argue.
That is, a falsely reconstructed story within the model can stem from an incorrect
recombination of memories during recall, but we believe that this is in contrast with
the idea that delusions are false beliefs strongly anchored in memory. However, it is
interesting that out of all types of story recall errors that were possible, agent slotting
errors were the most frequent, as was observed experimentally in the deluded sub-
group of patients.
Other studies used connectionist frameworks to describe how the aberrant salience
hypothesis might lead to cognitive and negative symptoms (Grossberg, 1999, 2000).
Particularly, these models were interested in investigating how these symptoms might
arise from impaired amygdala circuits and abnormal arousal levels in schizophre-
nia patients (Grossberg, 1999, 2000). In these studies, the arousal level of subjects
is assumed to be driven by dopamine and to follow an inverted-U response profile.
Specifically, DA release was postulated to drive the amygdala circuits, where hypo-
dopaminergic or hyper-dopaminergic activation would lead to a reduced top-down
control resulting in an inability to block incentive stimuli (Grossberg, 1999, 2000).
These models were solely descriptive and were not tested using computer simula-
tions, making it difficult to draw testable predictions.
2.2.2.4 Prediction Error
The prediction error (PE) hypothesis is the most recent interpretation of dopamine
function in the brain. The theory dates back to the 60’s when Sokolov (1960) proposed
that our internal representation of the environment should be updated as a function
of a mismatch between the predicted and actual stimuli (Schmajuk, 2005). This the-
ory was later supported by clinical studies in animals and humans revealing that the
dopaminergic signal was consistent with the expected reward signal of the Temporal
Difference Learning (TD-learning) algorithm (Schultz et al., 1997). We want to men-
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tion however, that the previous class of models supporting the dopamine hypothesis
do not compete against more recent accounts for the role of dopamine in the brain.
In fact, most of the connectionist models supporting the sensory gating and signal-to-
noise mechanisms pre-dates the finding of associative learning through dopaminer-
gic prediction-error signaling and focused almost exclusively on modelling prefrontal
cortices. This explains why early computational studies did not discriminate direct
and indirect dopamine pathways (D1r vs D2r) or tonic vs. phasic activity of dopamin-
ergic neurons. Interestingly, the predictions made by these early computational stud-
ies of DA function (SNR, attractors, sensory gating) are still valid. These supported
the idea that cognitive deficits stem from low prefrontal dopamine (D1r) activation,
which could explain working-memory deficits. In contrast, recent studies (aberrant
salience or prediction error) tend to account for the role of dopamine in the basal
ganglia to reveal how abnormal learning signals due to increased limbic DA levels
lead to positive symptoms and cognitive deficits.
In associative learning experiments, the DA signal originating from the Ventral
Tegmental Area (VTA) is found to be similar to the prediction error signal used to
drive learning in the TD-learning algorithm (Schultz et al., 1997; Smith et al., 2005).
The DA signal is interpreted as the biological substrate of the prediction error, where
an expected outcome leads to tonic DA release, unexpected positive outcome (say an
expected reward following a lever press) leads to phasic DA release and unexpected
negative outcome are represented by dips of DA release below the tonic baseline (lack
of expected reward; Grace, 1991). Consistent with these findings, Smith et al. (2003,
2004, 2007) successfully modelled patients’ cognitive deficits in associative learning
tasks by modelling aberrant DA prediction-error that disrupts learning. The results
and predictions of these models successfully matched the behavioural performance
of rodents in experimental studies using amphetamines and anti-psychotics as phar-
macological models of schizophrenia (Smith et al., 2003, 2004, 2007). Recent compu-
tational models from Frank & colleagues (O’Reilly and Frank, 2006; Frank and Claus,
2006; Waltz et al., 2007; Frank, 2008; Maia and Frank, 2011), also provide a very de-
tailed mechanistic account of the direct and indirect pathways of the basal ganglia
and how these interact with the frontal cortex. These cortico-basal-thalamo-cortical
models have been able to provide a detailed account for motor and cognitive deficits
in patients with Parkinson’s disease (Frank et al., 2004; Moustafa et al., 2008a,b; Maia
and Frank, 2011). Investigating the indirect and direct pathways modulated by D2r
and D1r (indirect/NoGo and direct/Go pathways) could lead to novel predictions
regarding D2r vs. D1r mediated cognitive deficits in schizophrenia (i.e. impairment
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in positive vs negative reinforcers; Frank, 2008).
Recent neuroimaging techniques provide new tools to assay whether prediction er-
ror signals are impaired in schizophrenia. Using associative learning and functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), multiple studies have identified strong distor-
tions in the expected prediction error signal of patients (Corlett et al., 2007b; Murray
et al., 2008; Roiser et al., 2009; Gradin et al., 2011; Roiser et al., 2013). Interestingly,
the distortion magnitude of the prediction error signal was highly predictive of pos-
itive symptom severity (delusions; Murray et al., 2008; Roiser et al., 2009, 2013; Cor-
lett et al., 2007b; Gradin et al., 2011). These findings led to suggest that incorrect
prediction-errors are consistent with the aberrant salience hypothesis. That is, delu-
sions might stem from faulty PE that fails to discriminate between logical, rational or
adaptive associations in the environment such that patients would attend to stimuli
they should normally ignore (Frank, 2008).
2.3 the glutamate hypothesis
2.3.1 Experimental Evidence
The glutamate hypothesis refers to the theory that glutamatergic signaling might
be disrupted in schizophrenia. N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) receptors are gluta-
matergic receptors known to be essential for synaptic plasticity and learning through
the stabilization of synaptic connections (long term potentiation (LTP); Kandel et al.,
2013). Consistent with this hypothesis, increases in the expression of NMDA recep-
tors of subtype NR2A were identified in the prefrontal regions of schizophrenia pa-
tients (Akbarian et al., 1996). Secondly, psychotomimetic drugs such as Phencyclidine
(PCP) and Ketamine that block NMDA receptors (NMDAr antagonists) lead to nega-
tive, cognitive and delusion-like symptoms in healthy individuals (Javitt, 1987; Javitt
and Zukin, 1991; Jentsch and Roth, 1999). As a result, Ketamine has been widely
used as a pharmacological model of schizophrenia (Javitt, 1987; Javitt and Zukin,
1991; Honey et al., 2006; Corlett et al., 2011; Moore et al., 2011; Anticevic et al., 2012;
Corlett et al., 2013). This led to the widely accepted hypothesis that schizophrenia pa-
tients might suffer from deficient NMDA receptors (NMDA receptor hypo-function;
Javitt, 1987; Javitt and Zukin, 1991; Jentsch and Roth, 1999; Honey et al., 2006). Fi-
nally, genetically modified NRG1 mice (NRG1 encodes the neuregulin protein, essen-
tial to NMDA receptor maturation) display abnormal behaviours similar to that of
schizophrenia patients: abnormal social interactions, increased anxiety, abnormal lev-
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els of DA release and hypersensitivity to amphetamines, all of which can be reversed
with anti-psychotics (Powell et al., 2009).
2.3.2 Models and support
While Dopamine is widely accepted as playing a major role in psychosis, the glu-
tamate hypothesis remains a strong potential candidate to explain the aetiology of
schizophrenia. One reason for this is that the glutamate hypothesis can account for
a wider range of symptoms, inducing positive, cognitive and negative symptoms
when using Ketamine or PCP in healthy controls (Javitt, 1987; Javitt and Zukin, 1991;
Jentsch and Roth, 1999). However, it is worth noting that no pharmacological treat-
ment affecting glutamate has been found to be effective to date in schizophrenia
(Papanastasiou et al., 2013).
The glutamate hypothesis is relatively recent in comparison to the DA hypothesis,
and as a result fewer computational models have been developed to assay its validity.
Such models (e.g. Murray et al., 2012) consist mostly of biophysical models using
integrate-and-fire neural networks that simulate memory or working-memory stor-
age and retrieval through attractor networks. These networks provide realistic simu-
lations of the interactions between excitatory and inhibitory (E/I) activity in cortical
areas relevant to the task being modelled (e.g. hippocampus and/or prefrontal cor-
tex). That is, making a number of assumptions regarding the topology of the network
(e.g. Mexican hat), these models can predict the E/I balance within cortical areas that
is necessary for memory storage and retrieval. While these realistic neural networks
provide very detailed predictions at the biophysical level, these predictions are diffi-
cult to validate experimentally. In fact, most of the data and measurements acquired
in schizophrenia comes from neuroimaging or behavioural experiments, and are thus
difficult to relate to predictions regarding precise neural activity.
2.3.2.1 NMDA receptor hypo-function - Cortical Stability
Models supporting the glutamate hypothesis usually address cognitive and/or neg-
ative symptoms due to NMDA receptors hypo-function in the PFC (Hsu et al., 2008;
Wang, 2006; Murray et al., 2012) or through a combination of NMDA receptors
hypo-function in the PFC and the hippocampus (Diwadkar et al., 2008; Siekmeier
et al., 2007). Wang (2006) simulated prefrontal networks of working-memory using
integrate-and-fire neural networks. In this model, pyramidal cells (excitatory) and
inhibitory interneurons are differently modulated by NMDA receptors. Wang (2006)
then tested whether such biophysically realistic attractor networks can simulate the
sustained activity of PFC neurons observed during delayed-response tasks in pri-
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mates. The author found that realistic models of WM maintenance can be instanti-
ated by attractor networks, but that a precise E/I balance is critical in order to filter
out distracting stimuli (Wang, 2006; Murray et al., 2012). A second class of models
also addressed NMDA receptor hypo-function in the hippocampus (Diwadkar et al.,
2008; Siekmeier et al., 2007). For example, Siekmeier et al. (2007) used a connectionist
model of the hippocampus to simulate associative learning and context-dependent re-
trieval of verbal stimuli. The model predicted that NMDA receptor hypo-function in
the hippocampus would result in poor memory retrieval (Siekmeier et al., 2007). Inter-
estingly, the authors argue that a hyper-dopaminergic activation of the hippocampus
would also result in NMDA receptor hypo-function, again leading to poor memory
retrieval.
A possible criticism of this study is that patients seem to usually display memory
encoding deficits rather than memory retrieval, and that a memory retrieval deficit
would normally stem from a cortical deficit rather than from the hippocampus. It
is important to note however that the different models presented here investigated
different types of memory (Baddeley, 1987). Siekmeier (2009) was modelling deficits
in verbal short-term memory, while Wang (2006); Murray et al. (2012) were investi-
gating spatial working-memory networks. These two types of memory are assumed
to involve different cortical processes and memory systems.
2.3.2.2 Realistic Biophysical models - Cortical stability & Signal-to-Noise ratio
Earlier attractor network models were the precursors of the latest biophysical mod-
els, which use AMPA, NMDA and GABA receptors to model working-memory (Loh
et al., 2007; Rolls et al., 2008). In these models, the balance between inhibitory (GABA)
and excitatory signals (AMPA/NMDA) is critical. First, in a combined experimental
and computational setting, Wolf et al. (2005) studied the bistability (i.e. the switching
between an up or down state) of medium spiny neurons in the Nucleus Accumbens
(NAcc), which has been proposed to serve for gating purposes in working-memory
(Gruber et al., 2006). Their model predicted that the medium spiny neurons (MSN)
would require sustained excitatory inputs (from about 1000 afferent) in order to main-
tain a stable depolarized (up) state. In this model, NMDA receptors hypo-function is
predicted to lead to an inability for MSN to express bistable activity and to impede
gating or integration of information. Another study by Loh et al. (2007) addressed the
interactions between inhibitory (GABA) and excitatory (NMDA/AMPA) activity on
the dynamics of a working-memory attractor network. The authors found that an im-
balance in excitation or inhibition led to the instability of the whole system, resulting
in unstable working-memory. This instability resulted in changes in the attractor land-
scape. Decreased excitatory activity led to jumps from one attractor to another due to
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an increased stochastic firing of the neurons in combination with shallower attractor
states. As a result, memories were unstable. In this model, a decrease in both excita-
tion (NMDA) and inhibition (GABA) results in a flat attractor landscape. The authors
argue that a flat attractor landscape in temporal areas (short & long-term memory)
would lead to jumps between trains of thoughts. This prediction is also in line with
previous experiments showing excessive amounts of noise in the temporal (auditory)
cortices of patients, especially during auditory hallucinations. Interestingly, although
supporting the glutamate hypothesis, the authors managed to adapt the model us-
ing the work from Durstewitz and Seamans (2008), so as to account for the role of
DA modulating network activity. The authors found that intermediate levels of DA
modulate the SNR in frontal areas. That is, D1 receptor activation enhance both exci-
tatory (NMDA) and inhibitory (GABA) activity resulting in an increased stability of
the network (increase in SNR), while D2 receptor activation has the opposite effect
and reduce the signal-to-noise ratio. The authors argue that this mechanism could
potentially explain the effects of anti-psychotic medications by stabilizing deficient
attractor networks through a decrease in D2 receptors activity.
It is worth noting however, that the majority of dopaminergic receptors in the frontal
cortex seem to be of the D1r subtype (Howes and Kapur, 2009), and that D2r acti-
vation have previously been found to have no effect on WM networks (Wang et al.,
2004). Again, while these studies provide interesting insights on the possible link be-
tween DA, SNR and attractor dynamics in schizophrenia, the model predictions are
difficult to relate to experimental data, which mostly consists of behavioral and/or
imaging data.
2.4 the gaba hypothesis
2.4.1 Experimental evidence
Lewis and Hashimoto (2005) observed abnormalities of GABAergic interneurons in
schizophrenia patients. Namely, they found that GABA synthesis and re-uptake was
altered and diminished in the dlPFC leading to disrupted gamma oscillations and
de-synchronization. Also, DA neurons appear to provide direct synaptic input to
some (i.e. parvalbumin-expressing GABA) interneurons in the dlPFC of primates,
suggesting a possible modulation of GABAergic inhibition through DA activation
(Lewis and Hashimoto, 2005).
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2.4.2 Models and support
Very few computational models support the GABAergic hypothesis alone, but rather
integrate GABAergic inhibition with NMDA hypo-function to model biologically re-
alistic simulations of cortical function, stability and synchrony (Loh et al., 2007; Rolls
et al., 2008; Murray et al., 2012).
2.4.2.1 Cortical stability
Of the models investigating the GABA hypothesis, each of these studies explored
different aspects of inhibitory dysfunction in schizophrenia (Tanaka, 2008; Akbarian
et al., 1996). In Tanaka (2008), the effects of GABAergic activation through dopamine
D1r modulation were investigated using a pure mathematical model of balanced
inhibitory and excitatory activity. The author established through parameter explo-
ration that for intermediate levels of D1r activation, GABA inhibits noise in the dlPFC
circuitry of working-memory (increased SNR). The model of Spencer (2009) investi-
gated the link between the GABA and disconnection hypothesis. Their integrate-and-
fire model suggests that a deficient inhibition would lead to disrupted  -rhythms
as observed in schizophrenia.  -rhythms, if disrupted, would disturb cortico-cortical
synchrony and eventually result in a functional disconnection syndrome.
2.5 the disconnection hypothesis
2.5.1 Experimental evidence
The disconnection hypothesis states that schizophrenia is associated with reduced
synaptic connectivity (disconnection) or dysfunctional connectivity (i.e. disconnec-
tion) primarily in the mesocortical pathway (i.e. midbrain dopamine and serotonin
afferent to the PFC) and between cortical areas such as the frontal cortex and the tem-
poral lobes (Stephan et al., 2009; Friston, 1996; Pettersson-Yeo et al., 2011). This theory
is supported by several post-mortem and neuroimaging studies revealing anatomical
(Kubicki et al., 2005, 2007; Samartzis et al., 2014) and functional disconnection (Dima
et al., 2010; Dauvermann et al., 2013) in patients. First, it was found that the normal
developmental course of the mammalian brain begins with an over-elaboration of
neuritic processes, which is then followed by a gradual reduction of synaptic den-
sity during adolescence, reaching about 60% of maximum levels in early adulthood
(McGlashan and Hoffman, 2000). Interestingly, the end of this developmental time-
line coincides with the age of onset of psychotic symptoms (first episode), suggest-
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ing a late neurodevelopmental dysfunction during adolescence. Several post-mortem
examinations later found reduced spine densities and smaller dendritic arbors on
prefrontal pyramidal cells of schizophrenia patients (Stephan et al., 2009). Addition-
ally, decreased synaptic protein messengers and synaptophysin were found in the
dlPFC of patients. Together these findings provide a possible explanation for the
observed decreased neuropil without neural loss found previously in schizophrenia
(McGlashan and Hoffman, 2000). It is worth noting however, that decreased neuropil
appears in other mental disorders and is not specific to psychotic-illness.
2.5.2 Models and support
2.5.2.1 Cortical stability
Computational models of the disconnection hypothesis can be classified into three
subcategories. In the first group, simple Hopfield networks were used to study pos-
itive symptoms (Hoffman, 1987; Hoffman and Dobscha, 1989; David, 1994; Seeman,
1994). In these models, a disconnection is usually implemented by ‘pruning’ the synap-
tic connections between the units of the networks after training. The pruning strategy
adopted is a Darwinian ‘evolutionary’ process, which eliminates weak and spatially
distant connections by setting their weights to zero. This eventually results in an
inability for the network to flow into previously learnt patterns of activation and
recover memories. When excessive pruning is performed two types of behaviours
emerge. First, the network produces generalizations or ‘loose associations’, by merg-
ing parts of distinct memory patterns into a single one, which was interpreted as a
potential explanation for bizarre trains of thoughts (thought disorder). Secondly, the
network could elicit spontaneous patterns of activations, that is, relentlessly recover-
ing the same memory output irrespective of the input presented or recovering new
memory patterns unknown to the model. The authors argued that the spontaneous
emergence of new memories was homologous to hallucinations. Hoffman was the
main instigator of this hypothesis in the field of schizophrenia. His early models qual-
itatively supported the hypothesis of an excessive pruning or memory overload in
the disorder (Hoffman and Dobscha, 1989; Hoffman, 1987). However, the simulations
of these effects were quantitatively unrealistic as up to 80% of ‘evolutionary’ pruning
was required for hallucinations to emerge. This specific hypothesis was later disputed
by David (1994), which instead proposed that positive symptoms may emerge from
an hyper-connectivity due to a deficit of the neurodevelopmental pruning process.
However, these conclusions appears to be contradicted by experimental findings of
reduced grey matter and connectivity in schizophrenia. Following Hoffman’s sug-
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gestions, other researchers sought to expand the model to account for the effects of
environmental stress and dopamine modulation (Chen, 1994, 1995; Seeman, 1994).
These effects were expressed in terms of memory overload and increased network
temperature. The models provided a possible link between the positive and cognitive
symptoms by incorporating dopamine as a signal-to-noise enhancer, where too little
or too much dopamine was detrimental to the signal. In the mid 90‘s, computational
studies started investigating the disconnectivity hypothesis from a different perspec-
tive such that positive symptoms might stem from secondary self-repairing proper-
ties of the brain following cortico-cortical synaptic pruning. When the cortico-cortical
inputs connecting to the working-memory units of the network were degraded, the
PFC tended to compensate by updating its local weights in order to recover memory
patterns. This, in turn, led to increased WM noise resulting in the spontaneous re-
trieval of memories in the absence of external inputs (Ruppin et al., 1996; Horn and
Ruppin, 1995; Ruppin, 1995).
The second group of disconnection models used three-layer perceptrons to study
hallucinated voices in patients with schizophrenia (Hoffman and McGlashan, 1993b,a;
Hoffman, 1997; Hoffman and McGlashan, 1997, 1999; McGlashan and Hoffman, 2000;
Hoffman and McGlashan, 2001; de la Fuente-Sandoval et al., 2005; Hoffman and Mc-
Glashan, 2006). These networks were trained in an ad-hoc manner to associate inputs
(phonemes) and outputs (words) using back-propagation. The network then relied on
an intermediate layer representing verbal working-memory to disambiguate current
phonemes. In the first implementations of this model, the working-memory module
was only a delayed copy of the hidden layer (i.e. temporary buffer) used to bias and
compute temporally successive inputs (Hoffman and McGlashan, 1993b,a; Hoffman,
1997; Hoffman and McGlashan, 1997, 1999; McGlashan and Hoffman, 2000; Hoffman
and McGlashan, 2001; de la Fuente-Sandoval et al., 2005). Later models modified the
working-memory so as to use a Hopfield network within the hidden layer (Hoffman
and McGlashan, 2006). To account for the disconnection syndrome, synaptic con-
nections were removed following an ‘evolutionary’ approach as described previously.
These models generated interesting results, whereby synaptic pruning improved the
performance of word recognition by 50% when pruning up to 64% of the connec-
tions. However, above 77% of pruning, hallucinated words — i.e. words detected
without input — started to occur and performance decreased drastically. The authors
suggested that synaptic pruning during the neurodevelopmental stage of late adoles-
cence might actually be beneficial as it would improve recall performances while re-
ducing energetic costs. The model also suggests that a failure to stop normal synaptic
pruning in early adulthood could account for the onset of the disorder. Neuronal loss
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(Hoffman, 1997) and deregulated hypo-dopaminergic modulation (McGlashan and
Hoffman, 2000; Hoffman and McGlashan, 2006) were also addressed in this frame-
work. However, both failed to initiate so-called “hallucinations”. Hypo-dopaminergic
modulation was implemented in this model as a shift of the bias to each neural unit in
WM (i.e. hidden layer), which protected over-pruned networks against hallucinations
(Hoffman and McGlashan, 2006). Interestingly, assuming that dopaminergic modula-
tion can realistically alter the bias of WM units, the model could successfully account
for the effects of anti-psychotics and protected against positive symptoms.
Other models studied schizophrenia impairments at specific cognitive tasks such as
facial affect recognition using a three-layer perceptron (Johnston et al., 2001), episodic
memory deficits using a connectionist framework (Meeter et al., 2002), and semantic
priming using interconnected Hopfield networks (Siekmeier and Hoffman, 2002). All
these studies converged to similar conclusions, namely that synaptic pruning was
found to degrade the performance of the network. However, the causes of an exces-
sive pruning mechanism remains unknown and was largely left untouched in these
studies. While genetic factors could be at play, no experimental study has found a
common genetic component that would be responsible for this developmental deficit.
It is important to mention that while R.E. Hoffman was the most prominent sci-
entist defending the disconnection hypothesis through models of excessive pruning
processes (10 out of the 15 published modelling studies on disconnection), in later
studies the author tested other competing hypotheses of schizophrenia including the
disconnection hypothesis in a story-recall task (Grasemann et al., 2009; Hoffman et al.,
2011). There, the authors found that only the disconnection and aberrant salience
hypotheses could account for positive symptoms, but that the aberrant salience hy-
pothesis accounted best for the performance of deluded schizophrenia patients at
story learning and recall task. Finally, recent work from Whitford et al. (2012), hy-
pothesized that frontal myelin damage in schizophrenia would lead to delays in the
transmission of efference copies & corollary discharge (copies of motor commands
& predicted sensory feedback). This delay would result in an asynchrony between
proprioception (sensory feedback) and corollary discharge leading to sensory dis-
crepancies. In such cases, a subject would perceive these sensory discrepancies as-if
their own actions were not self-generated. This would result in delusions of control,
that is, the false belief that an external force controls one’s thoughts and behaviour.
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2.6 the bayesian hypothesis
Recently the brain has been viewed as a complex processing machine used to inter-
pret sensory inputs in order to make sense of the environment (Friston, 2005a, 2010;
Franklin and Wolpert, 2011; Wolpert et al., 2011). According to this theory, the brain
evolved to interpret and infer the cause and consequences from the environment in
order to predict future outcomes in the environment and minimize surprises. This
framework assumes that cognition can be described in terms of Bayesian inference,
where subjects combine optimally sensory evidence (the “likelihood”, for e.g. sensory
inputs about a visual scene, say a face looking like Elvis Presley) and prior knowl-
edge or expectations (the “prior”, for e.g. knowledge about the frequency of certain
objects in the environment) so as to form probability distributions relevant to the
task at hand (e.g. how likely is it that I’ve just seen Elvis?). It is argued that using this
framework, illusions would lead to an effect of surprise. This surprise would then
require to logically explain these abnormal percepts by updating the internal model
of the environment, resulting in false beliefs akin to delusions (Corlett et al., 2007b,a,
2009a,c; Fletcher and Frith, 2009). Delusional content, would in turn bias expectations
of future outcomes in the environment resulting in stronger perceptual biases (i.e. il-
lusions or hallucinations). This spiralling effect would gradually result in stronger
and more salient illusions & false-beliefs, eventually leading to full-blown complex
hallucinations and deeply anchored delusions.
2.6.1 Experimental evidence
The Bayesian brain hypothesis of psychosis has received relatively little support ex-
perimentally, with the exception of studies investigating illusions (Tschacher et al.,
2006; Dima et al., 2009, 2010; Crawford et al., 2010; Williams et al., 2010; Horton and
Silverstein, 2011; Silverstein and Keane, 2011b,a; Keane et al., 2013) or explicit statis-
tical learning (Huq et al., 1988; Freeman et al., 2008; Speechley et al., 2010; Averbeck
et al., 2011; Evans et al., 2012; Joyce et al., 2013; Garety et al., 2013; Garety and Free-
man, 2013; Freeman et al., 2014). Such studies however, tend to investigate either
illusion or learning in isolation (i.e. not attempting to study first the acquisition of
expectations and then the influences of these expectations on perception).
For illusory perception, patients with schizophrenia have been found to be less sus-
ceptible than healthy controls at the hollow mask illusion (Dima et al., 2009, 2010;
Keane et al., 2013), motion-induced blindness (Tschacher et al., 2006), illusory motion
(Crawford et al., 2010), the size-weight illusion (Williams et al., 2010), and the Ebbing-
haus illusion (Horton and Silverstein, 2011), for a review of perception in schizophre-
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nia see (Silverstein and Keane, 2011b,a). In healthy controls, Schmack et al. (2013)
recently demonstrated that the magnitude of expectation-driven illusions correlated
with delusional ideation in these subjects. That is, in line with previous studies on
perceptual illusions in schizophrenia (Tschacher et al., 2006; Dima et al., 2009, 2010;
Crawford et al., 2010; Williams et al., 2010; Keane et al., 2013), the authors found
that the stronger the delusions of healthy controls, the less likely these were to have
their percepts affected by expectations (Schmack et al., 2013). This is consistent with
the idea that patients with schizophrenia (or controls with mild forms of delusions)
might have a deficit of perceptual inference or acquisition of expectations and out-
comes.
2.6.2 Models and support
While there are a couple of descriptive models that attempt to account for a prob-
lem of Bayesian inference in schizophrenia (Corlett et al., 2009a; Fletcher and Frith,
2009; Frith and Friston, 2012; Jardri and Cachia, 2013), relatively few computational
models have been implemented to provide a quantitative and mechanistic account
of delusions and hallucinations using this framework (Adams et al., 2013; Jardri and
Deneve, 2013).
In Adams et al. (2013), the authors argue that psychosis may stem from an abnormal
encoding of the ‘precision’ of prior beliefs relative to sensory evidence. That is, the ex-
pectations (prior beliefs) of the patients are weaker than they ought to be, resulting in
too much emphasis on sensory evidence. This leads to a high state of surprise since
sensory observations are not expected. The authors then argue that so as to minimise
surprise a secondary reduction in the ‘precision’ of sensory evidence follows. Using
their model, the authors then demonstrate how such a model could explain deficits in
tasks such as in the oddball stimuli, smooth eye-pursuit and the force-matching task.
However the computational models presented in Adams et al. (2013) were not fitted
to the experimental data of patients performing similar tasks. Instead the parameters
of the models were manipulated in an ad-hoc manner so as to illustrate how a re-
duction in the ‘precision’ of prior beliefs could lead to deficits in the tasks modelled
(synthetic data). Future work should attempt to fit such models to real data-sets and
test multiple hypotheses using model comparison, as it may yield different results.
Similarly to Adams et al. (2013), Jardri and Deneve (2013) proposed a hierarchical
Bayesian model where each level of the hierarchy produces inference and abstraction
over lower levels. In this model, the authors argue that bottom-up sensory evidence
and top-down predictions could be reverberated throughout the hierarchy due to
poor GABAergic inhibition. Particularly, the authors make the predictions that an
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impairment in inhibition of both bottom-up and top-down signals would lead to no
impairments in inference. However a selective impairment of inhibition of upward
loops (bottom-up, sensory evidence), would result in sensory evidence being rever-
berated throughout the hierarchy as if it were prior beliefs. This would result in an
over-estimation of sensory evidence (overconfidence). That is, consistent with Adams
et al. (2013), the authors argue that delusions and hallucinations stem from an under-
weighting of the prior (decreased ‘precision’ of the prior) and an over-estimation of
the strength of sensory evidence (i.e. increased ‘precision’ of sensory evidence). The
authors call for experimental investigations to be carried in order to measure how pa-
tients weight their expectations and sensory evidence during perceptual or decision
tasks.
2.7 discussion
In this review, we described promising models, which support various hypotheses
of schizophrenia’s aetiology. While, none of these computational studies could ac-
count for the variety and complexity of symptoms found in the disorder, most stud-
ies focusing on cognitive symptoms appear to support the dopaminergic hypothesis.
Computationally, cognitive symptoms appear to stem from:
1. A weak frontal dopaminergic D1r activation (dlPFC), resulting in a decreased
frontal SNR and deficient working memory.
2. Excessive striatal D2r activation, leading to impairments in prediction-error sig-
nalling, essential for associative learning and goal-directed behaviour.
Schizophrenia is an heterogeneous disorder, expressing itself through unique combi-
nations of symptoms in every patient. Therefore, we do not exclude the possibility
that several of the current hypotheses discussed in this review might jointly be re-
sponsible for the wide variety of behaviours and symptoms observed in the disorder.
For example, biophysically realistic models of working-memory elegantly demon-
strated how the balance between inhibitory GABAergic and excitatory glutamatergic
activity is crucial to the proper functioning of realistic attractor networks (cortical sta-
bility). In these models, a deficit in either excitatory glutamate or inhibitory GABAer-
gic activity led to impaired working-memory dynamics, cognitive impairments and
arguably to some form of positive symptoms. Alternatively, models supporting a dis-
connection syndrome were able to successfully demonstrate how excessive pruning
in cortical networks could lead to positive symptoms (spurious attractors), as well
as predicting the neurodevelopmental timeline of schizophrenia, providing for the
first time an explanation for the late adolescence onset of the disorder (McGlashan
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and Hoffman, 2000; Hoffman and McGlashan, 2006). Less experimental evidence
was found to support an association between neurotransmitter dysfunctions and
cortico-cortical disconnection. However, we would argue that both the glutamate and
GABAergic hypothesis could lead to a disconnection syndrome. Specifically, weaker
synapses could emerge following a prefrontal NMDA receptor hypo-function. Such
synapses could then be pruned away during the Darwinian ‘evolutionary’ neurode-
velopmental process proposed by (McGlashan and Hoffman, 2000; Hoffman and Mc-
Glashan, 2006). That is, weaker synapses would lead to an over-pruning of frontal
cortices, resulting in a ‘physical disconnection syndrome’, as presented by the synaptic
runaway model of Greenstein-Messica and Ruppin (1998). Alternatively, GABAergic
inhibition appears to be essential to the generation of  -band rhythms. Aberrant  -
oscillations, is argued to result in an asynchrony between cortical regions (Spencer,
2009), leading to a reduced ability to transmit information between cortical regions,
(‘functional disconnection’). As a result, we argue that a disconnection syndrome might
be secondary to an incorrect balance between excitatory and inhibitory activity in cor-
tical regions, leading to either excessive synaptic pruning during adolescence (‘phys-
ical disconnection’) or an impossibility to synchronize information across cortical re-
gions (‘functional disconnection’). Finally, it is worth mentioning that NMDA receptor
blockade has been found to result in strong changes of dopaminergic midbrain neu-
rons (Jentsch and Roth, 1999). It is therefore possible that the dopamine dysfunction
observed in schizophrenia could be secondary to a generalised NMDA receptor hypo-
function.
2.8 afterword & conclusions
In a recent review of computational studies in schizophrenia research, Rolls and Deco
(2011) called for further investigation using bottom-up modelling approaches. The au-
thors argued that using realistic biophysical models of attractor network and cortical
dynamics, one could explore in much detail the interactions between neurotransmit-
ter functions and produce precise predictions about the states of the neural networks
in schizophrenia. We agree with the authors that the abstract modelling of decreased
signal-to-noise ratio in schizophrenia can successfully give place to more refined bio-
physical models in order to account for our current knowledge of network dynamics
and neurotransmitter function. However, Rolls and Deco (2011) argue that high-level,
abstract, behavioural or descriptive models (i.e. phenomenological models) have no
construct validity since these do not map to realistic brain function and as a result
fail to produce testable predictions. In this thesis, we take a different standpoint. We
would argue that since cognitive, positive and negative symptoms are the most sta-
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ble, salient and measurable effect of the disorder across patients, high-level descrip-
tive models can result in strong testable predictions at the behavioural level. That
is, first, using high-level models, one can attempt to validate and refine the array
of possible hypotheses down to those that are most likely to account for the symp-
toms and behaviours observed in patients. Once a subset of hypotheses has been
identified, scientists will have a better chance to devise biophysically realistic models
and predictions that are testable using current neuroimaging tools. Particularly, in
light of the findings highlighted in this review, we found that the Bayesian brain hy-
pothesis of psychosis has received relatively little investigation in comparison to the
other hypotheses. This novel approach to schizophrenia is promising and deserves
further theoretical and experimental investigation. In fact, in comparison to the mod-
els supporting the GABAergic, glutamate or dopamine hypothesis, the Bayesian brain
hypothesis provides a high-level construct that makes strong testable predictions that
can be validated experimentally at the behavioural level. That is, we could potentially
test the predictions of this framework, and if proven successful, start to investigate
the underlying neural processes that may have gone awry in this framework. Specif-
ically, we propose to use a psychophysical task that has been validated in healthy
controls to assay learning and perceptual inference (Chalk et al., 2010; Gekas et al.,
2013). Using this task, we propose to investigate whether learning and perceptual
inference mechanisms appear disrupted in schizophrenia.
3
R AT G A M B L I N G TA S K ( R G T ) : M A L A D A P T I V E D E C I S I O N
M A K I N G , A C O N T I N U U M B E T W E E N H E A LT H Y A N D
P S Y C H I AT R I C P O P U L AT I O N S
The work presented in this chapter is the result of a close collaboration with be-
havioural experimentalists at the National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS -
Bordeaux 2). Marion Rivalan and Dr. Françoise Dellu-Hagedorn designed and per-
formed the behavioural experiments. The computational modelling and analysis was
performed by myself under the supervision of Dr. Peggy Seriès and Dr. Alain Marc-
hand. The resulting findings have been published in PLoS ONE as a shared first
co-authorship (Rivalan et al., 2013; see Appendix A).1
3.1 background
3.1.1 Iowa Gambling Task: Maladaptive decision making in humans
Humans often face complex and conflicting choices and have to refrain from imme-
diate gratification in order to select options with the best long-term pay-offs. The
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) is a cognitive test developed by Bechara and Damasio in
(1994), with the aim to devise a neuropsychological test that simulates this "complex"
and "conflicting" decision-making process in a laboratory. The task was originally
constructed to study deficits of decision-making in patients with frontal lesions (par-
ticularly ventro-medial PFC lesions;Bechara et al. 1994, 1996, 1997, 1999, for review
see Dunn et al. 2006). While these patients displayed no impairments in IQ, reason-
ing, comprehension and learning relative to healthy controls, they displayed specific
deficits for decisions that involves conflicting factors and necessitate to plan and fore-
see long term benefits (Bechara et al., 1994, 1996, 1997, 1999; Dunn et al., 2006). In
the IGT, participants are required to pick a card in one of four decks available (A,B,C
or D) for 100 trials. After a deck is selected, the participant receives an immediate
reward materialised as a gain of fictive money, sometimes followed by a penalty (loss
of fictive money; Figure 3.1). Unknown to the participant, there are two advanta-
geous (C-D) and two disadvantageous decks (A-B) of cards. Using trial-and-error,
1 The work presented in this chapter is largely adapted from (Rivalan et al., 2013; Valton, 2010). The
dataset presented in this chapter is different from this presented in (Valton, 2010), where methods have
been largely modified or extended.
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Figure 3.1: Principle of the Iowa Gambling Task. Participants can choose among four
different decks of cards (deck A, B, C and D) to earn as much money as possible
within one session (100 trials). The selection of an option is immediately rewarded
($50 or $100), but can also be followed by a penalty (loss of money) of variable
amounts and frequency depending on the option chosen. The options (C, D) are
equally advantageous in the long term in comparison to options (A, B) which are
equally disadvantageous, leading to long term losses. The figure was included with
permission from (Rivalan et al., 2009a)
participants are required to infer the optimal decision strategy by picking as often as
possible from the advantageous decks. Advantageous decks provide small immedi-
ate rewards (+50$) usually followed by infrequent small losses leading to an overall
net gain of +250$ every ten trials. On the other hand, disadvantageous decks result
in a large immediate reward (+100$) followed by frequent large losses leading to an
overall net loss of -250$ every ten trials. As a result, participants should gradually
learn to forgo short-term benefits for long term profits. The decision-making perfor-
mance is extracted by measuring either the total number of optimal deck selections
at the end of the task or the ratio of advantageous to disadvantageous deck selections
every 20 trials.
Uncertainty in the task is warranted by the immediate variability of gains (+50$
vs +100$) and the probability of punishments assigned to each deck. Conflicting
decisions are warranted by the trade-off between the immediate gains and long-term
consequences of each option. To-date, the IGT is the most commonly used tool to
address decision-making deficits in a clinical setting (Bechara et al., 1994; Dunn et al.,
2006; de Visser et al., 2011), particularly for disorders such as addiction, obsessive
compulsive disorder (OCD), attention-deficit hyper-activity disorder (ADHD) and
pathological gambling (Dunn et al., 2006; Buelow and Suhr, 2009).
3.1.1.1 Performance in healthy population
Most healthy participants successfully deduce that small but frequent payouts are
beneficial in the long term (Bechara et al., 1994; Dunn et al., 2006). Starting with an
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initial preference for disadvantageous decks (due to their high immediate reward),
participants gradually learn to favour advantageous decks once they have been ex-
posed to large penalties (Bechara and Damasio, 2002; Dunn et al., 2006). By the end
of the task, healthy individuals display a strong preference for advantageous choices
(Bechara and Damasio, 2002; Dunn et al., 2006).
Inter-individual differences in IGT performances within the healthy control group
are generally overlooked. Some studies, however, report finding a strong dichotomy
within healthy controls in terms of performances (Bechara et al., 1999, 2001; Petry,
2001; Bechara and Damasio, 2002; Bolla et al., 2004; Denburg et al., 2005, 2006; Glick-
sohn et al., 2007; Davis et al., 2007). These studies found that about 35% of healthy
controls (reported range: 23-57%) preferentially choose immediate pay-offs and per-
severe to select disadvantageous options throughout the task (Bechara et al., 1999,
2001; Petry, 2001; Bechara and Damasio, 2002; Bolla et al., 2004; Denburg et al., 2005,
2006; Glicksohn et al., 2007; Davis et al., 2007). Further to this initial sub-division
of poor and good DM within the healthy control group, studies also appear to find
significant gender (Bolla et al., 2004; Glicksohn et al., 2007; Davis et al., 2007) and age-
related effects (Denburg et al., 2005, 2006) to poor DM performances in these healthy
individuals. It is worth noting, however, that healthy individuals that perform poorly
at the IGT appear to be spared from impediments in everyday decision-making but
report themselves as preferring "sensation seeking", akin to risky situations, in every-
day life (Bechara et al., 1999, 2000). Further to this finding, studies have found a
link between poor performances at the IGT in healthy controls and traits such as
risk-seeking (Bechara et al., 1999; Crone et al., 2003; Davis et al., 2007), reward sen-
sitivity (Suhr and Tsanadis, 2007) and impulsivity (Crone et al., 2003; Davis et al.,
2007). Risk-seeking and impulsivity are behavioural traits that are reminiscent of a
variety of psychiatric conditions (DSM-IV-TR, 2000) such as ADHD (Moeller et al.,
2001), pathological gambling and substance abuse (Jentsch and Taylor, 1999; Volkow
and Fowler, 2000). If these traits are central to poor decision-making performances,
both in healthy individuals and psychiatric conditions, it is conceivable that such psy-
chiatric conditions might be better explained in terms of a continuum together with
healthy individuals, rather than a clear-cut dichotomy separating the two (see Section
1.1.2) . In fact, healthy poor decision-makers appear to support the hypothesis of a
spectrum of decision-making deficits, where healthy good decision-makers would lie
at one end and psychopathologies would lie at the other extreme of this spectrum
(see Section 1.1.2; Cuthbert and Insel, 2013).
Studying the influence of these behavioural traits on decision-making could help
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understanding the variability observed in decision making performances and poten-
tially help identifying the underlying neurobiological processes involved in these
traits. Most importantly, these investigations could pave the way for a more biological-
driven diagnosis of psychiatric conditions (Insel et al., 2010) that may exhibit extreme
manifestations and combinations of these traits (DSM-IV-TR, 2000; DSM-5, 2013).
3.1.1.2 Psychiatric population
Impaired decision making is a core deficit of many psychiatric disorders (for overall
review see Dunn et al., 2006) such as substance abuse (Bartzokis et al., 2000; Bolla
et al., 2003; Monterosso et al., 2001; Stout et al., 2004; Yechiam et al., 2005), patholog-
ical gambling (Cavedini et al., 2002b; Goudriaan et al., 2004), OCD (Cavedini et al.,
2004, 2002a; Lawrence et al., 2006), ADHD (Ernst et al., 2003a,b; Toplak et al., 2005,
2010), but is also found in schizophrenia (Beninger et al., 2003; Ritter et al., 2004;
Shurman et al., 2005; Kester et al., 2006; Bark et al., 2005; Kim et al., 2009; Sevy et al.,
2007), huntington’s disease (Stout et al., 2001; Campbell et al., 2004), Parkinson’s dis-
ease (Thiel et al., 2003) and anti-social behaviour such as psychopathy (Schmitt et al.,
1999; Blair et al., 2001; Mitchell et al., 2002). Most particularly, the IGT is a highly
sensitive tool to measure impaired decision-making in psychiatric conditions that are
known to be characterized by poor decision-making such as pathological gambling,
substance abuse, and OCD (Dunn et al., 2006).
While the list of psychopathologies associated with poor IGT performances is quite
heterogeneous, common features such as impulsive or compulsive behaviours can
be identified in a variety of these conditions (Suhr and Tsanadis, 2007; Buelow and
Suhr, 2009; Rivalan, 2010). OCD, for example, is characterized by extreme anxiety
(e.g. mysophobia - phobia for germs) leading individuals to perform compulsive
behaviours (e.g. extreme hand-washing) and can be found to a lesser extent in other
conditions like bulimia and pathological gambling (Hollander et al., 1996; Stein, 2000);
Impulsivity, on the other hand, appear to be a core deficit of ADHD, substance abuse
and anti-social behaviour (Hollander et al., 1996). While both compulsion and im-
pulsivity exhibit a similar stereotypical behaviour, namely the inability to delay or
inhibit behaviour, these behaviours have different causes. In compulsion, individuals
attempt to minimise stress or anxiety, while impulsivity is characterised as an at-
tempt to maximise "pleasure" or rewards (Hollander et al., 1996; Stein, 2000). This has
led researchers to argue for a reclassification of mental disorders that display poor
decision-making as the core symptom of the pathology (Hollander et al., 1996; Stein,
2000), in favour of a continuum-based classification where impulsivity and compul-
sivity act as extreme endpoints of this spectrum.
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Schizophrenia: Historically, differences between schizophrenia patients and healthy
controls at the IGT has been mixed. Early evidence suggested that patients did not
show impairments at the IGT (Wilder et al., 1998), and subsequent studies generally
replicated this finding (Cavallaro et al., 2003; Evans et al., 2005; Rodríguez-Sánchez
et al., 2005). Other studies, however, found subtle effects (Beninger et al., 2003; Ritter
et al., 2004; Shurman et al., 2005; Bark et al., 2005; Turnbull et al., 2006; Kester et al.,
2006), showing that all patients or a sub-group of patients tend to prefer disadvanta-
geous choices. In an early review of the IGT by Dunn et al. (2006), the authors argue
that differences exist between the two groups, I quote:
"For example, of six studies examining schizophrenia, one found no deficit
(Wilder et al., 1998), one found a disadvantageous deck preference (Ritter et al.,
2004), one found deficits were dependent on medication type (Beninger et al.,
2003), one found preference for the infrequent punishment decks (Shurman et al.,
2005), and two found only sub-types of schizophrenia patients were impaired on
the task (Bark et al., 2005; Turnbull et al., 2006)."
A later review by Sevy et al. (2007) added further studies to the analysis and found
methodological differences that might explain the lack of consistency across IGT stud-
ies in schizophrenia. The authors (Sevy et al., 2007) argue that several confounding
factors such as small sample sizes, comorbidity (i.e. co-occurring conditions) such
as substance abuse, IQ and education differences, as well as heterogeneous sam-
ples of patients (i.e. having different diagnosis) might account for the differences
observed. The review concludes that although results are generally mixed, patients
with schizophrenia tend to be generally impaired at the IGT and suggests to control
for these confounding variables in future studies (Sevy et al., 2007). A recent IGT
study appear to close this gap (Kim et al., 2009). The study used a relatively large
sample size (n=52 patients, n=55 controls), controlled for IQ, comorbid substance
abuse and finally used an homogeneous sample of chronic & stable schizophrenia
patients (Kim et al., 2009). In this study, the authors confirm a strong preference for
disadvantageous decks in the schizophrenia patient group. Nonetheless, the study
found that patients appear to gradually learn to switch to advantageous choices, al-
beit at a much lower rate than controls. Patients manage to reach chance level (i.e. an
equal ratio of advantageous to disadvantageous choices) in the last 20 trials of the
task, while starting with a net negative score at the beginning of the task (Kim et al.,
2009).
Overall, the literature tend to suggest that schizophrenia patients are impaired rel-
ative to controls at the IGT (Dunn et al., 2006; Sevy et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2009);
However, patients do display a slow but profitable shift from disadvantageous deck
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to advantageous ones over time (Kim et al., 2009). As a result, Kim et al. (2009) argue
that patients with schizophrenia should either be less sensitive to both reward and
punishment or hyper-sensitive to rewards and hypo-sensitive to punishments. Gener-
ally, patients also appear to prefer less frequent but larger penalties (decks B and D),
suggesting that they are sensitive to the frequency but not the magnitudes of these
penalties (Wilder et al., 1998; Shurman et al., 2005; Kim et al., 2009). With regards to
the real outcome of the IGT, preferring smaller frequencies of penalties might appear
as risk-averse. However, omitting to integrate the magnitude of rewards and pun-
ishments together with the frequency of penalties is risk-prone behaviour. Finally,
schizophrenia patients appear to be impaired in reversal-learning tests such as the
Wisconsin Card Sort Test (WCST) suggesting a relative inflexibility to changes of con-
tingencies in their environment. However, patients performances at the IGT are not
correlated with the measure of flexibility extracted by the WCST (Ritter et al., 2004;
Kim et al., 2009; for review see Dunn et al., 2006; Sevy et al., 2007).
3.2 rgt : animal model of the iowa gambling task
Animal research possess valuable advantages when compared to human experimen-
tation. First, using animal models, scientists can control for confounding factors such
as genetic variability or environmental factors that might affect behaviour. Secondly,
experimenters can use a wide variety of invasive techniques that would not be prac-
tical with human participants for ethical reasons (i.e. pharmacological manipulation,
direct cortical stimulation, lesions studies, etc.). Such tools, enable to manipulate
and alter the behaviour of subjects by targeting specific neuro-anatomical or neuro-
chemical pathways. These manipulations, in turn, induce changes in the performance
or behaviour of the animals, shedding light on the pathways at play in decision-
making or behaviour (Rivalan, 2010).
The Rat Gambling Task (RGT) developed by Rivalan et al. (2009a) is one of many
rodent analogues of the Iowa Gambling Task (de Visser et al., 2011). The version
of the RGT that we present in this chapter has been evaluated in a recent review
(de Visser et al., 2011) as the best rodent analogue to the IGT. In this task, rats are
required to select among 4 options (i.e., 2 advantageous, 2 disadvantageous) to collect
an immediate reward (i.e., appetitive food pellets). Following the delivery of rewards,
time-outs can occur with different probabilities and magnitude so as to model the
penalty system of the IGT. Similarly to the IGT, during this task the rats have to
infer that small but regular pay-outs (i.e. food pellets) are more beneficial in the long
term. The performance at the task is extracted by monitoring the number of optimal
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choices made by the animal every 10 minutes. Similarly to human studies using
the IGT, Rivalan et al. (2009a) found that while most healthy rats learn to choose
advantageous options, about 1/3rd of healthy rats preferentially choose immediate
pay-offs and persevere to select disadvantageous options throughout the task. The
authors found a link between risk-seeking and poor performances at the RGT, but this
trait alone could not explain the entire variability of performances observed (Rivalan
et al., 2009a). The authors argued that, as in humans, a combination of behavioural
traits might jointly contribute to poor performances at the RGT, and that these traits
need to be identified.
3.3 aims
3.3.1 Inter-individual behavioural traits, a dimensional approach
Several mental disorders related to poor executive functioning, such as substance
abuse, pathological gambling, attention-deficit hyperactivity-disorder or mania, share
common deficits and behavioural traits. Impulsiveness, risk taking (DSM-IV-TR, 2000)
or inflexible behaviour (Goudriaan et al., 2006; Rubia et al., 2010; van der Plas et al.,
2009; Walshaw et al., 2010), are often present, suggesting that they may jointly con-
tribute to pathological behaviour. Poor decision making is a hallmark of these mental
disorders and these patients are commonly impaired in the Iowa Gambling Task
(IGT). This task measures the capacity to balance risks and gains and to resist imme-
diate gratification in order to receive a larger long-term gain (Bechara et al., 1994).
Interestingly, within a healthy population, a subset of individuals described as im-
pulsive and sensation seekers display poor decision making in this task (Bechara and
Damasio, 2002), supporting the notion that a continuum may exist between normality
and pathological conditions. Accordingly, neuropsychological characteristics leading
to poor decision making in healthy individuals are probably shared by clinical poor
decision makers, and could be a potential risk factor for developing related mental
disorders (Rivalan et al., 2009b; Hayton et al., 2012).
Our collaborators developed a single-session Rat Gambling Task (RGT) that repro-
duces the IGT principles (de Visser et al., 2011; Rivalan et al., 2009a, 2011). In this
uncertain and conflicting situation, individuals without prior knowledge of the out-
comes must gradually learn that the less immediately rewarding options are also less
risky and more advantageous in the long term.
Using lesion studies, they have recently shown that good performances in the RGT
3.4 methods 37
depend of the functional integrity of several areas of the prefrontal cortex (Rivalan
et al., 2011). Like humans, a majority of rats are good decision makers (good DM) and
choose the best options, whereas a minority prefers the worst options. These inter-
individual differences are stable over time, specific to decision-making processes and
reproducible across groups (Rivalan et al., 2009a). They also showed that, like hu-
mans, rats that are poor decision makers (poor DM) are risk-prone and more sensitive
to reward than good DM (Rivalan et al., 2009a). However, although these traits were
clearly associated with poor decision making in the RGT, they were not sufficient to
dissociate good from poor performers individually. Therefore, Rivalan et al. (2009a)
argued that additional behavioural trait, such as inflexibility and impulsivity, could
also jointly contribute to poor decision-making.
Here, we present an analysis showing how inter-individual differences in clinically
relevant behavioural traits may contribute to poor and good decision making in the
RGT. Experimentally, we show that a combination of several independent behavioural
and cognitive characteristics in one individual, namely risk-proneness, motivation for
reward, motor impulsivity and behavioural inflexibility, have a cumulative effect and
is highly predictive of performance in the RGT.
To quantitatively explore the impact of these traits on learning and decision-making,
we developed a computational model of the RGT based on the Temporal Difference
(TD) learning algorithm (Schultz et al., 1997; Bayer and Glimcher, 2005; Maia, 2009).
The basic TD framework was extended to take into account these behavioural traits
(i.e. risk seeking, reward seeking and cognitive inflexibility) and to estimate the influ-
ence of these traits in each rat. The extended model was used to address the following
questions:
1. Can behavioural traits jointly contribute to poor performances in the RGT?
2. If they can, how do these traits alter learning and decision-making?
First our model suggests that behavioural traits can collectively account for good
and poor decision making performances. Secondly, the model provides a quantitative
explanation for the interactions between the behavioural traits and how these might
impact learning and decision-making performances in the RGT.
3.4 methods
The RGT requires successive choices among four options in an operant cage (de Visser
et al., 2011; Rivalan et al., 2009a). Two of the four options are associated with a higher
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immediate gain, but are disadvantageous in the long run due to higher unpredictable
penalties (time-outs). The experiments were performed in twelve polyvalent condi-
tioning boxes (Imetronic, Pessac, France; 28x30x34 cm). Boxes were equipped with
four nose-poke holes, dimly illuminated within the hole with a white LED. These
holes were located on a curved wall on one side of the box, equidistant to a food
magazine situated on the opposite wall. Each hole was equipped with an infra-red
detector connected to an external dispenser delivering food pellets (45 mg, formula
P, Sandow scientific, USA). Data collection was automated using a control software
(Imetronic, Pessac, France) running on a computer outside the testing room. At least
thirty minutes before each session, the rats were placed in the experimental room.
Training: During the training phase, the rats learned to associate two consecutive
nose-pokes in one of the four illuminated holes with the delivery of one or two food
pellets in the magazine. First, the rats had to associate a single nose-poke in any of the
four illuminated holes with the delivery of one food pellet in the magazine. After a
nose poke, only the selected hole remained illuminated, but all were inactivated until
the rat collected the food reward. This procedure continued daily until rats obtained
100 pellets within a session (30 min cut-off). Then two consecutive nose-pokes in the
same hole were required to obtain food, to ensure that the selection of the hole was a
voluntary choice. After reaching the same criterion, rats were submitted to two final
15 min training sessions. In the first session, two pellets were delivered after a choice
was made (maximum 30 pellets). This session habituated the rats to the quantity of
pellets which could be obtained during the test. A second session followed, delivering
only one pellet at a time (maximum 15 pellets). The number of reward deliveries was
reduced to avoid reduction of sampling and the development of a preference for
an option. The training phase usually lasted 5-7 days and tests were performed the
following day.
Test: Rats could freely choose between four nose-poke holes (A-D) during a one-
hour test session (or max. 250 pellets obtained). Choices C and D vs A and B led to
the immediate delivery of one vs two pellets, but choices A and B could be followed
by longer, unpredictable penalties (222 s and 444 sec time-outs) compared to choices
C and D (12 sec and 6 sec). Penalties occurred at a low probability (1/4) for choices
B and C, and at a high probability (1/2) for choices A and D (Figure 3.2). During the
penalty, all lights were switched off and nose-poke holes were disabled, but the cho-
sen hole remained illuminated to facilitate association between each choice and its
consequences. A brief extinction of this light (1 sec) signalled the end of the time-out.
The theoretical maximum gain was the same for advantageous choices C and D, and
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Figure 3.2: Principle of the Rat Gambling Task. Rats can nose-poke among four dif-
ferent holes (A, B, C and D) in an operant cage, to earn food reward (1-hour test).
The selection of one option is immediately rewarded, but can also be followed by
a penalty (time-out) of variable duration, according to different probabilities. Two
options (C, D) are equally more advantageous than the other two (A, B), which are
equally disadvantageous in the long term. The figure was included with permission
from (Rivalan et al., 2013)
five times higher than for disadvantageous choices A and B.
Good and poor decision makers were differentiated on the basis of the percentage
of advantageous choices (>70% and <30% respectively) during the last 20 minutes of
test. The remaining rats were undecided with intermediate scores (between 30% and
70% advantageous choices — de Visser et al., 2011; Rivalan et al., 2009a, 2011). The
mean latency to collect food pellets after a choice was taken as an indicator of the
rats motivation for the food reward (Rivalan et al., 2009a).
3.4.1 Scientific validity
Since this chapter builds upon previous findings from Rivalan et al. (2009a), we briefly
introduce analyses that successfully demonstrated the face and construct validity of
the RGT (Rivalan et al., 2009a).
Reproducibility and stability of performances: Rivalan et al. (2009a) tested the same
rats repeatedly at every 2-3 months interval to ensure that choice preferences were
stable over time. The distribution of individuals into good and poor decision makers
remained stable during repeated testing over a period of at least 6-9 months.
Food deprivation: Rivalan et al. (2009a) tested whether food deprivation induced
different intrinsic motivational state for some rats, which might have explained poor
decision-making. The authors challenged the stability of motivation for rewards on
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RGT performances by testing different levels of food restriction before the task (i.e.
decreasing the animal’s body weight from 0% to 20% of free feeding weight). Food
restriction had no significant impact on either the proportions of good and poor
decision-makers ( 2 exact test, p = .673; ns) nor on the evolution of their behaviour
over time (Rivalan et al., 2009a).
Task difficulty: Task difficulty could also explain population differences in the RGT.
As a result, good decision-makers were challenged with an increased task difficulty
by gradually reducing the relative gain between advantageous and disadvantageous
options. Increasing the task difficulty had no consequences on the proportions of
good and poor decision-makers (Rivalan et al., 2009a). Good decision makers took
more time to show significant preferences for advantageous choices. Poor decision-
makers remained as fast as before at selecting disadvantageous choices, even with
the increased task difficulty. This suggests that poor decision-makers rapidly assign
preference to disadvantageous choices, irrespective of the relative gain between ad-
vantageous and disadvantageous options.
Decision making bias: A modified RGT experiment was used to discriminate whether
the different subgroups of good and poor decision-makers were equally sensitive to
penalties. In this paradigm, all options led to one food pellet, while the penalties for
each option remained the same as in the original RGT (Rivalan et al., 2009a). Within
the first minutes, animals chose equally among the different options, showing no
pre-existing biases or preferences. All rats then rapidly developed a marked prefer-
ence for the shorter time-outs and, to a lesser extent, for the less frequent penalties
(Rivalan et al., 2009a). The rats readily discriminated between different dimensions
of the penalty (duration & probability), preferring the less punished options. The re-
sults show that all rats (good and poor decision-makers) were equally able to discrim-
inate optimal actions between different post-reward time-outs penalties. First, these
findings suggest that poor decision-makers are similar to good decision-makers in
their valuation of penalties. Second, this analysis confirms that poor decision-makers
are able to take optimal decisions, suggesting that their action-selection process (i.e.
decision-making) is not different from this of good decision-makers.
3.4.2 Subject sample
Male Wistar Han rats (n = 29; Charles River, France) were 12-13 weeks old at the
beginning of the experiment. They were housed in groups of four in a temperature
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Figure 3.3: Order and duration of behavioural tasks. The number of days (d) of each
behavioural testing phase (below arrow) and inter-test periods (grey zones) are indi-
cated. RGT: Rat Gambling task, FI-EXT: multiple fixed-interval/extinction schedules,
Emerg. Task: Light-dark emergence task, FCN16: Fixed consecutive number 16 cue
schedule, DDT: Delay discounting task.
(23 C) and humidity-controlled room (60%) on an inverted 12 hr light/dark cycle
(lights on at 20:30). Tests were conducted during the dark phase of the cycle. A week
before the beginning of the experiments, animals were handled every day. Rats had
free access to food and water except during impulsivity and decision-making tests
during which they were moderately food deprived (95% free feeding weight). The
configuration of the apparatus and the order of testing were chosen to minimize
any possible interference between protocols (see Figure 3.3 for order and duration of
tests). The whole behavioural testing phase lasted 6 months (178 days).
3.4.3 Results
The RGT measures, across successive trials, the ability to make the most advanta-
geous choices. In this task, the contingencies associated with a higher immediate gain
are disadvantageous in the long run due to higher unpredictable penalties. Decision-
making could not be properly measured in six rats because they immediately demon-
strated a preference without sampling the different options at the beginning of the
test. These rats were discarded from the analysis. Three rats did not display prefer-
ence for any particular option (undecided subgroup). Because of the small size of
this group they were also discarded from our analyses. Among the remaining rats
(n = 20), behaviour during the test was not influenced by prior spatial preference:
proportions of individuals with analogous choices during training and testing did
not significantly differ from chance (Chi-square test,  2 = .438; p = .33; ns).
As observed previously, typical good and poor decision makers (DM) can be dis-
tinguished within a normal group of rats. Because this task measures a preference
between two kinds of options, two subgroups can be easily distinguished, as shown
by the bimodal distribution of RGT scores (see meta analysis on Figure 3.4B). Good
DM first choose randomly and then gradually orient most of their choices toward
the advantageous options (Figure 3.4A). By contrast, poor DM sample the different
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Figure 3.4: Animals’ performance on the Rat Gambling Task (RGT). (A) Time-course
of advantageous choices (%) of good and poor DM on the RGT and individual scores
during the last 20 min of good (n = 14) and poor (n = 6) DM. Comparison with the
indifference level, dotted line, t-test: * p<.05. (B) Meta analysis of the RGT data based
on 12 distinct experiments (n = 228) using the same protocol. It reveals a bimodal
distribution of RGT scores (% of favourable choices during the last 20 min) with a
majority of good decision makers (good DM, with scores above 70%), a minority of
poor decision makers (poor DM, with scores below 30%) and the remaining, unde-
cided rats with intermediate scores.
options and rapidly orient their choices toward the disadvantageous options (within
10 minutes). During the last 20 minutes, percentages of choices for advantageous op-
tions could be divided into two main subgroups: a majority of good DM (n = 14;
61%, with scores above 70%) and a minority of poor DM (n = 6; 26%, with scores
below 30%) that preferred the disadvantageous options (n.b. scores for the remaining
undecided subjects were 38%, 54% and 63%).
3.4.4 Measuring risk-seeking
3.4.4.1 Method
The light-dark emergence test allows for the assessment of spontaneous risk taking
behaviour in rats (Rivalan et al., 2009a). Exiting from a dark, safe compartment to
a brightly illuminated one is a risky and stressful situation for a rat. This test was
performed in a box (40x40x35 cm) with two small equal compartments that limit
exploratory behaviour. An aperture (12x31 cm) enabled the rats to pass from one
compartment to the other. One was completely enclosed by black opaque plastic
sides, with a lid of the same material, while the other was white, had no lid, and
was illuminated (560 lux). The rat was placed in the illuminated compartment facing
the wall opposite the door. The rat was free to explore the two compartments of the
3.4 methods 43
apparatus during a single 10 minute session. Rats were tested in the middle of the
dark phase between 10:00a.m and 1:00p.m.
 
Figure 3.5: Rats’ performances at the light-
dark emergence test. Grey lines represent
the median used to compute proportions
of high and low scores in good and poor
decision makers (open and black circles
respectively). (A) The number of risk as-
sessments before the first emergence in the
risky compartment. (B) Time elapsed until
the first visit to the risky compartment.
Data measures: From the rat first en-
trance in the dark box, the latency to
emerge from this compartment to the il-
luminated one was recorded (600s cut-
off). Risk assessments were evaluated by
the number of body stretches and head
protruding into the light compartment
while the hind limbs remained in the
safe compartment. Because these two pa-
rameters are correlated with the num-
ber of visits of the extremity of the open
arms of an elevated plus-maze, which is
the more risky area of this task (see Ri-
valan et al., 2009a), we considered these
as a measure of risk-taking. Proportions
of visits and time spent in the dark com-
partment (%) were also measured.
3.4.4.2 Results
In the light-dark emergence test, poor DM took more risks than good DM. They
emerged more rapidly from the dark compartment than good DM (medians, 35 and
416 sec respectively; U = 13.5, p<.02). A majority of poor DM 83% vs 36% of good
DM had a score below the median (Figure 3.5B). Poor DM also made much fewer
risk assessments than good DM before the first exit (100% vs 29% below the median;
Fisher exact test, p = .0007; Figure 3.5A). The median number of risk assessments
were 1.5 and 11.2 for poor vs good DM respectively (U = 1.5, p<.001). Poor DM also




To assess behavioural flexibility, the contingencies for choices A-B and C-D were
spatially reversed (Rivalan et al., 2009a) such that disadvantageous choices during
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Figure 3.6: Animals’ performance on the Reversal-Rat Gambling Task (Reversal-RGT).
Grey lines represent the median used to compute proportions of high and low scores
for good and poor decision makers (open and black circles respectively). (A) Time-
course of advantageous choices (%) for flexible good DM, undecided good DM, inflex-
ible good DM, flexible good DM and inflexible poor DM groups on the RGT-reversed
version. Comparison with the indifference level, dotted line, t-test: * and  p<.05 at
least. (B) Relationship between individual RGT scores and flexibility (final scores in
the RGT-reversed version).
the RGT were now advantageous and vice-versa. To reduce spatial preferences related
to the previous experience in the RGT, animals were first given a new training session
(100 pellets or 30 min cut-off) during which only one hole at a time, pseudo-randomly,
was illuminated and operating at a time, each nose-poke delivering 1 pellet. The test
in reversed condition was done the following day, in the same conditions as the RGT,
except that options A-B and options C-D were spatially exchanged.
Data measure: Performances were calculated as the mean percentage of choices
for the preferred contingency during the RGT. Behaviours were differentiated on
the basis of the time course of choices and flexibility. The observed behaviours were
classified into three categories: flexible behaviour, with progressive reversion towards
the new location of their favourite options (>60% of choices during last 20 min),
undecided behaviour (choice between 40% and 60%) and inflexible behaviour with
perseveration to previously learned choices (<40% of choices).
3.4.5.2 Results
Reversing contingencies in the RGT measures the rats’ adaptation when advanta-
geous/disadvantageous outcomes are spatially exchanged. Persistence to choose the
same location reveals cognitive inflexibility (flexibility <35%), whereas shifting choices
reflects detection of the change and behavioural flexibility. All poor DM vs only a
third (36%) of good DM were inflexible (Fisher exact test, p = .014; Figure 3.6B).
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Among the remaining good DM, 36% gradually reoriented their choices toward the






sure at the Rat Gambling
Task (RGT). (A) Relation-
ship between individual
RGT scores and the
mean latency to collect
food pellets (one missing
value) during the RGT.
Reward seeking was measured in this experiment using
the latency to collect rewards (food pellets) during the
RGT session. Previously, the runway paradigm had been
used to measure to the latency for a rat to run along a
straight alley in order to collect a food reward (Rivalan,
2010; Valton, 2010). This measure represented the intrin-
sic motivation for each rat to seek food rewards. This
paradigm was found to be analogous to extracting indi-
vidual latencies for reward collection during the RGT, so
the latter measure has been used for this experiment (Ri-
valan et al., 2013). The number of visits to the nose-poke
apertures was also monitored as a potential measure of
reward-seeking behaviour.
Results
Poor DM showed a shorter latency to collect their reward
than good DM, as previously observed (Rivalan et al.,
2009a — Figure 3.7). All poor DM scores (100%) were be-
low the median vs 36% for good DM (Fisher exact test, p
= .032; group medians, 1.12 and 1.26 s respectively; U = 16, p = .07). However, the
global activity of the two groups, reflected by the total number of visits to the nose
poke holes, did not statistically differ (median scores: 1025 and 857 for good vs poor
DM respectively; U = 20, ns).
3.4.7 Motor Impulsivity / Perseverance
Impulsivity is a multi-factorial trait encompassing both impulsive actions and impul-
sive choices (Dalley et al., 2011). Impulsive actions refer to an inability to delay a
response (i.e., premature responses, or an inability to withhold a response; i.e. antici-
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patory hyperactivity and perseveration) while impulsive choices refer to an inability
to wait for a delayed greater benefit.
3.4.7.1 Methods
3.4.7.2 Impulsive actions: anticipatory hyperactivity and perseveration
The multiple Fixed-Interval/Extinction schedules of reinforcement (FI-EXT) was per-
formed during a single session in operant chambers equipped with one lever. The
chambers used for this test were different from the ones used in the RGT (Dellu-
Hagedorn, 2006). Two periods of fixed-interval schedule of reinforcement (FI) alter-
nated with two periods of extinction (EXT) (FI-EXT-FI-EXT). Impulsive responses
corresponded to lever presses during frustrating periods where no reward was avail-
able (that is, during the FI delay or the EXT extinction phase).
The apparatus consisted of eight sound-insulated light-tight outer chambers each
containing a lever conditioning box (Imetronic, Pessac). The boxes (32x32x22 cm)
were constructed from white plastic panels with a Plexiglas door. They were equipped
with a fan providing background noise. Each box was permanently illuminated by a
diffuse 2 lux light source located in the middle of the ceiling (box light) and another
light above the lever (cue light). The floor consisted of 5 mm diameter stainless steel
bars spaced 1.5 cm apart. One stainless steel lever protruded horizontally 1 cm from
the wall situated at the left of the door. A tray was situated centrally on the opposite
wall. Food pellets (45 mg, formula P, Sandow scientific, USA) were delivered in the
tray by a food dispenser. A program (Imetronic, Pessac) controlled the chambers and
collected the data on a computer situated outside the testing room.
Training and test: During the FI, the box light was ‘on’ and the first lever press
after a designated time-interval was reinforced by a food pellet. The cue light above
the lever was ‘on’ when the pellet was available until the rat visited the tray. During
the EXT (5 min), the box light was ‘off’ and no pellet was delivered. During each
session, the FI and EXT components operated twice in alternation. Rats were first
trained for four sessions with a 30s FI-EXT schedule. Then, rats were trained for four
sessions on a 1 min FI-EXT schedule followed by three sessions with a 2 min FI-EXT
schedule. A maximum of 7 pellets per FI (14 pellets in total) were delivered during
the 1 and 2 min FI conditions. Finally, rats were tested for four sessions on a 1 min
FI-EXT schedule to assess adaptability to a change for a shorter FI phase. This latter
condition has been chosen for analysis.
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Data measure: The mean number of lever presses during each FI and each EXT con-
ditions was recorded. As previously described (Dellu-Hagedorn, 2006), data from the
initial FI after the start of the session, as well as that from the first interval following
the first EXT were excluded because the behaviour during these intervals might de-
viate from those during the other intervals. The total mean number of lever presses,
the number of visits to the empty tray as well as the speed at collecting food pellets
were also measured for the FI and EXT schedules.
3.4.7.3 Impulsive actions: premature responses
The Fixed Consecutive Number of 16 lever press schedule (FCN16) measures be-
havioural inhibition in operant chambers by testing the rat’s ability to carry out a
long chain of sequential lever presses before obtaining a reward (Rivalan et al., 2007).
The schedule required a fixed minimum number of 16 responses on one lever (FCN
lever), signalled by a cue light, before a response on the second lever (Reinforcement
lever) resulted in the delivery of one food pellet. Impulsivity was reflected by the
proportion of prematurely ended chains of presses on the FCN lever. These chains
reset the count and were not rewarded. Chains longer that 16 responses were scored
as perseveration.
The operant chambers used for FCN16 testing were similar to the ones used for
the FI-EXT schedule, except that they had two levers situated on the wall opposite
to the food magazine instead of one. A cue light above the second (right) lever was
also added. The reinforcement lever, much less used than the FCN lever, was the one
previously used in the FI-EXT schedule.
Training: On the first day, only the reinforcement lever was available and every
press resulted in the delivery of a food pellet in the tray. The rats quickly obtained
at least 100 pellets within 40 min (criterion). The following days, both levers were
available and the light above the FCN lever was turned on and rats were required
to press the FCN lever first and then to press the Reinforcement lever to obtain food
(FCN1). The cue light was switched off when the rats had completed the number of
consecutive presses required on the FCN lever to obtain food. The cue light signalled
the completion of the response requirement to avoid confounds related to time esti-
mation (Rivalan et al., 2007). This cue light was turned on again when rats visited
the tray. If the chain was shorter than the number required, the rat had to start a new
chain. If the chain was longer, it had no consequence, and the pellet was delivered
when the rat pressed the reinforced lever. When 100 pellets were obtained within a
session (40 min cut-off), the FCN requirement was progressively increased to 2, 3, 5, 8
3.4 methods 48
and 12 using a less strict criterion (45-min cut-off and at least 70 pellets) to avoid over-
training. Rats that failed to reach the criterion in FCN5 after 20 training sessions were
excluded from this task. Training under FCN12 lasted a minimum of two consecutive
30-min sessions until rats had reached a stable level of performance.
Test: Rats were tested using the same procedural conditions as in training but with
a FCN requirement of 16 lever presses (FCN16) during three consecutive sessions (30
min or 100 pellets cut-off). A rewarded chain of lever presses corresponded to 16 or
more lever presses executed on the FCN lever before pressing the reinforced lever.
Data measure: Only data from the third session of FCN16 were analysed as they
revealed the largest inter-individual behavioural differences between good and poor
decision makers. Impulsivity in this task is reflected by a low percentage of rewarded
chains (<70%). Among rewarded chains, some were just as long as necessary (16
presses) and reflect high response efficiency, whereas some others exceeded the num-
ber of presses required and reflect low response efficiency. Thus, response efficiency
was estimated by the number of FCN lever presses divided by the total number of
food pellet consumed. The number of sessions needed to reach the test phase (learn-
ing score) and response rate (total number of each lever responses per min) were also
considered. The distribution of the mean number of chain of lever presses according
to their length was analysed.
Impulsive choice: delay discounting
The Delay Discounting Task (DDT) measures impulsive choices in an operant cham-
ber by assessing the preference for an immediate small reward (one pellet, when
pressing one of the levers) over a larger one delivered after a delay (5 pellets, when
pressing the other lever). The delay preceding the delivery of the larger reinforcement
was progressively increased between sessions.
The operant chambers were the same as those used for the RGT, except that the
curved wall was replaced by a straight one equipped with two levers facing the food
magazine on the opposite wall. The box light, two cue-lights above the two levers and
one cue light in the tray of the food magazine were available and could be turned ‘on’
and ‘off’ depending of the procedure.
Training: During training, a press on the right lever (L1) resulted in the immediate
delivery of one food pellet whereas a press on the left lever (L5) readily delivered five
pellets. Given that the rats were previously trained in the FCN16 schedule that also
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Figure 3.8: Good and poor decision makers (DM) performances in the multiple fixed-
interval (FI) and extinction (EXT) schedules. Relationship between individual scores
in the RGT and (A) the mean number of lever presses during the 1-min FI or (B)
during the 5-min EXT. (C, top panel) Mean number of lever presses of good and
poor DM during one 1-min FI component as a function of time. (C, lower panel)
Mean number of lever presses during the 5-min EXT component as a function time.
Grey lines represent the median used to compute proportions of high and low scores
for good and poor DM.
used two levers (the previous FCN lever being now the L1 lever), a training period
was conducted in order to obtain stable performances with no interference from pre-
vious requirements. This training period lasted until the rats made more than 70%
L5 selections with less than 15% variation in this score on 2 consecutive sessions (in
total, 3 sessions were necessary). Whenever an operant lever press was made, a light
above this lever was switched on for 1 sec. Three seconds after food delivery, the
magazine light was turned on for 60 sec, during which time additional presses were
without consequence (time-out). The end of this time-out and the beginning of a new
trial was signalled by turning off the food magazine light as well as the box light.
The duration of the time-out was adjusted such that the duration of each trial was
the same whichever lever was chosen.
Test: During the test phase, a press on L1 immediately delivered one food pellet,
and was followed by a 60 sec time-out, whereas a delay was inserted between L5
pressing and the delivery of the five pellets. During this delay, the light above L5
lever remained on until the pellets were delivered, then a time-out (60 sec minus
the length of the delay) immediately followed food delivery. The delay was fixed for
a given daily session and increased progressively over the days by 10 sec intervals
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from 0 to 40 sec according to a criterion of stability (i.e. scores over two consecutive
sessions should not vary by more than 10%). All sessions ended when 100 pellets had
been delivered.
Data measures: Percentage of L5 choice, total mean number of lever presses, and
presses during the delay and time-out periods were measured. These parameters
were calculated for each delay as the mean of the last two stable sessions.
3.4.7.4 Results
Impulsive actions using FI-EXT: Impulsive actions here denote anticipatory hyperac-
tivity and perseverance. The FI-EXT task assesses reward anticipation and sensitivity
to context during frustrating periods without reinforcement (Rivalan et al., 2007; Gré-
goire et al., 2012). Lever press activity is measured either during a delay before a
lever press can deliver the reward (FI) or during an extinction phase (EXT) where no
reward can be obtained (light house off). During the 1-min FI and 5-min EXT, 83%
of poor DM had a motor activity equal to or higher than the median score, vs 43%
for the good DM (Figure 3.8A,B). Overall, poor DM tended to perform more lever
presses than good DM both during FI, (medians, 178 and 98 respectively; U = 23, p
= .1) and during EXT (medians, 111 and 55; U = 21, p = .08), suggesting both antici-
pation and perseverance. Both groups exhibited the typical pattern of activity during
each interval of the FI, namely a progressive increase in response rate as reinforce-
ment availability approached, with poor DM reaching a score 1.5 times higher than
good DM. During EXT, poor performers exhibited both a larger and longer episode
of increased activity (Figure 3.8C). The latency to collect rewards did not significantly
differ between groups (U = 31.5), nor did the number of visits to the empty tray (U =
35 and 30, ns). The mean number of lever presses during FI and EXT were positively
correlated (r = .69, p<.001).
Impulsive actions using FCN16: Impulsive actions here denote premature responses
and compulsive-like behaviour. The FCN16 measures response inhibition through
the ability to complete a long sequence of lever presses on a first lever (FCN lever)
before moving on to another lever (reward lever) that provides a reward (Rivalan
et al., 2007; Grégoire et al., 2012). Both groups learned the task at the same rate
(learning scores, U = 36, ns). Poor DM did not exhibit any deficit in inhibitory control
(i.e. premature switches to the reward lever). The chain length distribution curve
of both good and poor DM showed a peak for the optimal chain length (Figure
3.9A). Both groups predominantly performed rewarded chains (i.e. of length > = 16,
Figure 3.9A-insert). However, poor DM made a higher proportion of long chains of
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Figure 3.9: Good and poor decision makers (DM) performances in the (FCN16) Fixed
Consecutive Number of 16 lever press schedule. (A) Frequency distribution (%) of
chain length in the two groups. Optimal chain length (16) is indicated by the verti-
cal dotted line. Inset: Percentage of rewarded chains for good and poor DM (Mean
+SEM). (B,C) Relationship between individual scores in the RGT and (B) response
efficiency or (C) the number of reinforcement lever presses. Grey lines represent the
median used to compute proportions of high and low scores in good and poor DM.
responses (>16), leading to a lower response efficiency (Figure 3.9B; U = 8, p<.01). The
occurrence of very long chains of presses was occasional. For instance, the number
of chains longer than 22 presses was 1% of the total number of chains for good DM,
and 3% for poor DM. However, all poor DM displayed at least one such very long
chain during the test vs only 6 out of the 14 good DM. Moreover, whilst the number
of presses on the FCN lever did not differ between groups (U = 28, ns), poor DM
were more active on the reinforcement lever (U = 18, p<.05), making short bursts of
presses instead of a single press. These perseverative behaviours, not accompanied by
an attempt to collect the reward even when a clear signal announces its availability,
are reminiscent of excessive and compulsive behaviour. All poor DM had scores on
or above the median vs 43% for the good DM, which had scores below the median
(Fisher exact test p = .018; Figure 3.9C).
Impulsive choices using DDT: Impulsive choice here refer to delay discounting. The
DDT assesses the ability to tolerate a delay when a choice between an immediate
small reward and a delayed larger reward is given. It indicates for each individual
the subjective value of the large reward as a function of the delay and the delay at
which both rewards are perceived to be of equal value. Under the no-delay condition,
good and poor DM preferentially chose the larger reward (Figure 3.10A) and poor
DM overall performed more lever presses than good DM (U = 16, p<.05; Figure 3.10B).
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Figure 3.10: Good and poor decision makers (DM) performances in the in the (DDT)
delay-discounting task. (A) Percentage of choices for the large, delayed reinforcement
as a function of delay in the two groups. (B) Relationship between individual scores
in the RGT and the mean number of lever press during DDT training. Dotted line rep-
resents chance level. The grey line denotes the median used to compute proportions
of high and low scores in good and poor DM.
When the delay increased, both groups shifted to the immediate reward at the same
delay, suggesting that they displayed similar reward discounting and tolerance to
delay (Figure 3.10A).
Poor decision makers Good decision makers
Rats 3 8 32 15 28 9 % 2 4 24 33 6 31 1 17 19 29 12 30 27 26 %
Motor impulsivity X X X X X 83 X X X X X X X 43
& perseverance X X X X X X X X X X X
Risk-seeking X X X X X 83 X X X X X 14
X X X X X X 100 X X X X
Reward-seeking X X X X X mis. 100 X X X X X 36
Inflexibility X X X X X X 100 X X X X X 36
Nb. of high scores 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
Table 3.1: Motor impulsivity/perseverative responses correspond to high activity
scores in both fixed-interval (FI) and extinction (EXT) schedules of reinforcement.
Risk taking is indicated by a short latency to emerge and a low number of risk assess-
ment in the dark-light box test, reward seeking by a short latency to collect food in the
RGT, and inflexibility by performance in the RGT reversed condition. A tick indicates
a high score (with respect to the global group median) for a given parameter. The
last line shows the total number of high scores displayed by each rat. Proportions of
subjects demonstrating high score in each group are also given. Mis. : missing value.
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3.4.8 Combination of traits
Figure 3.11: Animals’
combined score (i.e. sum
of ranks for each trait)
for all the behavioural
traits measured.
A combination of behavioural traits is highly predictive
of poor decision-making. Poor DM consistently displayed
above median scores for each of the following behaviours
(Table 3.1), except one poor DM missing motor impulsiv-
ity): motor impulsivity/perseveration, risk proneness, re-
ward seeking and behavioural inflexibility. They obtained
a lower global index when these behavioural traits were
combined (sum of the ranks) compared to good DM (Fig-
ure 3.11). By contrast, no good DM ever expressed high
scores for more than two of these particular behaviours.
Thus, in healthy individuals, the combination of these
traits more than any one in particular was highly pre-
dictive of poor decision making in the RGT. The associa-
tion of cognitive inflexibility and risk taking behaviour or
motor impulsivity was never observed in good DM and
thus may be a particularly relevant combination of risk factors for impaired decision-
making.
3.4.9 Discussion and limitations of behavioural results
As shown in Table 3.2, no correlation was observed between reward-seeking, risk
seeking and behavioural flexibility. A positive correlation was found between all im-
pulsive actions and perseverative responses in different experimental contexts. These
parameters (except FI activity) were positively correlated with risk taking, and were
independent from inhibitory control capacities (FCN schedule) and impulsive choice
(DDT). We decided to model all independent traits (risk, reward and flexibility) ex-
cluding motor impulsivity since impulsivity/perseverance measures were correlated
with the risk seeking trait (see Table 3.2).
3.5 modelling individual rgt performances with behavioural traits
3.5.1 Temporal Difference learning model
The environment of the RGT was modelled using a Markov decision process. The
four possible choices (actions) in the task lead to different rewarded states s (i.e. high
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Reward Flexibility Risk Inhib.cont. Motor impulsivity & perseverance
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Reward-seeking RGT 1
Behav. flexibility Reversal 2 0.09
Risk-seeking Emergence 3 0.11 0.22
Emergence 4 -0.24 0.11 0.69 ***
Inhibitory control FCN16 5 -0.27 0.00 -0.35 0.22
Motor impulsivity FCN16 6 0.14 -0.36 -0.51 ** 0.45 * -0.10
& perseverance FI 7 0.22 0.02 -0.28 -0.34 0.09 0.68 ***
EXT 8 -0.08 -0.07 -0.50 ** -0.52 0.07 0.53 ** 0.69 ***
DDT 9 0.20 -0.18 -0.61 *** -0.53 0.22 0.50 ** 0.40 0.57 **
Impulsive choices DDT 10 -0.23 0.12 -0.26 -0.22 0.50 ** -0.10 -0.056 -0.19 0.07
Table 3.2: The three behavioural processes included in the model, reward and risk
seeking, behavioural flexibility, were unrelated. Impulsive actions and perseverative
responses in different experimental contexts were positively correlated. These pa-
rameters (except FI activity) were positively correlated with risk taking, and were
independent from inhibitory control capacities (FCN schedule) and impulsive choice
(DDT). Significant correlations are shown in bold. RGT: rat gambling task; FCN16:
fixed consecutive number schedule of reinforcement; FI: fixed- interval; EXT: extinc-
tion: DDT: delay discounting task. Pearson’s correlation test; *, p,.05; **, p,.01; ***,
p,.001.
reward ‘r = 2 food pellets’ for choices A & B or a low reward ‘r = 1 food pellet’ for
choices C & D). Each of these states is then followed by a probabilistic transition to
the penalty associated with the reward state s (penalty transition probabilities are
1
/2, 1/4, 1/4, 1/2 for the A, B, C and D states respectively). Penalties correspond to
time-outs during which no food can be obtained. In the absence of penalties, rats
obtain and consume on average one food pellet in nine seconds ( 
episode
= 9 sec).
Therefore, time-outs of duration  
timeout(s) can be expressed in terms of a gain loss







This results in penalty values of -50, -25, -4/3, -2/3 food pellets for the states A,
B, C, and D respectively.
The reward received after taking action a in state s is described by a state-action
pair value Q(s,a), which gradually comes to reflect the ‘goodness’ of selecting action
a when in state s (Sutton and Barto, 1998; Doya, 2009; Maia and Frank, 2011). In this
framework, the agent learns the value corresponding to each state-action pair Q(s,a)
by updating its expectations of the reward Q(s,a) towards the reward received the
last time action a was chosen in state s. This updating is based on the prediction error
between the predicted reward for the state-action pair Q(s,a) and the reward actually
received r:
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where ↵ is the learning rate parameter, r





) is the current estimate of the value of choosing action a in state s
at time t (Sutton and Barto, 1998). This learning process causes Q(s,a) to gradually
approach the real value of choosing action a. No temporal discounting parameter
was introduced in this model as individual trials were considered to be independent,
each leading to immediate reward consumption as well as possible penalties.
3.5.2 Learning model with behavioural traits
We then extended this basic framework to account for reward seeking, risk seeking
and cognitive inflexibility.
3.5.2.1 Reward Sensitivity
The reward seeking trait is introduced as a modulation of the magnitude of the actual
rewards r
t
by a multiplicative weight:
r
t
 ! · r
t
(3.3)
Values of ! > 1 correspond to the agent representing the reward values as higher
than they really are. It was shown experimentally that poor decision makers were able
to perform optimally, similar to the good decision makers, in a penalty-only version
of the RGT. Therefore, sensitivity to penalty was left constant across animals. In the
RGT, rewards are equal to either one or two. Therefore, modelling reward seeking as
a multiplicative weight on the true reward provides the simplest way to describe the
transformation from objective to subjective reward values (Niv et al., 2006).
3.5.2.2 Risk Seeking
Following previous work (Li and Chan, 2006), the behavioural trait of risk seeking
(or risk aversion) is implemented by adding a positive (or negative) component to
the reward that is proportional to the risk level of the action. We define the risk level
associated with an action a as the standard deviation of penalty values experienced
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where n denotes the number of times the action a was taken from the start of the









Therefore, the combination of reward seeking and risk seeking is modelled replac-
ing the reward by:
r
t
 ! · r
t





where ⇢ controls the strength of the risk seeking trait and is unique to each individ-
ual rat. A positive value denotes risk-seeking while a negative value corresponds to
risk aversion. We choose to model risk in this form, in contrast to some other methods
(Mihatsch and Neuneier, 2002; Niv et al., 2012), as the present form requires only one
parameter and allows learning to reach larger asymptotic values in risky situations.
3.5.2.3 Cognitive Inflexibility
The cognitive inflexibility trait is modelled for simplicity by adjusting the learning
rate parameter ↵: ↵ is split into two separate components, an initial learning rate pa-
rameter ↵
0
and an exponential decay with time constant ⌧
0
, which gradually reduces









is comprised between 0 (no learning) and 1. Parameter ⌧
0
deter-
mines how quickly the agent stops learning and becomes insensitive to the reward










describe rats that are inflexible. A further global index of flexibility is given by
the integration of ↵ over time. We are aware that recent modelling studies have sug-
gested using a state-splitting mechanism (Gershman et al., 2010a; Redish et al., 2007)
to account for the commonly observed rapid recovery of performances during re-
instatement of learned contingencies after extinction. However, our experiments did
not address the recovery of the initial RGT conditions after the reversal. Therefore,
implementing the state-splitting mechanism would have greatly increased the model
complexity (i.e. number of free parameters) without improving the fit to the data.
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3.5.3 Combined model
The resulting model is a TD learning algorithm (SARSA- ) where risk seeking and
reward seeking traits affect the value of rewards, while cognitive inflexibility controls














































Actions are selected according to a Softmax process, by assigning a probability of
selection to each available action p(s
t


















where " is a temperature parameter which controls the amount of exploration. A
high level of exploration is imposed to all subjects during the first 10 min of simu-
lation to ensure that all the options are initially sampled (by analogy with the be-
havioural procedures).
3.5.5 Model fitting
The performance of this model during the RGT is fitted to the performance profile of
each individual rat using Maximum Likelihood, in order to extract a set of parame-
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) (3.10)
where L (✓ | x
10
· · · , x
60
) denotes the likelihood of the data under the model, ✓




are the experimental performance levels
(percentage of advantageous choices) of the rat over successive 10 min blocks. The
likelihood is computed by running the RGT model 50 times for a given set of param-
eters. Using the performance profiles extracted for each model iteration, we calculate
the probability distribution of getting an advantageous choice at every 10 minutes
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time-bin. The maximum likelihood is the set of parameters that gives the highest
probability of resulting in the observed rat performance profile at each of the 10
minutes time-bin.
3.5.6 Model comparison
We used the Likelihood Ratio Test and the Bayesian Information Criterion (Daw, 2011)
to test whether simpler models including only 1 or 2 behavioural traits could be as
predictive of poor decision making as the full model.
3.5.7 Correlation analysis
The significance of the observed correlation coefficient between the experimental mea-
sures and the modelled behavioural traits was tested using Monte Carlo permutation
tests. This method performs random permutations to mix the paired values (i.e. mod-
elled trait parameter values and the experimental analogue values) and measure the
new correlation coefficients for each new permutation. Doing so a large number of
times (i.e. 100,000 iterations) provides a distribution of correlation coefficients for
random permutations of values so as to test the null hypothesis.
3.6 results
3.6.1 RGT and Reversal
The TD model was fitted to each rats’ performances in the RGT to estimate the five
free parameters describing each rat: two parameters for cognitive inflexibility, one for
risk seeking, one for reward seeking and one for the exploration of the environment
(see Methods). Partial models with fewer parameters were also tested (see below).
The model was able to reproduce the distinct performance profiles observed dur-
ing the RGT session for poor and good DM (Figure 3.12A). This suggests that dif-
ferences in risk-proneness, reward seeking behaviour and cognitive inflexibility can
collectively account for the variability of performance profiles observed experimen-
tally. Moreover, based on the performance of the rats during the RGT, the model
could successfully predict the performance profile of all poor DM and of half of the







Figure 3.12: Model’s performance on the RGT & Reversal-RGT. (A) Simulated time-
course of advantageous choices (%) of good and poor DM on the RGT. (B) Simu-
lated time-course of advantageous choices for flexible, undecided, inflexible good
DM and inflexible poor DM groups on the RGT-reversed version. Dotted line repre-
sents chance level.
3.6.2 Cognitive Inflexibility
Cognitive inflexibility was implemented as a gradual decrease of the learning rate
over the course of the experimental session controlled by two parameters ↵
0
, the ini-
tial learning rate and ⌧
0
the decay (see Methods). The initial learning rate parameter
↵
0
, extracted from a fit of the RGT session alone was positively correlated with the
experimental measure of flexibility during reversal (r = .3303, group correlation MC
permutation test p = .0266). The model predicted an inflexible learning behavior in all
modelled poor DM (poor DMm; Figure 3.13A), as observed experimentally (Figure
3.6B). When both the RGT and reversal conditions were used to estimate all model pa-




and the area under ↵) correlated positively
with the experimental measure of flexibility (e.g. for ↵, r = -.73, MC permutation test
p = .0002, see 3.13B).
3.6.3 Risk Seeking
Risk seeking was implemented by adding a risk-related reward contribution (Li and
Chan, 2006) to the actual rewards (see Methods). In the model (Figure 3.14A), as
in the experiments (Figure 3.5A,B), poor DMm were characterized by higher levels
of risk sensitivity than good DMm. The risk parameter extracted from the model
significantly correlated with the two behavioural measures of risk seeking (i.e. mean
latency for the first visit in the light compartment and risk assessments, r = -.5370 and





Figure 3.13: Estimated learning rate parameter, modeling cognitive flexibility. (A) Re-
lationship between simulated individual RGT scores and the estimated flexibility pa-
rameters affecting the learning rate. (B) The measure of cognitive inflexibility (x-axis)
and the estimated inflexibility parameter (area under ↵; y-axis). Grey lines represent





Figure 3.14: Estimated ⇢ parameters modeling the risk-seeking behavioral trait. (A)
Relationship between simulated individual RGT scores and the estimated risk seek-
ing parameters. (B) The measured risk seeking (number of risk assessments; x-axis)
and the estimated risk-seeking parameter (y-axis). Grey lines represent the median
used to compute proportions of high and low scores in good and poor DM.
3.6.4 Reward Seeking
Reward seeking behaviour was modelled by allowing the perceived magnitude of
the rewards to be greater than the actual reward. In the model, consistent with ex-
perimental data (Figure 3.7), all poor DMm except one showed high reward seeking,
whereas less than 29% of modelled good DM (good DMm) showed this trait (Figure
3.15A). The reward seeking parameter estimated from the model correlated signifi-
cantly with the corresponding behavioural measure of reward sensitivity (r = -.4014,





Figure 3.15: Estimated ! parameters modeling the reward-seeking behavioral trait.
(A) Relationship between simulated individual RGT scores and the estimated reward
seeking parameters during the RGT + Reversal. (B) The measured reward sensitivity
(x-axis) and the estimated reward sensitivity (y-axis). Grey lines represent the median




Figure 3.16: Estimated individual rank scores when combining all the behavioral
traits modelled. (A) The sum of the simulated score ranks for each modelled behavior.
(B) The sum of ranks for all the behavioral traits measured experimentally (x-axis)
and those estimated by the model (y-axis). Grey lines represent the median used to
compute proportions of high and low scores in good and poor DM.
3.6.5 Combination of traits
Finally, when all the different behavioural traits are taken into account (Figure 3.16A),
poor DMm exhibited a combination of high levels for the modelled behavioural traits
as observed in behavioural measures. The global index (sum of the ranks for each
behavioural trait) of each modelled rat was highly correlated with the global index
derived from experimental measures (r = .7420, MC permutation test p = .0003, see
Figure 3.16B). Furthermore, similarly to the experimental data (Table 3.1 and Figure
3.11A), the model showed that the combination of high cognitive inflexibility, reward
and risk seeking is particularly discriminative of poor DMm, since good DMm almost
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never expressed more than one of those traits (Table 3.3).
Poor decision makers Good decision makers
Rats 3 8 32 15 28 9 % 2 4 24 33 6 31 1 17 19 29 12 30 27 26 %
Risk-seeking X X X X X X 100 X X X X X X X 50
Reward-seeking X X X X X 83 X X X X X X X 50
Inflexibility X X X X X X 100 X X X X 29
Nb. of high scores 3 2 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1
Table 3.3: Same representation as in Table 3.1 for modeled behavioral traits: risk tak-
ing, reward seeking and inflexibility parameters.
3.6.6 Influences of combined behavioural traits on learning
To understand why good and poor DM show different choice preferences, we anal-
ysed how well good and poor DMm evaluated advantageous and disadvantageous
actions. The Q-values representing the valuation of each choice at the end of the RGT
session were extracted for all rats, using the TD-learning model.
Figure 3.17B illustrates the mean Q-values assigned to the disadvantageous choices
(A & B) and advantageous choices (C & D) by poor and good decision makers. Poor
DMm vastly over-estimated the value of all states rather than just disadvantageous
options. The over-estimation was more important for disadvantageous choices in
comparison to the advantageous ones. By contrast, good DMm stopped exploring
disadvantageous choices early in the RGT session due to their negative value.
In the model, high scores in risk seeking, reward seeking or inflexibility lead to
an altered estimation of the true value of all states. High scores in a combination of
traits lead to a shift in the valuation of the state-action pairs, where disadvantageous
choices appear to be more valuable than advantageous ones.
Comparison with simpler models: Model comparison was also performed in order to
address whether simpler models with fewer behavioural traits could have accounted
just as well for the experimental data. We tested simpler versions of our model with
either only one or two behavioural traits and compared the fit of these models to
the experimental data. We used the Likelihood Ratio Test and the Bayesian Informa-
tion Criterion to assess the fit of the models while penalizing for added complexity.
The likelihood ratio test revealed that the full model (including reward sensitivity,
risk seeking and cognitive inflexibility) was significantly better (p<0.0001) than any
other simpler model, suggesting that all behavioural traits are necessary to describe
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Figure 3.17: Model comparison and impact of behavioural traits on learning and
decision-making. (A) Bayesian Information Criterion scores for each model (a low
score is better). Models based on two traits fare uniformly better than models based
on a single trait. Models with two traits including cognitive inflexibility have bet-
ter scores than equivalent or simpler models. The model with all three simulated
traits provides the best fit to the data even when penalizing for the increased model
complexity (number of free parameters). (B) Learned Q-Values for advantageous and
disadvantageous choices by both Good and Poor DM. Bars represent the mean Q-
values assigned to the disadvantageous choices (A & B; dark-grey) and advantageous
choices (C & D; light-grey) averaged over all poor or good decision makers at the end
of an RGT session. Error bars represent 95% CI around the mean Q-value for all the
rats of the population of interest. Poor decision makers vastly over-value disadvanta-
geous choices in comparison to advantageous choices.
the experimental data. Similar results were obtained using the Bayesian Information
Criterion (see Figure 3.17A).
3.7 discussion and limitations
Like the IGT in humans, the RGT probably involves a number of cognitive processes,
and separating their relative contribution is a challenge. However, our purpose was
not to focus on one specific executive function involved in choice, but rather to iden-
tify the whole complex phenotype sustaining poor decision making in conflictual
and risky situations, as observed in real life. Indeed, a complex interplay between
independent behavioural domains is more likely to reflect the complexity of human
phenotype and disorders (Kalueff et al., 2008; LaPorte et al., 2010; Robbins et al.,
2012).
In the present study, we confirm this hypothesis as we establish a clear link between
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separate behavioural traits in a normal sample of rats and decision-making in the
RGT. Although each trait considered separately has a poor predictive value, both the
behavioural and the modelling analyses indicate that poor decision making can be
accurately predicted when these traits are considered in combination.
3.7.1 Behaviour & decision-making
While integrating multiple cognitive abilities, the RGT offers the advantage to assess
the time-course of the decision making process within a single session. It is partic-
ularly suitable for identifying inter-individual differences in decision making, and
notably for identifying poor decision-makers because choices are made readily and
lead to two opposed decisions: either a preference for advantageous options or a
preference for the disadvantageous ones (Rivalan et al., 2011). As shown by the meta-
analysis of several experiments in the RGT (de Visser et al., 2011), these behaviours
are reproducible. Importantly, poor decision-making does not result from a slower
learning. We have previously shown that repeating the RGT on three consecutive
days does not change the rats’ preferences (data not shown). Additionally, acquir-
ing information about the value of the options separately before the test does not
change the proportions of poor and good decision-makers, nor does it change their
behaviours (Rivalan et al., 2011).
We show that poor decision making is expressed by individuals presenting exces-
sive scores for a combination of behavioural and cognitive traits: risk taking, higher
reward seeking behavior, motor impulsivity and behavioural inflexibility, expressed
simultaneously. This contrasts with good DM which present a wider range of scores
and only express up to two of these characteristics (Table 3.1). The various traits that
we examined were largely independent from one another. A noteworthy exception
was the relationship between motor impulsivity/perseveration and risk taking (see
Table 3.2).
Link to psychiatry: Poor DM are characterized by risk and reward seeking, which
have been found to be associated with trait dominance in rats and humans, and could
be necessary for the development and maintenance of social structure (Davis et al.,
2009; Demaree et al., 2009). Interestingly, risk and reward seeking, in combination
with impulsivity, are hallmarks of poor decision making related mental disorders
such as ADHD (Drechsler et al., 2008), personality disorders, substance abuse (Ernst
et al., 2003a; Mazas et al., 2000), pathological gambling (van Holst et al., 2010) or ma-
3.7 discussion and limitations 65
nia (Kathleen Holmes et al., 2009). Poor DM are also characterized by behavioural in-
flexibility as well as perseverative and compulsive-like behaviours. Their inflexibility
was particularly noticeable in the RGT reversal procedure, which requires redirect-
ing choices on the basis of new response-reward contingencies (Granon and Floresco,
2009), but also in the FCN schedule with perseverative responses. Indeed, persever-
ative responses in the FCN have similarly been observed following amphetamine
administration (0.8 mg/kg), in a similar procedure (Evenden and Ko, 2005). These
effects of the psychomotor stimulant are likely to reflect compulsivity, especially at
this dose, given that only low doses of amphetamine (0.25 mg/kg) are known to
reduce impulsivity in this task (Rivalan et al., 2007; Grégoire et al., 2012), whereas
higher doses (0.5 mg/kg or above) increase impulsive responses. Perseverative be-
havior, typically observed after acute administration of psychostimulants (Evenden
and Ko, 2005), inflexible and compulsive behavior can be seen in drug addiction (Calu
et al., 2007; Jentsch et al., 2002), pathological gambling (Goudriaan et al., 2006) and in
obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) (DSM-IV-TR, 2000). Inappropriate compulsive
behaviours (Dalley et al., 2011) may result from attributing excessive incentive value
to reward associated stimuli (Berridge, 1998; Flagel et al., 2009). This could explain
bursts of activity on the reinforcer level in the FCN schedule, as well as hyperactiv-
ity in the FI-EXT schedule. Compulsive behavior could also result from a quicker
switch from initial voluntary goal-directed behavior to an habitual, automatic pro-
cess with loss of control, as observed in drug addiction and OCD (Everitt et al., 2008;
Gillan et al., 2011). Interestingly, poor decision-makers do not have more impulsive
tendencies compared to good DM in terms of intolerance to delayed gratification
and of inhibitory control. Still, we cannot exclude that more demanding tasks (e.g.
the stop-task; Feola et al., 2000) could reveal differences in inhibition between both
phenotypes. Moreover, the higher sensitivity of poor DM may have influenced the
performance in this task. However, a recent meta-analysis also concluded that inhibi-
tion and decision-making in the IGT are dissociated (Toplak et al., 2010).
Previous studies have shown that individual behavioural traits can be related to
maladaptive behavior in animal models of mental disorders (i.e. novelty-seeking
in depression (Stedenfeld et al., 2011); impulsivity, novelty preference in drug self-
administration (Molander et al., 2011; Dalley et al., 2007; Diergaarde et al., 2008).
However, the cumulative effect of several symptoms in one individual, as systemat-
ically observed in mental disorders (DSM-IV-TR, 2000), has rarely been considered
in an animal model (Kalueff et al., 2008). Here, we show that a complex phenotype
is highly predictive of poor decision-making, since it only describes poor perform-
ers. Each of the traits identified participates to this phenotype that leads to the in-
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ability to adapt to the situation because of a distorted representation of the balance
between reward and risk, and an inflexible/compulsive behavior precluding readjust-
ment of behavior. This complex phenotype reflects well the relevance of the concept
of “domain-interplay” to explore the basis of maladaptive behavior (Kalueff et al., 2008;
LaPorte et al., 2010). Although we cannot conclude that the different observed phe-
notypes represent innate or acquired differences, it is noteworthy that dominant rats
are natural risk takers and display increased motivation for food reward (Davis et al.,
2009; Demaree et al., 2009), two characteristics of poor decision makers in the RGT.
This social parameter could be well related to performance in the RGT, a hypothesis
that remains to be elucidated.
3.7.2 Learning & decision-making
Building on the expanding literature indicating that behavioural traits such as risk
seeking affect learning and the prediction error signal (Niv et al., 2012; Schultz, 2011),
we used a reinforcement learning model of the RGT to investigate the relationship
between the traits and the decision making performances. First, we used the model
to address whether the behavioural traits could collectively account for the variety of
performances observed in the decision-making task (i.e. Can excessive behavioural
traits lead to poor and/or undecided decision-making?). Secondly, we used the model
to explore the interaction between the behavioural traits on learning and decision-
making (i.e. How and why do excessive traits lead to poor decision-making?). The
computational model, based on a TD-learning algorithm, was modified to include
the behavioural traits of risk seeking, reward sensitivity and behavioural inflexibility.
The model reveals how risk seeking, reward sensitivity and behavioural inflexibil-
ity jointly contribute to the learning and the decision-making process. The model of
the RGT fits the experimental data very closely, and demonstrates that traits such as
high risk seeking, high reward seeking and cognitive inflexibility can be derived from
the performance of individuals in the RGT. Importantly, all the parameters used to
model the behavioural traits successfully correlated with the experimental measures
for each trait, validating the assumptions made during the implementation. This sug-
gests that the mathematical formalization of all the behavioural traits and their in-
dependent influence on learning in the RGT were valid. Interestingly, we found that
individual traits were insufficient to lead to poor performances at the task (Table 3.3).
Rather, poor decision-making required specific combinations of at least two of the be-
havioural traits, namely inflexible learning and risk seeking or inflexible learning and
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reward seeking. This suggests that single excessive behavioural traits may be compen-
sated for in good decision makers. Yet, such potential compensatory processes may
fail when a combination of traits are involved.
Importantly, the computational study is based on the assumption that a failure in
decision-making occurs through an altered internal representation of the values in
the environment (Figure 3.17B), as is customary in computational modelling of psy-
chopathology (Redish, 2004; Redish et al., 2008). We investigated the difference in
valuation of the different choices by poor and good decision makers. Surprisingly,
we found that poor DMm vastly over-estimate the value of all choices, but espe-
cially those corresponding to disadvantageous options. According to their inflated
valuation of disadvantageous choices, poor DM appear to behave optimally accord-
ing to their subjective & inaccurate value-map of the environment, rather than sub-
optimally according to the objective outcome of the task. Our findings are in line with
recently suggested mechanisms of psychopathology such as addiction (Schultz, 2011).
Our model accounts for the role of behavioural traits in learning and decision-
making, using a basic TD-learning framework using minimal assumptions. Other
formalisms such as win-stay loose-shift, Bayesian models or more elaborate TD mod-
els could also be explored (Mihatsch and Neuneier, 2002; Williams and Dayan, 2005;
Niv et al., 2006; Redish et al., 2007; Gershman et al., 2010a; Niv et al., 2012). However,
the present model offers a straightforward way to implement the traits of interest and
allows a quantitative assessment of the impact of individual differences on the overall
decision-making performances. In particular, we show that simple models incorpo-
rating fewer discriminative traits have less predictive value than the full model. More
biologically targeted versions of this model could be developed (Bogacz and Larsen,
2011; Cohen and Frank, 2009; Potjans et al., 2009) and investigated with regard to the
cortical-subcortical interplay specific to good and poor DM.
3.8 conclusions
In conclusion, poor decision making in the RGT is predicted by a complex pheno-
type of cumulated behavioural and cognitive characteristics including risk seeking,
reward seeking, inflexibility, possibly combined with motor impulsivity and perse-
verative / compulsive-like behaviours. This approach, based on the identification of
high scores for these behavioural traits expressed spontaneously and in a compara-
ble way as to those observed in the clinic, demonstrates that rat behavior can reli-
ably model dimensions found in humans (Rivalan et al., 2009b; Matzel and Kolata,
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2010). This work emphasizes the need to use “integrative” animal models to mimic
the complexity of the clinically relevant phenotype (LaPorte et al., 2010). Our find-
ings are also in line with the recent proposal by Robbins et al. (2012) to undertake a
more objective description of psychiatric disorders through predisposing traits and
neurocognitive endophenotypes, thereby explaining the high level of comorbidities
between mental disorders. By integrating multiple behavioural measures, combined
with computational modelling, our work provides a promising framework for reveal-
ing the neuropsychological determinants of poor decision-making as a potential risk
factor for developing related mental disorders (Rivalan et al., 2009b; Hayton et al.,
2012) and for exploring its neurobiological substrates.
4
C O G N I T I V E D E F I C I T S & W O R K I N G M E M O RY
Working memory has been identified as the strongest and most stable neuropsy-
chological impairment present in schizophrenia (Lee and Park, 2005; Forbes et al.,
2009). It has been hypothesised to be the leading cause of the generalised cognitive
symptoms observed in the disorder (McKenna et al., 1990; Goldman-Rakic, 1994).
Recently however, researchers have found that the degree of WM impairments both
in schizophrenia and healthy controls were predictive of delusional ideation (Garety
et al., 2013; Garety and Freeman, 2013; Freeman et al., 2008) and might be involved
in the processes leading to psychosis. The work presented in this chapter uses the
Spatial Working Memory (SWM) task from the Cambridge Neuropsychological Test
Automated Battery (CANTAB) developed by Cambridge Cognition Ltd. It is one of
several experimental paradigms that tests the retention and manipulation of visuo-
spatial information over increasing memory load. The data acquired and presented
in this chapter is part of a wider research study (i.e. the Grand Challenge study)
investigating cognitive and functional differences in first episode psychosis, chronic
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and family members of Disrupted-In-SChizophrenia
1 translocation carriers (DISC1; known to be a risk factor for developing major men-
tal illness — Chubb et al., 2008). The recruitment and testing of participants was
performed by Barbara Duff. The implementation of a novel data extraction tool, anal-
ysis of the behavioural results, computational modelling of the SWM task, model
fitting and analysis was performed by myself under the supervision of Dr. Peggy
Seriès and Prof. Stephen Lawrie.
4.1 background
4.1.1 Working memory in psychosis
Working memory is the memory system used for the short term storage and manip-
ulation of information (Baddeley, 1987). Impairments of working memory have been
described as a recurrent feature of schizophrenia (Park and Holzman, 1992; Gold
et al., 2003; Lee and Park, 2005; Forbes et al., 2009). Recent reviews have identified
that WM deficits are probably the most stable neuropsychological deficit observed
in schizophrenia (Lee and Park, 2005; Forbes et al., 2009), which could not be ex-
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plained by differences in current IQ between samples (Forbes et al., 2009; Gray et al.,
2013). Authors (Green and Nuechterlein, 1999) have suggested that working mem-
ory deficits in schizophrenia might be the leading cause of the array of symptoms
observed in patients. However there is an ongoing debate as to whether the neu-
ropsychological impairments stem from a generalised cognitive deficit (Blanchard
and Neale, 1994; Johnston et al., 2001; Lencz et al., 2006; Fioravanti et al., 2012; Joyce,
2013; for a review see Reichenberg and Harvey, 2007) or from selective impairments.
Several impairments of specific domains have been proposed, such as increased dis-
tractibility (Oltmanns, 1978), attention deficit (Nuechterlein and Dawson, 1984; Kenny
and Meltzer, 1991) memory impairments (McKenna et al., 1990; for reviews see Ale-
man et al., 1999; Lee and Park, 2005; Forbes et al., 2009) or executive dysfunction
(Weinberger et al., 1988, 1992).
Goldman-Rakic (1994) a leading scientist in the field of working memory argued that
working memory dysfunction could explain some of the positive symptoms observed
in schizophrenia such as thought disorder. In line with Goldman-Rakic’s suggestions,
Wood et al. (2003) found that spatial working memory impairments were predictive
of psychosis in a Ultra High Risk (UHR) sample. Specifically, patients that subse-
quently became psychotic in this UHR group performed generally worse in working
memory than those who did not (Wood et al., 2003). Multiple studies have since inves-
tigated working memory in schizophrenia, where robust deficits were demonstrated
(Lee and Park, 2005; Forbes et al., 2009).
Other psychiatric disorders also appear to be affected by working memory deficits.
For example, in a study involving 200+ participants, McIntosh et al. (2005) found
that memory was impaired in schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and patient’s relatives.
Working memory was significantly affected across all groups (bipolar, schizophre-
nia, family members) when compared to controls, suggesting that impaired memory
might be predictive of an increased liability to psychosis (McIntosh et al., 2005). Re-
views of neuropsychological impairments in bipolar disorder (Quraishi and Frangou,
2002) and schizophrenia (Aleman et al., 1999; Lee and Park, 2005; Forbes et al., 2009)
suggest that both groups are significantly impaired in working memory and dis-
play a similar magnitude of impairment when compared to controls (Seidman et al.,
2002; McClellan et al., 2004; McIntosh et al., 2005). Although it is worth noting that
some studies found that bipolar patients displayed milder impairments than that of
schizophrenia patients (Glahn et al., 2006; Badcock et al., 2005; Pirkola et al., 2005). A
recent meta-analysis involving more than 17, 000 working memory tests performed in
patients with schizophrenia (Forbes et al., 2009), found that first episode patients were
less affected than chronic patients in working memory, and argue that the disorder
might accelerate the age-related decline of working memory performances. However
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it is worth noting that some early studies identified significant deficits of working
memory in first episode psychosis (Hutton et al., 1998; Joyce et al., 2002). In DISC1
translocation carriers, an increasing number of studies have found evidence for an
association or a linkage between the DISC1 locus and impaired working memory
function (Gasperoni et al., 2003; Porteous et al., 2006).
4.1.1.1 Working memory, positive and cognitive symptoms
Consistent with suggestions from Goldman-Rakic (1994) that working memory im-
pairments in schizophrenia might lead to a subset of positive symptoms (thought
disorder), recent studies (Broome et al., 2007; Garety et al., 2013; Freeman et al., 2014)
have found that WM appear to be involved in probabilistic learning deficits and as-
sociated with delusional ideation in schizophrenia and healthy controls using the
beads task (Huq et al., 1988). In this task, participants are presented with two jars
of beads, one containing substantially more blue than red beads while the other jar
contains opposite amounts of red and blue beads. Beads are taken one by one from a
hidden jar and participants are required to guess which jar the beads originated from.
Patients with schizophrenia appear to require significantly fewer draws of beads be-
fore they can make a firm decision, and report stronger beliefs about the origin of
the beads than they ought to (Averbeck et al., 2011). Rapid decisions without careful
sampling of the environment lead to early decision errors known as the jumping to
conclusion bias (JTC). Particularly, probabilistic learning deficits as measured by the
beads task (Huq et al., 1988) have been found to be linked to delusional ideation
both in schizophrenia (Speechley et al., 2010) and in the general population (Free-
man et al., 2008), suggesting that there is a continuum of severity for delusions (for
a review see Garety and Freeman, 2013). That is, both in patients with schizophre-
nia and to a certain degree healthy controls, the jumping-to-conclusions (JTC) bias
traditionally observed with the beads task is predictive of the intensity of delusional
ideation. Interestingly, Broome et al. (2007) recently identified in a high-risk (HR)
group that working memory deficits were also associated to the jumping to conclu-
sion (JTC) bias. Specifically, the authors tested whether the JTC bias was associated
with impaired working memory and found a significant association suggesting that
a failure to hold information in memory might lead to deficiencies in probabilis-
tic learning. Follow-up studies have since confirmed these results in schizophrenia
spectrum psychosis (Garety et al., 2013), and in patients with persecutory delusions
(Freeman et al., 2014). Particularly, Garety et al. (2013) argue that WM manipulation
was particularly predictive of the JTC bias and poor probabilistic learning rather than
WM span. While relatively few studies have demonstrated this effect to date, the ac-
cumulating evidence of a possible relationship between working memory, the JTC
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bias and delusions suggest that these should be investigated systematically (Garety
et al., 2013; Garety and Freeman, 2013).
4.1.2 Neural basis of working memory
Goldman-Rakic (1987, 1995) pioneering work on working memory helped to identify
neuroanatomical correlates of working memory. Using occulomotor delayed-response
tasks in primates, the author demonstrated how neurons in the dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex (dlPFC) are tuned to specific spatial orientations and display an in-
creased discharge rate when a cue that match their preference is presented. The rate
of these neurons was then sustained throughout the delay period until a response
was made (Goldman-Rakic, 1987, 1995). That is, the author identified a neural biolog-
ical basis for the encoding and maintenance of working memory in primates. Again
in primates, Vijayraghavan et al. (2007) then demonstrated how the maintenance of
information in working memory is critically dependent on the activation of dopamin-
ergic D1 receptors (D1r) in the dlPFC (however not dependent on D2r; Wang et al.,
2004, for a review see Cools and D’Esposito, 2011). Specifically, Vijayraghavan et al.
(2007) found that the maintenance of information in dlPFC neurons was dependent
on the level of dopamine present in the dlPFC. The response of dlPFC neurons fol-
lowed an inverted-U dose-response profile, where moderate or excessive dopamine
levels lead to suboptimal discharge rates during the maintenance of information in
WM (Wang et al., 2004; Vijayraghavan et al., 2007; Cools and D’Esposito, 2011). That
is, dopamine levels appear to modulate the robustness of the WM neural network to
maintain information in memory against internal cortical noise or external distractor
cues (Cools and D’Esposito, 2011).
Using neuroimaging tools in humans, studies (e.g. Braver et al., 1997; Cohen et al.,
1997) have revealed that similar cortical structures to those found in primates were
activated during working memory tasks (Fletcher and Henson, 2001; McNab and
Klingberg, 2008). Particularly, McNab and Klingberg (2008) revealed that the basal
ganglia along with the frontal cortex were concurrently responsible for filtering irrel-
evant information from entering WM and to gate relevant information into memory
(Cools and D’Esposito, 2011). The activity of the basal ganglia and dlPFC in humans
was predictive of the participants’ WM capacity (McNab and Klingberg, 2008). Both
the dlPFC and basal ganglia are known to be rich in dopamine afferent and receptor
densities (Farde et al., 1987; Suhara et al., 1991), suggesting that dopamine might be
critically involved in the encoding and maintenance of working memory in primates
and in humans (Cools and D’Esposito, 2011).
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4.1.2.1 Neuroimaging of working memory in psychosis
Dopaminergic transmission has been thoroughly documented as being significantly
impaired in schizophrenia (Grace, 1991; Seeman et al., 1993; Howes and Kapur, 2009;
Hall et al., 2009; Roiser et al., 2012; Howes and Murray, 2013; Fusar-Poli and Meyer-
Lindenberg, 2013a,b) and is known to also be instrumental for learning and goal-
directed behaviour (Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz, 2002; Montague et al., 2004; Schultz,
2007; Behrens et al., 2008). Specifically, positron emission tomography (PET) studies
in schizophrenia (Abi-Dargham et al., 2002) have found elevated dopamine D1r avail-
ability in the dlPFC in comparison to controls. This increased availability was predic-
tive of poor WM performance. Interestingly however, although first episode patients
appear relatively spared from WM impairments (Forbes et al., 2009), a similar gain of
D1r availability was also found in the dlPFC of these patients. In the striatum, meta-
analyses of PET imaging for dopamine receptor densities found no evidence for in-
creased D2/3 receptor densities in schizophrenia (Fusar-Poli and Meyer-Lindenberg,
2013a). However, the authors found large increases in dopamine synthesis capacity in
comparison to controls (Fusar-Poli and Meyer-Lindenberg, 2013b). Recent reviews in-
vestigating dopaminergic signalling in schizophrenia (Howes et al., 2012; Howes and
Murray, 2013) also identified that dopamine synthesis capacity, dopamine release
and baseline synaptic concentrations were also elevated in schizophrenia (Howes
and Murray, 2013). Early functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies iden-
tified a reduced activation of the PFC of patients during WM tasks ("hypofrontality";
Yurgelun-Todd et al., 1996; Callicott et al., 1998; Carter et al., 1998), however these
findings were disputed due to potential confounding factors such as a lack of mo-
tivation, inadequate strategy use of demanding task requirements (for review see
Weinberger and Berman, 1996). Later studies addressed these issues (Manoach et al.,
1999; Perlstein et al., 2001), and revealed that schizophrenia patients demonstrated an
elevated activation of the left dlPFC, which was predictive of their deficits at the WM
task. That is, the strongest the fMRI activation of the dlPFC, the more errors were
being made. The authors argued that this over-activation of the dlPFC is the result of
a prefrontal dysfunction, requiring exaggerated efforts in order to complete the task.
Overall, the accumulating evidence suggests that abnormal dopaminergic transmis-




While neuropsychological tests have generally revealed significant cognitive impair-
ments in schizophrenia (Reichenberg and Harvey, 2007; Gold et al., 2009), there is
clear lack of scientific consensus regarding the origins of those impairments. We
have identified six major hypotheses of generalised dysfunction in schizophrenia
that could lead to the generalised neuropsychological deficits observed in patients;
namely a deficit in working memory encoding (Lee and Park, 2005; Mayer and Park,
2012), a deficit in working memory maintenance and/or manipulation (Reichenberg
and Harvey, 2007; Fletcher and Honey, 2006), inflexible learning leading to persevera-
tive behaviour (Goldberg et al., 1987; Morice, 1990; Ritter et al., 2004; Kim et al., 2009),
an overconfidence and data gathering bias (Broome et al., 2007; Freeman et al., 2008;
Speechley et al., 2010; Averbeck et al., 2011; Evans et al., 2012; Garety et al., 2013;
Garety and Freeman, 2013; Joyce et al., 2013; Freeman et al., 2014), a deficit of atten-
tion (Nuechterlein and Dawson, 1984; Kenny and Meltzer, 1991; Gold et al., 2003) or
distractibility (Oltmanns, 1978), and finally a failure to reduce the task complexity
to a subset of relevant features for completion of the task (Gershman et al., 2010b).
While these hypotheses are frequently debated in the literature of schizophrenia (Re-
ichenberg and Harvey, 2007), no study has attempted to systematically test all these
competing hypotheses simultaneously in a patient sample, as is now customary in
computational modelling studies in psychiatry (Grasemann et al., 2009; Huys et al.,
2011; Hoffman et al., 2011; Huys et al., 2012).
4.2 aims
Previous reviews have shown that patients with bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and
family relatives share similar working memory impairments (McIntosh et al., 2005).
We hypothesize that rather than a common deficit across populations with differ-
ent diagnoses, the measures extracted during working memory tasks might not have
been specific enough to capture subtle differences in group performances.
In this study, we decided to use the spatial working memory task from the CANTAB
that has been previously used in the literature to address spatial working memory
deficits in schizophrenia (Pantelis et al., 1997; Hutton et al., 1998; Joyce et al., 2002;
Wood et al., 2003; Badcock et al., 2005; Pantelis et al., 2009). However, we decided
to expand the measures extracted from this task to identify whether subtle group
differences in performance might exist. Additionally, by modelling the performance
of participants at the CANTAB spatial working memory task, we wished to simul-
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taneously test the six most commonly debated hypotheses of generalised cognitive
deficits described in section 4.1.3. Using these models, we expect to detect whether
the deficits observed in different groups stem from different generalised impairments
or strategies. Formally, this study will attempt to address the following questions:
1. Can additional features (e.g. optimality score, time, etc.) be extracted from the
raw performances at the spatial working memory task? If yes, can these addi-
tional features detect subtle differences in group performances and dissociate
patients groups with different psychiatric diagnoses?
2. Which of the competing hypotheses presented in section 4.1.3 accounts best
for the performance deficits observed in patients with first episode psychosis,
chronic schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and family members? Are different
groups better accounted for by different hypotheses?
To approach these questions, we built a computational model that uses probabilistic
inference to solve the SWM task optimally. Using this model, we propose to test the
validity of each hypothesis by comparing their ability to generate a performance sim-
ilar to that of patients. To do so, each hypothesis will be implemented individually
within our optimal inference model using the simplest assumptions. Then, the abil-
ity for each of these hypotheses to generate and fit patients’ experimental data will
be compared and analysed using the Bayesian Information Criterion. This compari-
son will enable to score and compare each hypothesis for every individual and group.
4.3 sample demographics
For this study, 43 healthy controls were recruited together with 5 first episode pa-
tients (1ST), 24 patients with chronic schizophrenia (SCZ), 15 patients with bipolar
disorder (BPD), and 24 family members (FAM) with/without DISC1 translocation,
for a total of 111 participants (see table 4.1). Recruitment and testing of participants
was performed by Barbara Duff between 2010 and 2013. Translocation status of family
members was unknown at the time of recruitment but following sequencing later re-
vealed that 11 of the 24 family members were translocation carriers. Clinical diagnosis
for translocation carriers was as follows: Major Depressive Disorder (Recurrent; n=3),
Major Depressive Disorder (Single episode; n=3), Cyclothymia (n=3), Schizoaffective
Disorder (n=1), Conduct Disorder (n=1). Clinical diagnoses were also established for
three of the non-carriers: Major Depressive Disorder (Recurrent; n=1), Generalised
Anxiety Disorder (n=2). One healthy subject requested to be withdrawn from the
study and was therefore excluded from further analyses. One chronic schizophrenia












Age 37.54 (2.14) 35.00 (3.22) 37.26 (2.25) 42.40 (3.66) 49.92 (3.70) F =3.62 p<0.01
Gender (M/F) 25/17 3/2 18/5 11/4 8/16  2 =11.38 p<0.05
NART IQ 110.98 (1.84) 113.60 (3.50) 109.57 (2.32) 113.07 (1.86) 105.04 (1.16) F =3.47 p<0.05
current IQ 113.63 (1.84) 110.40 (6.24) 103.65 (3.54) 107.67 (4.21) 91.92 (2.24) F =9.86 p<0.01
PANSS
Total 31.56 (0.66) 52.60 (10.44) 54.30 (4.26) 45.53 (3.64) 37.83 (2.05) F =12.61 p<0.01
Positive 7.18 (0.11) 11.20 (1.91) 12.57 (1.01) 9.87 (0.77) 8.04 (0.69) F =12.10 p<0.01
Negative 7.31 (0.22) 12.60 (3.26) 14.43 (1.70) 10.40 (1.40) 7.12 (0.12) F =10.89 p<0.01
SANS Total 1.15 (0.73) 23.40 (12.24) 28.48 (4.75) 18.40 (5.06) 0.00 (0.00) F =18.65 p<0.01
GAF 86.84 (1.25) 46.40 (8.18) 50.65 (3.44) 61.07 (3.89) 83.17 (3.00) F =37.54 p<0.01
YMRS 0.16 (0.14) 0.20 (0.20) 1.50 (0.33) 2.87 (0.81) 1.46 (0.88) F =3.02 p<0.05
HAM-D 0.94 (0.50) 9.00 (4.49) 8.45 (1.75) 8.27 (1.95) 4.12 (1.19) F =6.37 p<0.01
Table 4.1: Participants summary information. NART = National Adult Reading Test,
PANSS = Positive And Negative Symptom Scale (lower score is better), SANS = Scale for the
Assessment of Negative Symptoms, GAF = Global Assessment of Functioning (higher score is
better), YMRS = Young Mania Rating Scale, HAM-D = Hamilton Depression Rating Scale.
Values indicate mean and (standard error)
patient met exclusion criteria for substance abuse and was also excluded from further
analyses.
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of normality revealed that age, premorbid-IQ (National
Adult Reading Test — NART) and current IQ (Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of In-
telligence) were normally distributed (ks-test; p>0.05). Follow-up analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA) revealed a significant difference across groups for age (F(4,103)=3.62,
p<0.01), pre-morbid IQ (F(4,103)=3.472, p<0.05) and current IQ (F(4,103)=9.86, p<0.01).
Post-hoc analyses revealed that family members (FAM) were significantly different to
controls for age (i.e. older; p=0.01), pre-morbid IQ (i.e. lower premorbid IQ; p=0.036) and
current IQ (lower current IQ; p<0.01). No significant differences were found for age,
premorbid or current IQ between our the patients and control group (i.e. first episode,
bipolar disorder, chronic schizophrenia; p>0.05), suggesting that our patients groups
were matched to controls for these variables. Bonferroni correction was applied to
post-hoc tests to account for multiple comparisons.
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Spatial Working Memory task
CANTAB Research Ltd.
Figure 4.1: Illustration of the spatial
working memory task. Using trial and
error the subject attempts to find the
location of the token (star) hidden in
one of the boxes (black squares). Once
the token is found, the search ends
and a new one starts.
The CANTAB spatial working memory
(SWM) task requires participants to find a to-
ken in a series of boxes displayed on a com-
puter screen (see figure 4.1). The participant,
unaware of the location of the token, must
initially search through the set of boxes until
the token is found. Prior to the task, the par-
ticipant is told that once a token has been
found in a box, it will never re-appear in
that box. A set finishes once the token has
been found in each box present on the screen.
The number of boxes displayed per set grad-
ually increases over time (i.e. from sets of 3
boxes and up to 8 boxes) so as to challenge
the participants’ working memory mainte-
nance, manipulation and capacity. Hence, in
this task participants are required to keep track of the position of past tokens in order
to apply an optimal search strategy (that is, searching exclusively in boxes that never
contained a token). According to these rules, a subject can commit to four types of
errors (see figure 4.1):
• Between-search errors: These errors happen when participants returns to ex-
plore a box that has previously contained a token (i.e. in a previous completed
search1 of that set2; see figure 4.1).
• Within-search errors: These errors arise when participants returns to a box pre-
viously explored (empty) during that search (see figure 4.1).
• Retouch errors: These errors occur when participants returns to explore the
same box explored at time (t- 1). A retouch error will also be classified as a
between or within-search error depending on whether the box was empty or
contained a token at time (t- 1; see figure 4.1).
1 A search is referred here as the explorations of boxes within the whole set of boxes to find the hidden
token.
2 A set consists of multiple searches and ends once the token has been found in each box presented on
screen.










































Figure 4.2: Sequence of spatial working memory sets given to each subject. The diffi-
culty increased every four sets by increasing the number of boxes displayed on screen,
so as to challenge that participants’ working memory load.
• Double errors3: These errors appear when a participant makes an exploration-
error that can be classified as both between and within-search error.
4.4.1 Sequence
The stimulus presentation sequence of the SWM task (shown in figure 4.2) was iden-
tical for every participant. It was composed of 4 sets per difficulty level (i.e. 4 sets of
3 boxes, 4 sets of 4 boxes, 4 sets of 6 boxes, 4 sets of 8 boxes) for a total of 16 sets. The
colour of the boxes changed at the end of every set so as to observe whether colour
affected the participants’ performances.
4.5 methods : behavioural data analysis
The data analysis tools provided by Cambridge Research Ltd. enables to extract sum-
mary statistics about all the error types committed per difficulty level, for every par-
ticipant. However, these are quite limited if one wishes to extract detailed information
and summary statistics for every set or search throughout the task. We developed our
own analysis tool to extract as much information and features as possible from the
raw dataset of every participant (i.e. trial-by-trial actions). For each participant we
extracted the following features:
• Between-search errors for each of the 16 sets presented.
• Within-search errors for each search of the 16 sets presented, for a total of 84
searches per participant.
• Retouch-error for each search of the 16 sets presented, for a total of 84 searches
per participant.
3 Double errors were removed from the data-analysis framework provided by Cambridge Research Ltd.
in recent versions of the SWM task.
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• Double-errors for each search of the 16 sets presented, for a total of 84 searches
per participant.
• The time required for solving a search for each 16 sets presented, for a total of
84 searches per participant.
• Time required for solving each of the 16 sets presented.
• An optimality score for each search of the 16 sets presented. The optimality
score is defined as the number of unnecessary moves (i.e. explorations of boxes
known not to hold the token — the sum of within-search, between-search and
retouch errors). A score of zero on every set describes a participant that solved
the task optimally, while a score below zero provides an estimation of the num-
ber of sub-optimal moves a participant has performed.
All the scores extracted from the raw participant data can also be summarized using
conventional summary statistics at each of the four difficulty level (see figure 4.2).
Participants’ trial-by-trial analysis can then be used to fit our computational models
and compare competing hypotheses for a given subject.
4.6 methods : computational modelling
We developed a series of computational models that replicate the the participants’
performances at the spatial working memory task. A total of seven different models
have been developed (one optimal model and six variants, one for each hypothesis).
4.6.1 Optimal inference model
The initial model uses optimal inference to solve the SWM task. In this framework,
an optimal agent is required to find the target (token) while minimising the number
of explorations (and errors) executed by making use of his current knowledge of the
environment.
In probabilistic terms, this translates into computing the probability of finding the
token ‘r = 1’ (i.e. the token can either be present ‘1’, or absent ‘-1’) given that the
agent selects the stimulus ‘s
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where ‘n’ is equal to the number of boxes in the current set, ‘s_observed’ is the set
of observed boxes (i.e. where the target cannot be found) and ‘|s_observed|’ defines
the number of items in the set ‘s_observed’.
For example, let’s assume that 3 boxes are presented to the agent. The probabil-
ity that each box holds the token is one over the total number of boxes available
‘n’. That is, all the boxes have an equal probability to hold the token (e.g. 1/3).
Let’s say that the agent then observes the box number ‘s
1





) is then equal to 0 and ‘s
1
’ is added to the set of observed
boxes ‘s_observed’. Since the probability P(r = 1|s
1
) is equal to zero, the total prob-
ability of finding the token is now one over the total number of remaining boxes





















Boxes are then chosen using the Softmax function (see eq. 4.2), which defines the
probability of choosing a stimulus as a function of the likelihood of finding the to-
ken P(r = 1|s
i


























In the following sections we alter the optimal inference model described above by
introducing extra parameters that modify its performance at the SWM task. Each
new computational model affects the SWM performance in different ways, leading to
different types of errors.
4.6.2.1 Model 1: Deficit of working-memory update
In this model, we introduce a deficit in the update of working memory. In the initial
optimal model, the information about the environment is held into working memory
‘s_observed’. As the subject explores new boxes, the newly acquired information is
updated into ‘s_observed’ to reflect the new probability of finding the token in the
remaining boxes. We defined a deficit in the update of working-memory by introduc-
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ing an extra parameter ‘ 
j
’ that controls whether novel information from a given trial











was observed ^ 8x 2 [0,1] >  
j
1




’ is the update threshold parameter of the individual ‘j’, and ‘x’ is a ran-





’ is not included in the list of observed stimuli ‘s_observed’.
That is, the working-memory is not updated with the newly acquired information
gathered from the past exploration.
For example, let’s assume that 3 boxes are presented to the agent, which chooses
to observe the box ‘s
1
’. This box is found to be empty. Before the agent updates this
information a randomly generated value ‘x’ is drawn between zero and one. If this
value ‘x’ is superior to the update threshold ‘ 
j
’ of that individual, then ‘s
1
’ is added
to the list of observed stimuli ‘s_observed’ and ‘P(r = 1|s
1
) = 0’, as in the optimal





’ is not added to the list of observed stimuli ‘s_observed’ re-






’ still being equally likely to hold the token on the
next trial. This is equivalent to performing an action without taking the result into
account, which would eventually lead to within-search errors.
4.6.2.2 Model 2: Deficit of working-memory maintenance
In this model we introduce a deficit in the maintenance of working memory. To model
this deficit we decided to degrade the information held in memory as a function of
the current working memory load of the participant. Specifically, the record of past
observations r
i
= 1 in this model decays exponentially to baseline (i.e. corrupted/lost




































’ defines the remaining number of items that can be stored in
the working memory of the individual ‘j’, and ‘!
j
’ is the working memory mainte-
nance parameter of this individual. Here we define the remainder of available mem-
ory ‘avail_wm
j
’ as the difference between the minimum memory capacity required
to complete the task (i.e. 8 items) and the current memory load of the individual
‘|s_observed|’. The maintenance parameter ‘!
j
’, controls how rapidly the participants’
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memory will degrade as a function of their current memory load (i.e. the larger ‘!
j
’
the faster the memory will degrade). When the reward value from an observed stim-
ulus decays back to its original value (i.e. 0), the stimulus ‘s
i
’ is removed from the list
of observed stimuli ‘s_observed’. For a participant, this is equivalent to forgetting the
result of previous explorations of that stimulus and will eventually lead to redundant
explorations (i.e. between-search and within-search errors).
4.6.2.3 Model 3: Inflexible learning
A reminiscent component of learning deficits in psychotic patients, is their inability
to flexibly adapt their behaviour to a changing environment (Goldberg et al., 1987;
Morice, 1990; Ritter et al., 2004; Kim et al., 2009). We decided to model inflexible
learning by introducing a learning rate parameter ‘⌧
j
’ that controls the amount of in-
formation that the participant takes into account on a given trial. That is, by gradually
decreasing the learning-rate over time, the model will eventually become indifferent










































’ controls the gradient of the exponential decay. The smaller ‘⌧
j
’ the faster
the model stops acquiring information, leading to between, within and retouch er-
rors.
For example, let’s assume that 3 boxes are presented to an inflexible agent (‘⌧
j
= 0.01’)
on trial 10. This agent chooses to observe ‘s
1





)’ should be updated to reflect the new probabilities of observing the
token in that box from 1/3 to 0. However, since the learning rate ‘↵’ is equal to zero
(exp(- 10
0.01) ⇡ 0), the probabilities are not updated towards their new values, reflect-
ing the relative inflexibility of the agent to take new information into account.
4.6.2.4 Model 4: Overconfidence & data gathering bias
In this model we introduce a data gathering bias such that the sampling is inappro-
priate for the task at hand, as is evidenced in the literature of ‘jumping to conclusions’
(Broome et al., 2007; Freeman et al., 2008; Averbeck et al., 2011; Evans et al., 2012;
Garety et al., 2013; Garety and Freeman, 2013; Freeman et al., 2014). For this hy-
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pothesis, we decided to model the data gathering bias by increasing the temperature
parameter ‘"
j




























where a high ‘"
j
’ (i.e. 0.5 to 1) leads to sub-optimal action-selection. That is, partici-
pants will not rely on the information retrieved from the environment when deciding
which novel stimuli to observe.
4.6.2.5 Model 5: Attention & distraction
This hypothesis suggest that patients with schizophrenia have a deficit of attention
(Nuechterlein and Dawson, 1984; Kenny and Meltzer, 1991; Gold et al., 2003) and are
often distracted (Oltmanns, 1978) during cognitive tasks. We implemented distrac-
tions by introducing a new parameter ‘ 
j
’ that controls whether the participant was
distracted on a given trial by assigning the value of a previously observed stimuli to
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’ is the distractibility threshold that controls whether the value of the
stimulus ‘s
i
’ currently observed is correctly acquired. ‘x’ is a random generated value
extracted on each trial within the range [0, 1]. When x 6  
j
, the value assigned to the
currently explored stimulus will be this of another previously observed stimuli, as if
the participant was distracted when presented the outcome of observing a box and
confused it with another previously observed stimuli.
4.6.2.6 Model 6: Failure to reduce task complexity
Our last model tests the ability for patients to reduce the task complexity by only
attending to features of the task that are relevant for its completion. This hypothesis
comes from recent published literature (Gershman et al., 2010b) and meta-analyses of
cognitive deficits in schizophrenia showing that patients are able to learn and solve
simple tasks but tend to fail when the complexity of the task increases (Reichenberg
and Harvey, 2007; Siegert et al., 2008; Gold et al., 2009). In the case of our spatial
working memory task, the complexity of the task is reduced at each trial if the partic-
ipant understands that each time a token is found the subsequent search for the new
token will happen in a ‘n- |s_observed|’ subset. This strategy decreases efficiently
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the size of the search by one for every token previously found. We implemented this
in our model by introducing a new parameter ‘
j
’ that controls whether the partici-
pant reduces their search to a subset of possible token positions known not to have






















’ is a parameter that controls whether the participant ‘j’ does take previ-
ous observations into account to reduce the size of search space at time (t+ 1). That
is, performing a search on ‘s_unobserved’ rather than on the full set ‘n’ boxes. A
subject not reducing the complexity of the task (i.e. 
j
= 0) will eventually re-explore
previous stimuli known not to hold the token again and commit between-errors.
4.6.3 Separability of hypothesis
It is important that each of the hypotheses implemented by our computational mod-
els lead to different predictions in terms of performances at the task. In fact, if dif-
ferent models lead to the exact same performance profiles, all our models would fit
equally well the performance of participants. That is, we would not be able to discern
which hypothesis (i.e. computational model) is most likely to account for the perfor-
mances observed in our patient groups. We performed a preliminary analysis of our
models to test whether each implemented hypothesis leads to different performances
at the task. To do so, each model was tested over a range of increasing parameter val-
ues so as to monitor how parameters influence performances as a function of the task
difficulty (see figure 4.3). The results of this preliminary analysis demonstrate that
each model lead to different performance profiles (i.e. the evolution of the number of
errors as a function of the task difficulty and the number of errors achieved at each
difficulty level). That is, each model lead to different predictions, which will later
facilitate the distinction between competing hypotheses of cognitive dysfunction in
schizophrenia (assuming participants make errors at the working-memory task).
4.6.4 Model fitting
For each of our six models (i.e. WM update, WM maintenance, Inflexible learning,
over-confidence, Distraction, Reduce complexity), the performances of the model
(i.e. between-search, within-search and retouch errors) are fitted to the performances
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Figure 4.3: Preliminary analysis of separability between hypotheses. Each model was
tested over a range of increasing parameter values to compare the performance pro-
files of different models. (A) Working Memory update model. (B) Working Memory
maintenance model. (C) Inflexible learning model. (D) Over-confidence & gathering-
bias model. (E) Distraction model. (F) Reduce complexity model.
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of every individual participant. Using maximum likelihood, we find the parameters

















lihood of the data under the model, ✓ are the model parameters, ‘Between
Err(1:16)’,
‘Within
Err(1:16)’ and ‘RetouchErr(1:16)’are the between-search, within-search and
retouch errors performed at each of the 16 sets of the task. The likelihood is com-
puted by running each model 800 times for a given set of parameter values. Using
the performance profiles extracted after all the iterations, we calculate the probability
distribution of getting an error (between, within or retouch error) at each set of the
task. The maximum likelihood is then given by the parameters values that gives the
highest probability of resulting in the observed participant performances (errors) at
each of the 16 sets.
4.6.5 Model comparison
Since the models varied with respect to their implementation and their number of
free parameters (one parameter for overconfidence and two parameters for every
other model), we used the ‘Bayesian Information Criterion’ (BIC) to compare different
models and avoid choosing a model that over-fits the data. This technique allows to
score the fit of a given model to the experimental data while penalising this score for
added model complexity (i.e. number of free parameters). This enables us to compare
different models and select those that explain the best our dataset. The BIC metric is
given by:
BIC = -2 · ln (L) + k · ln (n) (4.11)
where L defines the likelihood of generating the experimental data from the model,
‘k’ represent the number of free parameters in that model and ‘n’ is the number of
data points available when fitting the experimental data. The model resulting with the
lower BIC metric is the one to be preferred as this model provides the best trade-off
between the fit to the experimental data and the model complexity (i.e. less complex





































































































Figure 4.4: (A) Between-search errors at the SWM task for each group at increasing dif-
ficulty levels (i.e. 3, 4, 6 and 8 items). Error bars depict 95%-bootstrapped confidence
intervals. (B) Boxplot representing the distribution of between-search errors made
at the highest difficulty level (8 items) for each of our participant groups. Shaded
area represent the smoothed distribution of between-search errors for the group and
individual data points depict the mean number of between-search error for each indi-
vidual of that group (i.e. mean number of errors of the last 4 sets). The PSY group is a
composite group made from the chronic schizophrenia and bipolar disorder groups.
4.7 results
4.7.1 Behavioural data
We analysed independent measures of SWM performances using repeated-measures
analysis of variance (repeated-measures ANOVA) for the 16 different sets displayed
to the participants (i.e. 4 sets in each of the 4 difficulty levels). Mauchly’s test of
sphericity was performed prior to the repeated-measure ANOVA to check for spheric-
ity assumptions. Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied when assumptions were
violated. Post-hoc tests and corrections were performed using 10, 000 Monte Carlo
permutations per statistical test.
4.7.1.1 Error analysis
Between-search errors: The Mauchly’s test revealed that the sphericity assumption
was violated for between-search errors ( 2 = 352.149, p<0.001). Corrected analysis re-
vealed a main effect of difficulty on the number of between-search errors (F(1.348,40.234)
=116.507, p<0.001). Analysis of interaction between difficulty level and groups (difficulty⇥
group) was significant (F(5.394,140.234)=4.141, p<0.005), suggesting that the groups
were affected differently by difficulty levels. Sets with similar difficulty were pooled
to extract a single measure of between-search errors per difficulty level. A following
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analysis was performed on this measure to identify which difficulty levels were signif-
icantly different between our participants’ groups. The analysis revealed a significant
mean difference across groups for the highest difficulty level (i.e. 8 items, see Figure
4.4A — F(4,104)=4.919, p=0.001). Figure 4.4A illustrates how increasing the working
memory load affects the number of between-search errors for all groups.
Post-hoc analysis at the highest level of difficulty (i.e. 8 items — Figure 4.4B) re-
vealed significant differences between groups for chronic schizophrenia vs. controls
(2-tailed MC permutation tests: p=0.0242), bipolar disorder vs. controls (2-tailed MC
permutation test: p=0.0125) and family relatives vs. controls (2-tailed MC permutation
test: p<0.01). No significant difference was found between first episode psychosis and
healthy controls nor between chronic schizophrenia vs. bipolar disorder (2-tailed MC
permutation test: p=n.s.), or chronic schizophrenia vs. family members (2-tailed MC
permutation test: p=n.s.). No significant difference in between-search error was found
within the family member group for translocation carriers vs. non-carriers (2-tailed
MC permutation test: p=n.s.).
Within-search errors: Analysis of within-search error using correction for spheric-
ity violation (Mauchly’s test  2 = 194.266, p<0.001) revealed a significant effect of
difficulty on within-search errors across groups (F(1.587,165.044)=8.823, p=0.001), but
found no significant interaction between difficulty and groups (difficulty⇥ group;
F(6.348,165.044)=0.659, p=n.s.). This suggests that difficulty affects the mean number
of within-errors across all groups, but that the mean number of within-errors is not
significantly different between our groups. Post-hoc analysis within family members
revealed that the translocation-carrier status had no significant effect on the mean
number of within-search errors (F(3.176,318)=0.879, p=n.s.).
Retouch errors: Analysis of retouch-errors using correction for sphericity violation
(Mauchly’s test  2 = 20.403, p<0.005) revealed no significant effect of difficulty on the
number of retouch errors (F(2.619,272.395)=1.373, p=n.s.). That is, retouch errors re-
mained at similar levels throughout the task. No significant interaction was found be-
tween difficulty level and groups (difficulty⇥group; F(10.477,272.395)=0.797, p=n.s.).
Post-hoc analysis within family members revealed no translocation-carrier effect on
the mean number of retouch errors (F(5.11,318)=1.475, p=n.s.).
Remaining variables: Since analyses of within-search and retouch errors revealed no
significant difference between groups, no further analyses were performed on these
variables. Double errors were removed from further analyses as these result from
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Figure 4.5: (A) Group response times at the SWM task for increasing difficulty levels
(i.e. 3, 4, 6 and 8 items). Error bars depict 95%-bootstrapped confidence intervals. The
PSY group is a composite group made from the chronic schizophrenia and bipolar
disorder groups. (B) Boxplot representing the distribution of the time required to
finish a set at the 2nd difficulty level (4 items) for each group. The shaded area
represent the smoothed distribution of required time to finish a set for each group.
Individual data points depict the mean time required for each individual of that
group (i.e. mean of the 4 sets with difficulty 4).
errors that can be categorised as both between and within-search error. Since within-
search errors are not significantly different across groups, double errors would not
have conveyed further information than between-search errors alone. The optimality
measure was also excluded from our analysis as it is a compound feature resulting
from participants’ within-search, between-search and retouch errors. Since significant
differences were observed only for between-search errors, the optimality measure
would have been virtually identical to the number of between-search errors and lead
to redundant analyses.
4.7.1.2 Analysis of time variables
Time required to solve a set per difficulty level: Analysis of the time required to solve
a set using correction for sphericity violation (Mauchly’s test  2 = 222.481, p<0.001)
revealed a significant effect of difficulty across all groups (F(1.346,140.007)= 41.366,
p<0.001 — see Figure 4.5A). Sets with similar difficulty were pooled to extract a
single measure of the time required to solve a set at each difficulty level. A fol-
lowing analysis was performed on this measure to identify which difficulty lev-
els were significantly different between our groups. This revealed that the mean
time required to complete a set was significantly different across groups when 4
items were present (F(4,104)=2.707, p=0.034) and a trend towards significance when
3 items were displayed (F(4,104)=2.375, p=0.057). Post-hoc analysis using correction
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for sphericity violation (Mauchly’s test  2 = 228.036, p<0.001) revealed a significant
effect of difficulty within the family members on the time required to solve a set
(F(1.345,318)=38.82, p<0.001), but no interaction between difficulty and translocation
carrier status (difficulty⇥ translocation — (F(2.69,318)=0.523, p=n.s.).
Post-hoc analysis on sets containing 3 items revealed significant differences between
chronic schizophrenia vs. controls (2-tailed MC permutation tests: p=0.0046), bipolar
disorder vs. controls (2-tailed MC permutation test: p=0.003) and family relatives vs.
controls (2-tailed MC permutation test: p<0.001). Analysis of the time required to
solve a set when 4 items were displayed (see Figure 4.5B) revealed significant dif-
ferences between chronic schizophrenia vs. controls (2-tailed MC permutation tests:
p<0.001), bipolar disorder vs. controls (2-tailed MC permutation test: p<0.001) and
family relatives vs. controls (2-tailed MC permutation test: p<0.001). No significant
difference was found between first-episode psychosis and controls (2-tailed MC per-
mutation test: p=n.s.). With sets of 3 or 4 items, no significant difference were found
between chronic schizophrenia vs. bipolar disorder (2-tailed MC permutation test:
p=n.s.) or schizophrenia vs. family members (2-tailed MC permutation test: p=n.s.).
Time required for search completion: Analysis of the time required to solve a search
was performed using a multivariate analysis of variance. This revealed no difference
across groups (F(68,364)=1.12; p=n.s.). Similarly, no significant differences were found
between family members with and without translocation (F(34,182)= 1.088; p=n.s.).
These findings are in line with earlier analyses of within-search errors suggesting
that patients do not make significantly more within-search errors than controls. That
is, if patients performed more within-search errors than controls, the average time
required to solve the task should have been proportional to the number of within-
errors (i.e. extra trials resulting in more time spent to solve the search).
4.7.1.3 Correlation with symptoms
Significant correlations were found between the number of between-search errors
of participants at the highest difficulty level and the PANSS total score (⇢ = 0.256,
p=0.008), and the PANSS negative scores (⇢ = -0.195, p=0.045). No significant cor-
relations were found between the number of between-search errors and GAF score
(⇢ = -0.063, p=n.s.), PANSS positive score (⇢ = 0.087, p=n.s.), SANS score (⇢ = 0.059,
p=n.s., YMRS score (⇢ = 0.111, p=n.s.) or HAM-D scores (⇢ = 0.098, p=n.s.).
Within family members, the translocation status was found to correlate with the GAF






































































































































































































Figure 4.6: Comparison of models using the Bayesian Information Criterion for each
group. For each group, the dashed-horizontal line and the plain horizontal line de-
note the mean and median BIC scores for the best fit of each model (lower is better).
The standard error centered around the mean is denoted by the light-grey area, while
the standard deviation (centered around the median) is denoted by the dark-grey
shaded area. Within each group, the model with the lowest mean and median is the
model that best captures the performances of the individuals of that group.
score (⇢ = 0.410, p=0.047), YMRS score (⇢ = 0.553, p=0.005).
In summary, we found that the chronic schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and family
member groups were significantly impaired in working-memory when compared to
healthy controls. This difference was most pronounced at challenging memory loads
(i.e. 8 items). These groups were also found to be significantly slower than controls at
the easiest memory loads (i.e. 3 & 4 items), which could not be accounted for by the
number of errors made by the participants. Interestingly, the translocation status of
family members was not found to predict working-memory performances at the task.
Finally, the first episode group appeared to be relatively unimpaired at the working-
memory task, and performed similarly to healthy controls throughout the task.
4.7.2 Computational analysis
Our models were then fitted to the experimental data of each individual participant.
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Figure 4.7: Model fit and estimated parameters for the healthy control group using
the "Inflexible Learning" model. (A) The modeled group performance was generated
from the individual performance profile of every subject using individually estimated
parameter values. (B) Estimated parameter values for each healthy control subject
(grey dots). Black elipses denote the contour of the probability density (gaussian
mixture model) of the estimated parameters for the group. The smaller the radius of
the elipse the higher the probability density.
while our models are fitted to the performance of every individual (i.e. between-
search, within-search and retouch errors), the timing data extracted from the be-
havioural data was not used to fit our models since no timing components were
accounted for in the model.
4.7.2.1 Model fit and comparison
Our six models were fitted to each of the 109 participants in this study in order to find
the parameter values that best describe each individual performance profile. Once
the parameters found for each model and individual, a complete model comparison
was performed in order to assess which of the six hypothesis accounts best for the
performance profiles of every group (see Figure 4.6).
Healthy controls: Analysis of the model fit for the healthy control group suggests
that participants are best described by the "Inflexible Learning" model, (see figure 4.6).
That is, although the mean BIC score is not significantly different between the two
models ("Inflexible Learning" vs. "WM Maintenance"), on average the "Inflexible Learn-
ing" model was the hypothesis that could account best for the participant’s perfor-
mances (i.e. no errors or low amount of between-search errors). The fit of this model
to the group’s performance can be seen on figure 4.7A, where the performance profile
of the model is made from the composite performance profile of all the individual
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Figure 4.8: Model fit and estimated parameters for the first-episode group using the
"Working-memory update" model. (A) The modeled group performance was generated
from the individual performance profile of every subject using individually estimated
parameter values. (B) Estimated parameter values for each healthy control subject
(grey dots). Black elipses denote the contour of the probability density (gaussian
mixture model) of the estimated parameters for the group. The smaller the radius of
the elipse the higher the probability density.
participants of the group using each participants’ estimated set of parameters. The
figure demonstrates how closely the model can match the performance of the whole
group, both in terms of median performance (number of between-search errors) and
in terms of standard deviation over increasing difficulty levels.
We then analysed the distribution of parameter values for the "Inflexible learning"
model in order to find whether the parameters of participants that made errors were
significantly different from those who did not. The analysis revealed that parameter
estimates were quite similar across participants. For example, parameter values of
inflexibility ‘⌧
j
’ were clustered around intermediate-to-high levels of inflexibility for
all subjects. That is, all participants were consistently acquiring information from the
environment throughout the task. Healthy controls were represented by low temper-
ature values ‘"
j
’, suggesting a relatively low exploration/exploitation trade-off. That
is, participants were generally exploiting the information acquired from the environ-
ment. This exploration parameter ‘"
j
’ was found to correlate significantly with age
(Pearson r = 0.414, p = 0.007), current IQ (Pearson r = -0.415, p = 0.007), PANSS
negative scores (Pearson r = 0.642, p < 0.001) and the SANS (Pearson r = 0.53,
p = 0.001).
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First episode psychosis : Analysis of the model fit for the first episode group suggests
that participants are best described by the "Working-memory update" model, (see fig-
ure 4.6). That is, on average the "Working-memory update" model was the hypothesis
that explained best the participant’s behaviour (i.e. no-errors or low amount of errors).
The fit of this model to the group’s performances can be seen on figure 4.8A, where
the performance profile of the model is made from the composite performance profile
of all the individual participants of the group using each participants’ estimated set
of parameters. The figure demonstrates how closely the model can match the group’s
performances, both in terms of median performances (number of between-search er-
rors) and in terms of standard deviation over increasing difficulty levels.
Analysis of the distribution of parameter values for the "Working-memory update"
model revealed that participants were clustered around low parameter values of WM
update ‘ 
j
’. That is, participants were updating their working-memory on the major-
ity of trials using novel trial-by-trial information gathered from the environment (i.e.
low ‘ 
j
’ threshold). First episode participants appear relatively well described by low
temperature values ‘"
j
’, suggesting a relatively low exploration/exploitation trade-
off. That is, participants were generally exploiting the information retrieved from the
environment. The exploration parameter ‘"
j
’ was found to correlate significantly with
pre-morbid IQ (Pearson r = -0.972, p = 0.006), but was not correlated with any of
the clinical symptom scales (i.e. PANS, SANS, GAF, YMRS, HAM-D). The working-
memory update parameter ‘ 
j
’ was found to correlate significantly with the PANSS
positive symptom score (Pearson r = -0.886, p = 0.045).
Chronic schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and family members Analysis of the model fit
for chronic schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and family members suggests that partic-
ipants were best described by the "Working-memory maintenance" model, (see figure
4.6). That is, on average the "Working-memory maintenance" model was the hypothe-
sis that explained best the participant’s performances (i.e. moderate-to-high number
of between-search errors). Chronic schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and family mem-
bers groups were pooled together for this analysis since the behavioural analysis
suggested that they all have similar performance profiles and that the model com-
parison suggest that the same hypothesis accounts best for their performance. The
fit of the model to the group’s performance can be seen on figure 4.9A, where the
performance profile of the model is made from the composite performance profile of
all the individual participants using each participants’ estimated set of parameters.
The figure 4.9A demonstrates how closely the model fits the behavioural data, both
in terms of median performances (number of between-search errors) and in terms of
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Figure 4.9: Model fit and estimated parameters for the chonic schizophrenia, bipo-
lar disorder and family member groups pooled together using the "Working-memory
mainteance" model. The three groups were pooled together since behavioural-analysis
revealed these groups were similar in terms of between-search errors and since the
same model was found to account best for these groups performance profiles. (A)
The modeled group performance was generated from the individual performance
profile of every subject using individually estimated parameter values. (B) Estimated
parameter values for each healthy control subject (grey dots). Black elipses denote
the contour of the probability density (gaussian mixture model) of the estimated pa-
rameters for the group. The smaller the radius of the elipse the higher the probability
density.
variance over increasing difficulty levels.
Analysis of the distribution of parameter values for the "Working-memory mainte-
nance" model revealed that most participants were clustered around intermediate-
to-high parameter values of WM maintenance ‘!
j
’. That is, working memory was de-
grading at a faster rate when working memory load was high (i.e. participants were
forgetting earlier information rapidly on difficult sets). The participants were well
modelled by low temperature values ‘"
j
’, suggesting a relatively low exploration/-
exploitation trade-off. This suggests that participants were generally exploiting the
information retrieved from the environment, but forgot earlier information as the
task started to challenge working-memory load. The exploration parameter ‘"
j
’ es-
timated for each participant was found to correlate significantly with age (Pearson
r = 0.345, p = 0.005) and current IQ (Pearson r = -0.344, p = 0.005) but was not




4.8.1 Behavioural results and intepretation
In this chapter we studied the WM performances of a variety of patient groups in
a spatial working memory task. The literature on spatial working memory in pa-
tients with first episode psychosis (Hutton et al., 1998; Wood et al., 2003; Joyce et al.,
2002; Pantelis et al., 2009), chronic schizophrenia (Park and Holzman, 1992; Pantelis
et al., 1997; Tek et al., 2002; Saperstein et al., 2006; Pantelis et al., 2009; for a review
see Lee and Park, 2005; Piskulic et al., 2007), and bipolar disorder (Kéri et al., 2001;
Pirkola et al., 2005; Badcock et al., 2005; Glahn et al., 2006), already identified that
patients tend to show WM deficits when compared to healthy controls. Particularly,
within the studies that used the same spatial working memory task presented in this
chapter (i.e. CANTAB spatial working memory task — Pantelis et al., 1997; Hutton
et al., 1998; Joyce et al., 2002; Wood et al., 2003; Badcock et al., 2005; Pantelis et al.,
2009), researchers consistently found significant impairments in between-search er-
rors when patients were compared to controls. The strategy scores provided by the
CANTAB analysis tools were found to be correlated with between-search errors in
two studies (Hutton et al., 1998; Joyce et al., 2002), but detailed analysis suggests that
the difference in performance relies on spatial span rather than strategy use (Pantelis
et al., 1997; Piskulic et al., 2007). In this study, we designed a refined data analysis
tool to extract between-search, within-search, retouch, and double errors for every
set and search of the task, as well as novel features such as response time and com-
pound optimality scores. The aims of this detailed data extraction tool were two-fold:
1) To observe whether patients with different diagnoses could be dissociated by a
specific subset of performance features that might have been overlooked using sum-
mary statistics; 2) To provide detailed experimental data to our computational model,
thereby greatly improving the fit of the models to behavioural data, which would not
have been possible with the summary statistics alone.
Similarly to previous studies using the CANTAB spatial working memory task (Pan-
telis et al., 1997; Hutton et al., 1998; Joyce et al., 2002; Wood et al., 2003; Badcock et al.,
2005; Pantelis et al., 2009), we found significant impairments in between-search errors
between groups, but no impairments were found for the remaining error types (i.e.
within-search, retouch, double errors). Specifically, we found a significant increase in
between-search errors for the highest difficulty level in chronic schizophrenia, bipo-
lar disorder and family members when compared to healthy controls. However in
contrast with previous work (Badcock et al., 2005), we found that these groups did
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not differ from each other in terms of performances. That is, in our study bipolar
patients were impaired to a similar degree with chronic schizophrenia patients and
family members (irrespective of their translocation status). Also unlike previous stud-
ies (Pantelis et al., 2009), we found no significant impairment in SWM performances
of first episode patients when compared to controls. We suspect that the relatively
small sample-size of our first episode sample (n=5) might not have been sufficient to
reveal significant impairments.
Further to the impairments observed in between-search errors, we found a significant
difference between chronic schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and the family member
groups to that of controls at the time required by a participant to solve a set (one of
our novel performance features). Specifically, we found that the chronic schizophre-
nia, bipolar and family members were significantly slower than healthy controls at
the easiest sets of the task, when the working memory load was relatively low (3 &
4 items). Slower response times at the beginning of the task could result from an in-
creased number of errors in this population, however the analysis of between-search
errors reveals no differences in terms of errors at the early stages of the task. This
suggests that the increase in response time does not stem from errors made by the
participants. Intriguingly, this difference disappears at higher memory load, when
participants do make significantly more errors than controls. This suggests that pa-
tients are slower at making decisions than controls at the early stages of the task, but
then become faster than controls since patients make more errors but still manage to
solve a set in the same amount of time than controls. In light of these findings, we
posit that patients are slower in early stages simply due to being cautious until they
are confident that they have correctly acquired the rules of the task. We hypothesize
that three distinct mechanisms could explain why patients are responding faster than
controls during later stages of the task:
1. Patients gradually become overconfident in later stages of the task, leading to
faster but uncarefully planned decisions resulting in more errors.
2. Patients’ attention level deteriorate due to the repetitiveness of the task, tired-
ness, or simply because the novelty of the task has worn. Reduced attention
levels would lead to hasty responses and an increased amount of errors.
3. Patients start making errors at the task due to a more taxing load on working
memory, resulting in an increased speed of execution due to frustration.
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4.8.2 Computational analysis
In this chapter we assessed a variety of computational models to address which of
many competing hypothesis of cognitive dysfunction in schizophrenia, is most likely
to account for the performance deficits observed in a spatial working memory task.
First we developed a computational model that uses probabilistic inference to solve
the SWM task in an optimal manner and then introduced simple alterations to model
the hypotheses of interest (i.e. overconfidence, WM update deficit, WM maintenance
deficit, Inflexible learning, distraction to irrelevant stimuli, deficit in reducing the
complexity of the task to the relevant components). Interestingly, each of these models
led to highly dissociable performance profiles at the SWM task.
4.8.2.1 Healthy controls & first episode psychosis:
Both the healthy control and first episode groups made relatively few number of
between-errors at the task. However, the model comparison suggests that the perfor-
mance of the first episode group is best accounted for by a deficit of WM update,
while healthy controls are best described by the inflexible learning model. That is, al-
though the performance of first episodes was qualitatively similar to that of controls,
different models were selected as more likely to account for their respective perfor-
mances. However, we would advise caution while interpreting these results in healthy
controls and first episode patients. In fact, while our models were able to make dif-
ferent predictions when working-memory performance was impaired, all our models
could account equally well for performances when few or no errors were made by
participants. We therefore suggest that our models are better suited to compare and
explain performance deficits when participants do make errors at the task.
4.8.2.2 Bipolar disorder, DISC1 family & chronic schizophrenia :
Model comparison for the bipolar, family members and the chronic schizophrenia
group revealed that their performances were better accounted for by the working
memory maintenance model. This is in line with the conclusions reached by recent re-
views and meta-analyses of generalised cognitive deficits in schizophrenia (Reichen-
berg and Harvey, 2007; Gold et al., 2009). These argued that memory maintenance
and manipulation appear most likely to result in poor WM performances since work-
ing memory capacity is relatively spared in schizophrenia (Goldberg et al., 1993; Kolb
and Whishaw, 1983; Park et al., 1995; Tamlyn et al., 1992 4), that memory encoding
deficits could not account for poor performances (Tek et al., 2002) and that decreased
4 Although some authors disagree (Aleman et al., 1999; Dickinson and Ramsey, 2007; Gold et al., 2010)
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attention was also unable to account for the generalised cognitive impairments ob-
served in patients (Goldberg et al., 1987; Gold et al., 2009).
Maintenance of working memory has been thoroughly documented from the early
work of Goldman-Rakic (1995) and more recently Vijayraghavan et al. (2007; for a
review see Cools and D’Esposito, 2011) as requiring precise levels of dopamine to
WM dlPFC neurons for correct WM maintenance. That is, too little or too much
dopamine release to dlPFC WM neurons lead to incorrect updating or maintenance
of information in memory (Vijayraghavan et al., 2007; Cools and D’Esposito, 2011). In-
terestingly, abnormal dlPFC activation has been found in schizophrenia during WM
tasks (Manoach et al., 1999; Perlstein et al., 2001; Abi-Dargham et al., 2002; Rodríguez-
Sánchez et al., 2005) and more recently impaired fronto-striatal prediction-error sig-
nals were also identified in patients (Corlett et al., 2007b). These appear to suggest
that impaired DA signalling found in schizophrenia (Howes and Kapur, 2009) or
bipolar disorder (Abler et al., 2008) may be able to account for their poor WM per-
formances. Early computational studies have attempted to explain away the role of
DA in WM as a gating mechanism (Cohen et al., 1996; Durstewitz et al., 1999; Braver
et al., 1999; Braver and Cohen, 1999, 2000; Durstewitz et al., 2000a,b; Frank et al., 2001;
Durstewitz and Seamans, 2002; Gruber et al., 2006; O’Reilly and Frank, 2006; Todd
et al., 2008; Badre and Frank, 2012), whereby DA helps to "gate" relevant informa-
tion to working memory through phasic activity during encoding of stimuli, while
tonic DA activity "locks" the information in memory to prevent corruption from exter-
nal distractors or internal cortical noise. However, recent computational studies now
tend to approach WM maintenance deficits as a imbalance between excitation and
inhibition (E/I) at the level of neuronal micro-circuits (Loh et al., 2007; Cano-Colino
and Compte, 2012; Murray et al., 2012). For example, Murray et al. (2012) demon-
strated that a cortical micro-circuit can accurately encode spatial information and
sustain the activity of a pool of neurons (maintenance of information) over time, as
observed experimentally (Goldman-Rakic, 1995). However when reducing inhibition
(disinhibition), encoding of information was still possible but resulted in less accu-
rate sustained activity that was prone to corruption by external distractors close to
the originally encoded information. Disinhibition has been previously documented
in schizophrenia by Lewis and Hashimoto (2005) and is thought to stem from NM-
DAr hypofunction of inhibitory interneurons (Murray et al., 2012). While these two
types of models can equally account for the WM maintenance deficits observed in
patients, both support different hypotheses of the aetiology of schizophrenia. Inter-
estingly however, these hypotheses are not mutually exclusive (Jentsch and Roth,
1999). Earlier computational studies (Durstewitz et al., 1999; Brunel and Wang, 2001;
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Durstewitz et al., 2000a,b; Durstewitz and Seamans, 2002, 2008; Seamans et al., 2001;
Tanaka, 2006) suggest that DA can modulate inhibition through NMDA activation.
Specifically, Durstewitz et al. (1999, 2000a,b) argue that DA can enhance NMDAr con-
ductances, resulting in an increased robustness of the sustained activity to distracting
stimuli or internal cortical noise. While, Murray et al. (2012) argue for decreased NM-
DAr conductances on inhibitory interneurons, both models could theoretically result
in imbalanced E/I in cortical micro-circuits, leading to identical impairments during
maintenance of WM information. These hypotheses deserve further investigation to
identify which of those two E/I imbalances might be present in schizophrenia.
4.8.3 Limitations
While we did observe significant differences across groups in between-search errors,
our participants demographics suggest a significant difference for age, gender ratio
and IQ (both current and pre-morbid) in the DISC1 family member group. Further
analysis within these covariates revealed that age was negatively correlated to cur-
rent IQ in this subgroup (i.e. family members are on average 10-15 years older that
the average participant of the other groups), which in retrospect could be explain
part of the drop in IQ observed between family members and the control group. Age
was removed as a covariate from further analysis as required per the rules of the
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) to avoid statistically redundant features. An AN-
COVA was performed to control for current IQ, gender ratio and revealed that no
significant difference in between-search errors between family members and healthy
controls could be found once the covariates were included as regressors. Particularly,
current IQ was found to account for all the performance differences between family
members and healthy controls. This would tend to suggest that no significant differ-
ence in performance truly exist between family members and healthy controls, and
that the difference reported in the result section stemmed from the lower current-IQ
of family members. However, we want to express caution regarding the interpreta-
tion of this covariate analysis. In fact, measures of current IQ are computed from a
composite of scores made in a battery of standardized cognitive tests used to assess
independent processes, one of which being working memory. Furthermore, although
tasks are designed in such a way as to test independent components, tasks that assess
planning and reasoning will always require use of working memory to some degree.
That is, to a certain degree, part of the IQ score of every participant will reflect their
intrinsic performance in working memory. Therefore, using IQ as a covariate for a
measure or performance in working memory would be inappropriate and similar to
using working-memory performance as a regressor for itself. We believe, this could
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explain why differences between family members and controls disappear when con-
trolling for IQ. Further investigation is required to identify whether the effect we
observed in family member is veridical. Ideally, future studies in DISC1 family mem-
bers should attempt to carefully match the participants demographic variables to this
of healthy controls. In schizophrenia, a meta-analysis of SWM performances (Piskulic
et al., 2007) revealed similar limitations, namely a significant correlation between IQ
of schizophrenia patients and SWM performances in 56% of the reviewed literature.
In our case however, ANCOVA analyses were not performed for the first episode,
chronic schizophrenia and bipolar disorder groups since post-hoc analyses revealed
that pre-morbid IQ, current IQ and age were matched to those of healthy controls.
The original goal of this study was to identify which of the most commonly dis-
puted set of hypothesis for cognitive dysfunction in schizophrenia is most likely to
account for our patients’ performances in a SWM task. As a result, hypotheses were
tested independently of each other on all participants, one at a time. One possible
extension of our computational analysis would be to test a combination of hypothe-
ses on the participants’ data. That is, in our current analysis, only one model at a
time was fitted to the participant data, but it is possible that a combination of mod-
els (e.g. WM maintenance model with inflexible learning) might have improved the
fit of the participants’ data and yield novel predictions. None of our computational
models challenged WM capacity as others have done previously (Collins and Frank,
2012). However reviews and meta analyses suggest that WM capacity is relatively
spared or within normal range in patients with schizophrenia (Reichenberg and Har-
vey, 2007). Meta-analysis of neuropsychological impairment in schizophrenia and
relatives found that relatives of schizophrenia and schizotypal patients show mild
to moderate impairment at maintenance & manipulation of WM (Reichenberg and
Harvey, 2007). This is in line with the findings of our model comparison for family
members and chronic schizophrenia (Reichenberg and Harvey, 2007; Lee and Park,
2005), since deficits are still present when encoding of information is optimized (Tek
et al., 2002).
4.9 conclusion
Similarly to previous studies using the CANTAB spatial working memory task (Pan-
telis et al., 1997; Hutton et al., 1998; Joyce et al., 2002; Wood et al., 2003; Badcock et al.,
2005; Pantelis et al., 2009), we found significant impairment of working memory in
chronic schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and family members. Although in compari-
son with the previous literature (Gasperoni et al., 2003; Porteous et al., 2006), we did
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not observe an association between translocation status and working memory perfor-
mances. Interestingly however, our extended data analysis suggest that these groups
require more time to solve a set in earlier trials when compared to controls and this
difference cannot be accounted for by the number of errors performed by patients.
Our computational analysis reinforces previous suspicions that WM maintenance
is probably responsible for the generalised cognitive deficits observed in schizophre-
nia (Reichenberg and Harvey, 2007). Further studies are now required to identify the
mechanisms leading to poorer WM maintenance in these patients. Two theories pre-
vail, the WM gating hypothesis (Cohen et al., 1996; Durstewitz et al., 1999; Braver
et al., 1999; Braver and Cohen, 1999, 2000; Durstewitz et al., 2000a,b; Frank et al.,
2001; Durstewitz and Seamans, 2002; Gruber et al., 2006; O’Reilly and Frank, 2006;
Todd et al., 2008; Badre and Frank, 2012) and the cortical microcircuit imbalance (Loh
et al., 2007; Cano-Colino and Compte, 2012; Murray et al., 2012). The former theory
suggests that abnormal dopaminergic transmission to the dlPFC leads to a failure
to gate and maintain information in memory when faced with distractors, while the
latter suggests that excitatory/inhibitory imbalances at the level of cortical micro-
circuits lead to shallow bump-attractor states that are prone to disruption. Further
investigation is required to identify the neural basis of WM maintenance deficits in
schizophrenia.
5
B AY E S I A N I N F E R E N C E A N D P E R C E P T I O N : S TAT I S T I C A L
L E A R N I N G A N D P E R C E P T U A L I N F E R E N C E I N C H R O N I C
S C H I Z O P H R E N I A
The work presented in this chapter uses an experimental paradigm that was initially
developed by Chalk et al. (2010) in the laboratory of Dr. Peggy Seriès and in close
collaboration with Prof. Aaron Seitz at the University of California Riverside. Modi-
fication of the behavioural paradigm, recruitment of participants, testing of patients
as well as the analysis of results was performed by myself under the supervision of
Dr. Peggy Seriès and Prof. Stephen Lawrie. The resulting findings are about to be
submitted for publication as a first author (see Appendix B)1. This chapter builds
on the assumptions that perception is a process of inference. Here we test statistical
learning and inference in schizophrenia, and compare these to a control population.
This chapter, however, does not aim to elaborate on the possible cortical implemen-
tations that might perform such computations (for reviews of this specific topic see:
Knill and Pouget, 2004; Fiser et al., 2010; Series and Seitz, 2013)
5.1 inference and perception
While there is inherent structure, regularity and continuity within our sensory envi-
ronment, sensory information is noisy and uncertain. In vision, physical limitations
of the eye (e.g. retinal blind-spot, density of receptors on the retina, mapping of a
3D environment into a 2D image) or noise in the neural encoding of the stimulus
induces uncertainty in the interpretation of sensory information. Nevertheless, the
brain appears to deal effectively with this uncertainty such that we can plan and inter-
act "optimally" within the environment (Knill and Pouget, 2004). Although Hermann
von Helmholtz (1867) did not talk about optimality per se, he was first to outline
the idea that perception might result from a process of "unconscious inference" (von
Helmholtz, 1925). Namely that, in order to deal with the "ambiguity" of sensory in-
formation, the brain must use "knowledge derived from the past" or "assumptions" about
the stimuli to resolve uncertainty. Interestingly, if perception results from a process
of inference we should observe specific behavioural effects in perceptual tasks (Series
1 The work presented in this chapter is largely adapted from a draft of publication to be submitted. The
computational methods have been altered or extended from previous work by Chalk et al. (2010) and
the dataset presented consists of patients with chronic schizophrenia and healthy controls.
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and Seitz, 2013). First, using previous knowledge about a stimulus should reduce the
uncertainty about this stimulus, resulting in increased performances. That is, combin-
ing noisy sensory information with previous knowledge would essentially increase
the precision of the resulting percept, leading to an increased speed and accuracy
that would not have been possible from noisy sensory information alone. Second,
previous knowledge should alter the subjective interpretation of the stimuli. For ex-
ample, when sensory information is either exceptionally noisy, ambiguous or even
non-existent, the resulting percept should mostly be driven by the knowledge of the
participant, resulting in perceptions that conform to the subjects’ expectations (i.e.
illusions; Gregory, 1968, 1997).
Expectations (or "knowledge") about the world can be manipulated by experimenters
to assay how these interact with sensory information and contribute to perception.
Expectations have been found to modulate and interact with a variety of sensory
modalities such as vision (Sterzer et al., 2008; Chalk et al., 2010; Gekas et al., 2013;
Series and Seitz, 2013), audition (Remez et al., 1981; Davis and Johnsrude, 2007),
touch (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998) and even complex sensations such as such as pain
(Voudouris et al., 1990; Colloca and Benedetti, 2005) and emotions (Petrovic et al.,
2005).
5.2 bayesian brain hypothesis
The combination of expectations and sensory evidence can be formalised mathemat-
ically using Bayes theorem. Particularly, an increasingly popular idea in theoretical
neuroscience is that perception and decision making can be well described using
probabilistic inference (a.k.a. “Bayesian”) models (Knill and Pouget, 2004; Friston,
2010, 2012). According to this “Bayesian Brain Hypothesis”, the brain learns inter-
nal statistical models of the environment which are used in situations of uncertainty
to disambiguate perceptual inputs and guide decisions. "Statistical and perceptual
learning studies have repeatedly shown that the visual system continuously extracts
and learns the statistical regularities of the environment, and can do so automatically
and without awareness", for a review, see Series and Seitz (2013).
For example, Weiss et al. (2002) used this framework to successfully describe percep-
tual illusions in healthy individuals. In this study, illusions result from the brain’s
attempts to interpret sensory inputs based on its internal models and expectations.
Specifically, Weiss et al. (2002) demonstrated that a large number of visual motion
illusions could be explained in terms of an ‘a priori’ expectation for "slow speeds".
Multiple studies have since found that healthy subjects quickly learn the statistics of
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their environment, and combine these statistics with sensory evidence resulting in
behaviour akin to that of an ideal Bayesian observer (Weiss et al., 2002; Chalk et al.,
2010; Gekas et al., 2013), for reviews see (Knill and Pouget, 2004; Fiser et al., 2010; Se-
ries and Seitz, 2013). This framework is known to result in optimal perception when
the inputs match the environment statistics but can result in biases when the stimuli
deviate from expected inputs (Series and Seitz, 2013). A famous example of such a
bias is the “hollow-mask illusion”, where subjects perceive a face-mask as being convex,
while it is in fact concave, presumably due to the very strong ‘a priori’ expectation that
faces are convex objects (Gregory, 1968, 1980, 1997).
This Bayesian framework can be extremely informative. For example, using well
defined experimental conditions, scientists can precisely control the stimuli given to
participants and manipulate the subjects’ expectations to see how it affects their per-
ception. Using these techniques, one can measure perceptual biases over multiple
trials to estimate a participant’s confidence in sensory information (i.e. sensory evi-
dence), pre-existing expectations (Weiss et al., 2002), whether these expectations are
immutable (Sotiropoulos et al., 2011), the time-frame required for the acquisition of
new expectations (Chalk et al., 2010), or even assay the acquisition of increasingly
complex expectations (Acerbi et al., 2012; Gekas et al., 2013), for a review, see Series
and Seitz (2013).
5.3 bayesian brain hypothesis in psychosis
Interestingly, a wide variety of psychiatric conditions are characterised by experiences
of abnormal percepts (i.e. hallucinations; Collerton et al., 2005) and delusions (van Os
and Kapur, 2009). Relevant to delusions and perception, psychotic patients have been
found to exhibit disturbed prediction-error signalling (Corlett et al., 2007b; Murray
et al., 2008; Romaniuk et al., 2010; Gradin et al., 2013), which is known to be essential
for learning stimulus-reward associations (Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz, 2002, 2010)
and building internal models of the environment so as to guide behaviour (Dayan
and Daw, 2008; Daw et al., 2011; Dolan and Dayan, 2013; Dayan and Berridge, 2014).
The magnitude of prediction-error signalling anomalies have repeatedly been found
to correlate with delusion severity (Corlett et al., 2007b, 2010), suggesting a possible
link between abnormal prediction-error signalling and delusions. Further to deficits
of prediction-error signalling, an increasing number of studies report that schizophre-
nia patients show a deficit in integrating probabilistic information resulting in faster
responses than healthy subjects, an effect called the ‘jumping-to-conclusions’ (JTC) bias
(Huq et al., 1988; Speechley et al., 2010; Averbeck et al., 2011; Evans et al., 2012; Joyce
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et al., 2013). This bias is often measured using the ‘beads task’ (Huq et al., 1988). Al-
though these findings have not always been replicated (McKay et al., 2007; Heerey
et al., 2008), there is a growing body of evidence suggesting that schizophrenia pa-
tients are impaired in statistical learning and inference (Garety et al., 2013). Simi-
larly to the observed link between prediction-error disturbance and delusion severity,
patients with stronger delusional symptoms appear to fare worse at the task than
those who do not, suggesting a potential link between delusions and statistical learn-
ing/probabilistic inference (Huq et al., 1988; Speechley et al., 2010).
This is critical since statistical learning is essential to Bayesian inference. To attain the
performance of an ideal observer, a participant must be able to update its internal
model of the world with every new piece of information (e.g. after every trial). Only
by doing so, one can accurately represent the uncertainty for a given choice in the
case of the ‘beads task’, or for a given stimulus in the case of perception. Impaired sta-
tistical learning would lead to incorrect or malformed expectations (internal model)
that would ultimately result in sub-optimal performances.
As a result, scientists have posited that the delusions and hallucinations, as seen in
psychotic patients, may result from an incorrect Bayesian inference mechanism (Fris-
ton, 2005b; Corlett et al., 2009c,a; Frith and Friston, 2012; Adams et al., 2013; Jardri and
Deneve, 2013). That is, from a cognitive perspective since patients with schizophrenia
appear to be impaired in statistical learning and inference, their internal model of
the world would be erroneous, resulting in abnormal beliefs or delusions. From the
perception side, it is argued that hallucinations could be interpreted as a severe form
of illusions. These would arise from either an incorrect mapping between the sensory
information and expectations, an incorrect acquisition of these expectations, or an
imbalance between learnt statistics and sensory information (for reviews see Fletcher
and Frith, 2009; Corlett et al., 2011).
5.3.1 Perception and illusions in schizophrenia
Supporting the idea that psychosis might be explained in terms of deficient percep-
tual inference, patients with schizophrenia have been found to be less susceptible
to a large variety of illusions such as: the hollow mask illusion (Dima et al., 2009,
2010; Keane et al., 2013), motion-induced blindness (Tschacher et al., 2006), illusory
motion (Crawford et al., 2010), the size-weight illusion (Williams et al., 2010), and
the Ebbinghaus illusion (Horton and Silverstein, 2011), for a review of perception in
schizophrenia see (Silverstein and Keane, 2011b,a).
Building on the premise that perception is a process of inference, investigations of
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illusions in schizophrenia tend to suggest that patients would either be deficient in
terms of probabilistic learning, sensory integration or perceptual inference. However,
these perceptual studies tend to measure a patients’ susceptibility to illusions that
are driven by pre-existing expectations (Tschacher et al., 2006; Dima et al., 2009, 2010;
Crawford et al., 2010; Williams et al., 2010; Keane et al., 2013). Such expectations
would most likely have been acquired by participants long before being exposed to
the perceptual task (i.e. probably throughout their lifetime). As a result, these stud-
ies could not measure the shape of the participants’ perceptual prior, before and
after the task. This is important, as one needs to ensure that the statistics of the
stimulus (i.e. perceptual prior) has been correctly acquired for all participants before
measuring their susceptibility to these illusions. Otherwise, it is impossible to dis-
criminate whether reduced illusory percepts stem from either: weaker expectations
(sub-optimal learning), a failure to acquire the prior altogether (non-existent learn-
ing), or a decrease in the uncertainty of sensory information (increased likelihood).
Following earlier work from Sterzer et al. (2008), a recent study found that delusional
ideation correlated positively with the magnitude of expectation-driven illusions in
healthy controls (Schmack et al., 2013). That is, in contrast with previous studies on
perceptual illusions in schizophrenia (Tschacher et al., 2006; Dima et al., 2009, 2010;
Crawford et al., 2010; Williams et al., 2010; Keane et al., 2013), the authors found that
the stronger the delusions of healthy controls, the more likely these were to have
their percepts affected by expectations (Schmack et al., 2013). This would tend to sug-
gest that there is an association between delusional ideation and expectation-driven
illusions, although the direction of this association appears to be debated2. To our
knowledge however, no study has looked simultaneously at the acquisition of expec-
tations (i.e. probabilistic learning) and their influences on perception (i.e. perceptual
illusions) in the context of a perceptual task in schizophrenia.
5.4 aims
The current study therefore investigates visual statistical learning and the influence
of these expectations on perception in patients with schizophrenia. We used a previ-
ously developed motion task (Chalk et al., 2010) that is known to induce the rapid
acquisition of the statistics of a motion stimuli. In this task, subjects need to report
the direction of motion of a cloud of dots (estimation task) and whether they have
perceived the dots or not (detection task; on some trials no stimulus are presented).
2 However, Schmack et al. (2013) also reported a negative correlation between delusional ideation and
perceptual stability
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Unknown to the participants, two directions of motion are more frequently presented
than others. In healthy individuals, we found that subjects implicitly and uncon-
sciously learn those stimulus statistics. This learning influenced perception such that:
1) motion stimuli were perceived as being more similar to the most frequently pre-
sented stimuli than they really were (i.e. estimation biases); 2) participants reported
perceiving the most frequently presented stimuli in absence of visual stimuli (i.e.
illusion/’hallucinated’ dots). Bayesian modelling could be applied to individual per-
formance to monitor the acquisition of the statistics of the stimuli (i.e. perceptual
prior).
Using this task, we here aimed to address whether patients with schizophrenia can
acquire correctly the statistics of the motion stimuli and to assay how those percep-
tual priors are used in perception.
5.5 sample demographics
Twenty-one male subjects (11 chronic patients with schizophrenia; 10 healthy con-
trols) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision were recruited from the outpatient
clinic of the Royal Edinburgh Hospital (Participants demographics – Table 5.1). Pa-
tients’ diagnoses were assigned by experienced clinicians based on standardised in-
terviews (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders; DSM-IV-TR, 2000).
None of the control participants met the criteria for psychotic illness, schizotypal
or schizoid personality disorder (DSM-IV-TR, 2000). All participants gave informed
written consent and did not receive monetary compensation for participation. The
study was approved by the Psychiatry and Clinical Psychology subcommittee of the
Lothian research ethics committee.
The two groups did not differ in age, pre-morbid IQ or current IQ. All patients
were medicated (90% on atypical anti-psychotics, 50% of these were also on mood
stabilisers). Patients were well at the time of testing and did not differ from controls
on the PANSS positive, general and total symptoms scale (PANSS = Positive and
Negative Symptom Scale). Significant differences were found between the two groups
on the negative symptom scale and the global assessment of functioning.







Age 36.66 (3.85) 37.63 (3.40) n.s.
Premorbid IQ 114.66 (1.86) 113.90 (2.75) n.s.
Current IQ 118.11 (2.07) 109.09 (4.33) n.s.
PANSS
Positive Scale 7.77 (0.43) 10.27 (1.26) n.s.
Negative Scale 7.44 (0.24) 11.45 (1.53) ⇤⇤(p<0.05)
General Scale 21 (2.45) 24.27 (2.71) n.s.
Total 36.33 (2.53) 44.63 (4.78) n.s.
GAF 75.55 (3.96) 58.63 (4.77) ⇤⇤⇤(p<0.01)
CPZ eq. (mg/day) — 447.16 (60.30) N/A
Illness duration yr. — 14.72 (2.73) N/A
Table 5.1: Participants summary information. PANSS=Positive And Negative Symptom
Scale (lower score is better), GAF = Global Assessment of Functioning (higher score is better),
CPZ eq. = Chlorpromazine anti-psychotic equivalent dose in mg/day. Values indicate mean
and (standard error)
5.6 moving dots experiment
5.6.1 Apparatus & Stimuli
Motion stimuli consisted of a field of dots with a density of 2 dots/deg2, moving
coherently (100%) at a speed of 9  s-1. Dots were contained within a circular annu-
lus with minimum and maximum diameter of 2.2  and 7  respectively. Using coher-
ent motion direction and speed of 9  s-1 ensures that motion discrimination per se
should not differ significantly between patients and control groups (Chen et al., 2005,
2006). Stimuli were generated using the Matlab programming language with the psy-
chophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997), displayed on a Dell P790 monitor running at
1024⇥ 768 at 100 Hz. The display luminance was calibrated and linearised using a
Cambridge Research Systems Colorimeter (ColorCal MKII). The background lumi-
nance was set to 5.2 cd/m2. Participants viewed the display in a darkened room at a
viewing distance of 100cm.
5.6.2 Procedure
Each trial was composed of two tasks arranged as follows (Figure 5.1a); First, par-
ticipants were presented with a fixation point (0.5  diameter) for 400 ms. With the
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Figure 5.1: (A) Experimental procedure. Participants were presented with a fixation
point followed by the motion stimulus and a response bar (red bar) that they were
instructed to align to the perceived motion-direction. The screen was cleared either
when participants clicked to validate their estimation or 3000 ms had elapsed. A new
screen appeared with a two-alternative forced choice task (2-AFC), requiring partici-
pants to indicate whether they perceived dots during the estimation task. (B) Proba-
bility distribution of the motion directions. Unknown to participants, the distribution
of motion direction was bimodal (i.e. stimuli appeared most often at ±32  around a
central direction). The central direction was randomised for each participant.
fixation point still on-screen, the motion stimulus (cloud of dots) was displayed along
with a red bar extending from this fixation point. During the presentation of the field
of dots, participants were required to estimate the direction of motion by aligning the
red bar into the perceived direction of motion (Estimation task). The angle of this bar
was randomized on each trial and participants were instructed to focus their gaze
on the fixation point throughout the estimation task. The display then cleared when
the participant either clicked the mouse to validate their choice (estimation) or when
3000 ms had elapsed. After the estimation, a 200 ms delay was enforced before the
detection screen was presented. The new screen was divided in two equal areas read-
ing “Dots” and “No Dots”, giving the participants a two-alternative forced choice
(2-AFC). Subjects were required to move the cursor to the right or the left to indicate
whether they detected dots or not, and click to validate their choice (Detection task).
The cursor flashed green or red for correct or incorrect responses respectively. No
time-outs were enforced during the detection task. Finally, the screen was cleared
for 400 ms before a new trial began. Every 20 trials, subjects were presented with
feedback on their estimation performance in terms of average estimation error.
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5.6.3 Design
The task structure repeated for 567 trials (i.e. lasting approximately 40 minutes in-
stead of 60 minutes for 850 trials in Chalk et al., 2010) with opportunities for breaks
every 170 trials (i.e. every 10 to 15 minutes) to prevent fatigue. Stimuli were presented
at four different randomly interleaved contrast levels. The highest contrast level was
1.7 cd/m2 above the 5.2 cd/m2 background. There were 167 trials at zero contrast
and 67 trials at high contrast. Contrasts of other stimuli were determined using a
4/1 and 2/1 staircase on detection performance (García-Pérez, 1998). Throughout the
experiment, there were 90 trials with the 2/1 staircase and 243 trials with the 4/1 stair-
case. For the two stair-cased contrast levels, on a given trial, the direction of motion
could either be 0 , ±16 , ±32 , ±48 , ±64 , with respect to a central reference angle.
This central reference angle was randomised for each participant. To reduce potential
biases in the population, we averaged results due to reference repulsion from cardi-
nal motion directions.
Unbeknownst to the participants, we manipulated their expectations about which
motion directions were most likely to occur by presenting stimuli moving at ±32 
more frequently than others (resulting in a bimodal distribution, Figure 5.1b). At the
highest contrast level, 50% of trials were at ±32  and 50% remaining trials at random
directions (i.e. not just the predetermined directions).
5.7 methods
Data analysis on the estimation task was performed on confirmed trials only (i.e.
trials where participants validated their choice with a click on both detection and esti-
mation tasks). Since the presented directions were symmetrical around a central refer-
ence angle, results were averaged for stimuli moving on either side of this reference
angle. The first 130 trials were excluded from the analysis to allow the staircases to
converge to stable contrast levels (see Figure 5.3). Out of the original 21 participants,
one subject had a mean absolute estimation error greater than 30  at the highest con-
trast levels and was therefore discarded from further analysis. Responses from high
contrast stimuli were used as a performance benchmark to ensure that participants
were performing the task. These trials were excluded from the analysis.
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5.7.1 Behavioural analysis
In the estimation task, the variance of participants’ direction-estimates was large. As
in previous work (Chalk et al., 2010; Gekas et al., 2013), we hypothesized that these
resulted from random estimations on a proportion of trials, thus increasing substan-
tially the variance of motion direction estimates. To account for this, we fitted the
estimation responses to the following distribution:
(1-↵) ·V (µ, ) + ↵/2⇡ (5.1)
where ‘↵’ is the proportion of trials where the participant makes random estimates,
and ‘V (µ, )’ is the circular normal (i.e. von-Mises) distribution with mean ‘µ’ and








Parameters were chosen by maximising the likelihood of generating the data from
the distribution. Participants’ estimation means and standard deviation were taken
as the circular mean and standard deviation of the von-Mises distribution. This para-
metric approach allows for more consistent and significantly smaller variances across
participants, motion directions, and contrasts, than merely averaging over trials, with-
out compromising the qualitative aspect of the results (Chalk et al., 2010; Gekas et al.,
2013).
5.7.2 Kernel density estimation
In trials were no stimulus was presented, we reconstructed the probability distribu-
tions of participants’ responses over motion directions using Kernel Density Estima-
tion (KDE) across each group. The KDE is a non-parametric method used to estimate
the probability density function from discrete measures of a random variable. To do
so, a kernel that defines the form of the probability density function (e.g. Gaussian
kernel) is placed at each of the observed measurement. Then, all the individual ker-
nels are summed to create the probability density function of the random variable
(motion direction). In our case, we used a circular normal kernel since our random
variable is circular. As is customary for KDE, the variance of the kernel is estimated
from the data using the minimum of standard deviation and interquartile range im-
proved (MSNI) method. This method has proven to be robust against over-smoothing
(Silverman, 1986) as well as providing adequate fit to skewed (Wand and Jones, 1994)
and multi-modal distributions (Bowman and Azzalini, 1997).
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5.7.3 Computational analysis
In Chalk et al. (2010), the authors compared two alternative classes of computa-
tional models to understand how the participants’ expectations affect the estimation
of motion-direction. The first class consists of ‘response-bias’ models that attempt to
replicate the observed behaviour using a response strategy unrelated to perceptual
changes. The second class of models however, builds on the premise that percep-
tion results from an inference akin to a ‘Bayesian strategy’ (Knill and Pouget, 2004;
Series and Seitz, 2013), where participants combine their expectations about motion-
direction with the sensory evidence available.
In studies by Chalk et al. (2010); Gekas et al. (2013), Bayesian models were found
to account best for the behaviour of healthy participants. In this study, both classes of
models were fitted to the behavioural data of patients to uncover whether different
















Figure 5.2: Diagram of the Bayesian
model. This schematic depicts the
three different processing stages of
the stimulus, from sensory integration
to perceptual inference and motor re-
sponse (estimation).
We used two Bayesian models in this study.
First a simple model was used to study how
expectations are combined with sensory evi-
dence to produce the estimation of motion-
directions. Then a refined version of that
model was used to account for the detec-
tion phase of the task, and to address how
expectations alter the detection of stimuli.
Both Bayesian models start from the same
premise, namely that participants combine
their expectations about the stimulus (prior)
with sensory evidence (stimulus) in a proba-
bilistic manner. A diagram of the three differ-
ent processing stages of the Bayesian model
are shown in Figure 5.2. First, we assume
that on every trial participants make noisy sensory observations of the motion-
direction (stimulus). This effectively transforms the stimulus direction from a point-
value (✓











) is a circular normal probability distribution (defined in eq.
5.2) centred on the point-value ‘✓’ with variance 1/
sensory
that defines the participant
uncertainty about the motion-stimulus. We name the resulting probability distribu-
tion ‘sensory evidence’ or ‘sensory observation’. We then hypothesize that participants
only acquire an approximation of the ‘true’ prior probability p
prior
(✓) representing



























’ with variance 1/
expected
. These pa-
rameters were estimated from the data of each participant. Following our premise, the
posterior probability that the stimulus is moving in a particular direction ‘✓’, given
a sensory observation ✓
observed
























✓2[0,2⇡] max pposterior (✓|✓observed) (5.6)
Finally, the Bayesian model accounts for the ‘motor noise’ associated with the estima-
tion response ✓
perceived
















where ‘↵’ controls the proportion of random guesses on each trial, and the magni-
tude of the ‘motor noise’ is determined by the variance 1/
motor
of a circular normal
(eq. 5.2) centred on the perceived stimulus ✓
perceived
. The parameter 
motor
is es-
timated from the participants’ estimation trials when the contrast is high, such that
there is no (or relatively few) uncertainty about the sensory stimulus (i.e. 
sensory
virtually equivalent to zero). Two alternative versions of the simple Bayesian model
were tested, one where the sensory concentration parameter (i.e. 
sensory
) was kept
constant across all motion-direction presented, and one where 
sensory
was allowed
to vary with the stimulus direction. We named the simple model with constant value
‘Bayes’ and the later ‘Bayes_var’. The ‘Bayes’ model has a total of four free param-






) that were chosen so as to maximise the
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fit of the model to the data of each individual participant. ‘Bayes_var’ on the other
hand required eight free parameters since it required a new 
sensory
parameter for
every motion direction presented.
5.7.4.1 Bayesian model with detection
The simple Bayesian model ‘Bayes’ presented above ignored the detection phase of
the moving-dots task, and relied exclusively on trials where participants correctly
detected the stimulus. Here, still based on (Chalk et al., 2010), we describe a refined
version of the simple Bayesian model that takes into account the participants’ detec-
tion of the stimulus as well as their estimation of motion-direction. We named this
model ‘Bayes_full’. On a single trial, stimuli moved in a direction ‘✓’, and could be
either present (s = 1) or absent (s = 0), such that :
Stimulus = (✓ 2 [0, 2⇡], s 2 {0 = absent, 1 = present}) (5.8)
As previously, we assume that participants made noisy sensory observations on each
trial such that the motion direction presented is effectively transformed from point-




). For simplicity, we made




’ were made in-




























if s = 0
(5.9)
where parameters ‘d’ and ‘c’ represent the sensory likelihood that the participant
detected a stimulus when it is presented (s = 1) or absent (s = 0) respectively. For
trials where no stimulus were presented (s = 0), we assumed that participants picked











) if s = 1
1




) is the circular normal distribution (eq. 5.2) centred around
‘✓’ with variance defined by 1/
sensory
. The parameters 
sensory
, ‘d’ and ‘c’ were kept
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constant across motion-directions as in the simple ‘Bayes’ model. The participants’
























if s = 1
(1- b) · 1/2⇡ if s = 0
(5.11)
where ‘b’ defines the participants’ expectation of a stimulus being present. We as-
sumed that participants’ expectations were uniform when no stimulus was presented.
On the other hand, when a stimulus was presented, the participants’ expectations
were parametrized as in the original ‘Bayes’ model. As before, the posterior probabil-





















We hypothesized that participants estimated the motion-direction and stimulus pres-







✓,s max p (✓, s|✓observed, sobserved) (5.13)
As in the original ‘Bayes’ model the last stage of the model accounts for the ‘motor


















where ‘↵’ controls the proportion of random guesses on each trial, and the magni-
tude of the ‘motor noise’ is determined by the variance 1/
motor
of a circular normal
(eq. 5.2) centred on the perceived stimulus ✓
perceived
. The ‘Bayes_full’ model has
a total of seven free parameters (i.e.: ↵, 
sensory





that were chosen so as to maximise the fit of the model to the data of each individual
participant.
5.7.5 Response-bias models
While the previous models attempted to model estimation biases assuming that par-
ticipants follow a ‘Bayesian strategy’, based on previous work (Chalk et al., 2010)
we also decided to address whether this behaviour might result from a simple ‘re-
sponse bias’. That is, participants might rely solely on either sensory information or on
their expectations on a given trial. For example, a participant might estimate motion-
direction as one of the most presented directions on a certain proportion of trials and
estimate correctly motion-direction using sensory inputs on the remaining trials.
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5.7.5.1 Response bias — ADD1 model
In this model we assumed that on a proportion of trials participants were unsure
about the presented motion direction and as a result estimated close to one of the
most presented direction (i.e. as if relying entirely on their expectations). We named
this model ‘ADD1’. Similarly to the models following a ‘Bayesian strategy’, in this
model participants also made noisy sensory observations such that the presented
motion direction ‘✓’ was transformed from a point-value to a probability distribution
p(✓
observed
|✓) to account for sensory uncertainty:
p (✓
observed
|✓) = V (✓|
sensory
) (5.15)
On the majority of trials, we assume that participants make a perceptual estimate
✓
perceived
that is equal to the observed stimulus ✓
observed
. That is, on most trials,
participants rely exclusively on their sensory information during the estimation task.
On the remaining proportion of trials, participants rely exclusively on their expec-

























As in our previous Bayesian models, we add uncertainty around the perceived stim-
ulus ✓
perceived
to account for ‘motor noise’ during the estimation (5.2), and to allow






































where ⇤ denotes a convolution and a(✓) determines the proportion of trials where









, and ↵) that were fitted to the
estimation data of each individual participant.
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5.7.5.2 Response bias — ADD2 model
The second response-bias model ‘ADD2’ is identical to the ‘ADD1’ model, with the
exception that the strategy used to sample from expectations is now slightly more
elaborate. In this model, we assume that on the proportion of trials were the partici-
pants sample from their expectations, they preferentially sample from the side of the
distribution where the observed motion direction just occurred. That is, participants
effectively truncate the probability distribution of their expectations on a trial by trial
basis to sample only from the most ‘relevant’ side of their expectations. For example,
if the motion-direction presented on a given trial was 45 , participants would sample
only from their expectations between 0-180  as opposed to -180 -180 . As a result
p
expected






















if s = anticlockwise
(5.19)
As in the ‘ADD1’ model, on the majority of trials participants made sensory estimates
✓
estimated
that were equal to their sensory observation ✓
observed
. Now however,
on the remaining proportion of trials, participants would make estimates that are





on the actual stimulus motion-direction. As for all models, we also allowed for ‘motor
noise’ and for a proportion of random guesses during the estimation. The resulting























where ⇤ denotes a convolution, a(✓) and b(✓) are free parameters that control the
proportion of trials were participants sample from each distribution. Additionally,
we considered variations to the ‘ADD1’ and ‘ADD2’ models (denoted ‘ADD1_mode’
and ‘ADD2_mode’ respectively). There, on trials where participants were unsure of
the stimulus motion direction, they made perceptual estimates that were equal to the
mode of their expectations. This is equivalent to the ‘ADD1’ and ‘ADD2’ models, with
the concentration parameter 1/
expected
being equal to zero.
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5.7.6 Model fitting
As previously mentioned, one can estimate the ‘motor noise’ inherent to each indi-
vidual by fitting the participants’ estimation-response at the highest contrast. At the
highest stimulus contrast, we assumed that the stimulus was clearly visible such that
the ‘sensory noise’ is virtually non-existent. That is, uncertainty about the stimulus
motion-direction is equivalent to zero (1/
sensory
= 0). As a result, the ‘motor noise’




For each of our seven models (i.e. Bayes, Bayes_var, Bayes_full, ADD1, ADD1_mode,
ADD2, ADD2_mode), we calculate the probability p (✓
estimate
|✓;M) of making an esti-
mate ✓
estimated
given the ‘true’ motion-direction presented ‘✓’ and the set of free
parameters ‘M’ of each model. We make the assumption that the participants’ esti-
mation responses are independent on each trial and calculate the likelihood of gener-
ating the observed experimental data given the model and its parameters ‘M’. Model
parameters are chosen so as to maximise the fit to the experimental data of each in-
dividual participant, resulting in a set of parameters unique to every individual. To
find the parameters ‘M’ that maximise the fit to the data, we maximise the log of the
















’ is the presented motion-direction and ‘✓
i,data’ the estimation-response
on a given trial ‘i 0.
5.7.7 Model comparison
Since the models varied greatly with respect to the number of free parameters, we
used the ‘Bayesian Information Criterion’ (BIC) to compare different models and avoid
choosing a model that over-fits the data. This technique allows to score the fit of a
given model to the experimental data while penalising this score for added model
complexity (i.e. number of free parameters). This enables us to compare the fit of
widely different models and select those that explain the best our dataset. The BIC
metric is given by:
BIC = -2 · ln (L) + k · ln (n) (5.22)
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Figure 5.3: Comparison of contrast discrimination performances between the two
groups. (A) Controls’ averaged stimulus contrast, relative to background contrast
for the 4/1 (plain line) and 2/1 (dashed line) staircased contrast levels. (B) Patients’
averaged stimulus contrast, relative to background contrast for the 4/1 (plain line)
and 2/1 (dashed line) staircased contrast levels. For all figures, results are averaged
across all participants. Error bars denote standard error.
where L defines the likelihood of generating the experimental data from the model,
‘k’ represent the number of free parameters in that model and ‘n’ is the number of
data points available when fitting the experimental data. The model resulting with the
lower BIC metric is the one to be preferred as this model provides the best trade-off
between the fit to the experimental data and the model complexity (i.e. less complex
model avoid over-fitting and lead to better generalisation).
5.8 results
5.8.1 General performance
Participants’ detection performance was monitored to adapt the stimulus contrast to
each participant’s just noticeable difference (JND – contrast sensitivity). Using 2/1
and 4/1 staircases, we ensured that the individual detection performances would
converge to 70.4% and 84.1% respectively (Levitt, 1971).
Contrast staircases converged to stable luminance levels after about 130 trials for both
groups (figure 5.3a-b); Controls converged to a stable luminance level of 0.48cd/m2
(±0.06) after 130 trials, while patients converged to 0.68cd/m2 (±0.07) after 51 trials.
These results confirm previous findings (Skottun and Skoyles, 2007) suggesting that
schizophrenia patients display significantly poorer contrast-sensitivity in comparison
to controls (t(18)=3.42, p<0.01).
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Figure 5.4: Effect of expectations on estimation biases between Controls (plain line)
and Patients (dotted line). (A) Participants’ mean bias in the perceived of motion-
direction as a function of the true motion direction presented. (B) Standard deviation
of participants’ estimated motion-directions as a function of the presented of motion-
direction. Results were averaged over all participants in each group; error bars repre-
sent within-subject standard error. The vertical dashed lines correspond to the most
frequently presented motion-direction (i.e. ±32 ). ** & *** denotes p<0.05 and p<0.01
respectively.
5.8.2 Statistical learning
First, we investigated whether participants acquired the statistics of the stimulus. To
do so, we looked at patterns suggestive of statistical learning in each group, namely
attractive biases towards the most frequent directions, decreased reaction times and
improved detection performance for the most frequent directions (Chalk et al., 2010).
5.8.2.1 Estimation performance
To investigate whether the participants’ perceived motion-directions were biased, we
measured the difference between the true motion-direction and the motion direction
reported by the participants. Figure 5.4a displays the average estimation bias plotted
against the true motion-direction for each population (i.e. plain line for controls, dot-
ted line for patients). Estimates at ±16  and ±48  were respectively positively and
negatively biased towards stimuli moving at ±32 , while estimates at ±32  (vertical
dashed line) were unbiased. This indicates that for both groups, estimations were
biased towards ±32 , the most frequent directions. These results replicate findings
by Chalk et al. (2010) and Gekas et al. (2013) in control subjects. Overall, there was a
significant effect of motion-direction on the estimation bias for controls (F(1,4)=6.12,
p<0.001; One-way ANOVA) and patients (F(1,4)=8.27, p<0.001; One-way ANOVA). The
estimation bias at ±16  and ±48  was significantly different from the bias at ±32 
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Figure 5.5: Effect of expectations on detection performance and reaction times be-
tween Controls (plain line) and Patients (dotted line). (A) Reaction times during the
estimation task as a function of motion direction. (B) Proportion of motion directions
that were detected by the participants as a function of the presented motion direction.
Results were averaged over all participants in each group; error bars represent within-
subject standard error. The vertical dashed lines correspond to the most frequently
presented motion-direction (i.e. ±32 ), **denotes p<0.05.
for patients (p<0.001 and p<0.001 respectively, paired t-test). Similarly, the estimation
bias at ±48  was significantly different from the bias at ±32  for controls (p<0.05
, paired t-test). Together, these results confirm that participants perceived the most
frequently presented motion-direction correctly but tended to perceive other motion
directions as being more similar to the most frequent directions than they really were.
We also investigated whether the standard deviation of estimated motion-directions
changed as a function of the presented motion-direction. In accordance with previ-
ous work (Chalk et al., 2010; Gekas et al., 2013), we found that the mean standard
deviation was smaller at ±32  than at other directions (figure 5.4b). Although there
was no significant effect of motion-direction on the estimation standard deviation for
both controls (ns., Kruskal-Wallis H test) and patients (ns., Kruskal-Wallis H test), the
standard deviation at ±32  was significantly lower than the median standard devia-
tion at the other motion-directions (Controls: p=0.033, Patients: p=0.046; one-tailed MC
permutation test — difference of medians). These results indicate that participants’ es-
timations were more accurate for the most frequently presented directions than for
other directions, consistent with the idea that participants had learned to optimise
their performance for these most frequent directions.
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5.8.2.2 Detection performance
Next we examined whether participants’ expectations influenced their performances
at the 2-AFC detection task. To do so, we measured the fraction of trials where partic-
ipants’ reaction times were shorter than the stimulus presentation (i.e. <3s during the
estimation) and where they correctly responded “dots” during the detection task (fig-
ure 5.5d). We observed a common pattern across participants, whereby stimuli were
more often detected at the most frequently presented directions than at other direc-
tions. Controls were more likely to detect stimuli moving in the most frequently pre-
sented motion directions: 78.1%±1.5 at ±32  versus 65.3%±1.4 detected for all other
directions (p<0.001, two-tailed paired t-test). Similarly, patients were significantly more
likely to detect stimuli moving at ±32  (73.2%±1.8) in comparison to all other motion-
directions (64.2%±3.2; p<0.01, two-tailed paired t-test). Overall, there was a significant
effect of motion-direction on the fraction detected, both for controls (F(1,4)=11.36,
p<0.001, one-way ANOVA) and patients (F(1,4)=4.72, p<0.005, one-way ANOVA). Pa-
tients and controls did not differ at detecting motion-direction at the mostly pre-
sented direction (±32 ; ns., two-tailed independent samples t-test). These results indicate
that, in terms of detection responses (hit rates), similar benefits of statistical learning
were present in both patient and control groups.
Another measure that reflects how easily participants detected stimuli is their re-
sponse reaction time during the estimation task. To do so, we measured the elapsed
time between the stimulus presentation and the estimation response of the partici-
pant (i.e. mouse click). A general pattern was observed across participants, whereby
the mean reaction time at the most presented direction was shorter than at all other
directions (figure 5.5c). For trials where controls correctly detected a stimulus, their
reaction time was significantly reduced for the most frequently presented motion-
direction relative to other motion directions (201±4.2 ms at ±32  versus 214±5.2 ms
over all other motion-directions; p<0.005, two-tailed signed rank test). Similarly, patients
were generally faster at detecting and responding to stimuli presented at the most fre-
quented motion directions (217±7.4 ms at ±32  vs. 225±6.5 ms over all other motion-
directions; p=0.019, two-tailed signed rank test). However, although patients were gener-
ally faster for the most presented motion direction in comparison to other directions,
they were significantly slower than controls at the estimation of motion direction
(p=0.014; two-tailed ranksum test). Slow reaction time is a hallmark of schizophrenia
that has been documented thoroughly in the literature in simple reaction-time tasks
using visual and/or auditory stimuli (Nuechterlein, 1977).
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5.8.3 Perceived motion in absence of visual stimuli ‘hallucinations’
Finally, we investigated whether the acquired statistics about the motion stimulus
affected the participants’ perception on trials where no stimulus was presented but
where participants reported both a motion-direction and seeing a stimulus. We re-
fer to this effect as ‘hallucinations’. The ‘hallucinations’ in our perceptual task are of
course different in terms of content and complexity to the visual hallucinations ob-
served in psychosis (Collerton et al., 2005). However, studying these has the potential
to shed light on perhaps similar perceptual mechanisms at play. On average partici-
pants ‘hallucinated’ the stimulus on 17.9±4.77 trials for controls and 14.60±5.87 trials
for patients, corresponding to 13.8±4% and 11.3±4% of trials where no stimulus
were presented (ns., two-tailed MC permutations test — difference of medians). Interest-
ingly, for this subset of trials, participants’ estimation responses varied significantly
with motion-direction, with a clear peak at the most frequently presented motion-
directions (±32 ; Controls: p=0.002, Patients: p=0.019, two-tailed signed-rank test). This
suggests that participants did not make random ‘hallucinations’ of the stimulus but
rather preferentially hallucinated the most presented motion-directions.
To quantify the probability ratio that participants made estimates that were closer to
the most frequently presented motion directions relative to other directions, we multi-
plied the probability that participants estimated within 8  of these motion-directions





= ±32 (±8)deg) ·N
bins
(5.23)
This probability would be equal to 1 if participants were equally likely to estimate
within 8  of ±32  as they were to estimate within the other 16  bins. We found that
the median value of ‘P
rel
’ was significantly greater than 1 for both groups, indicating
that participants were strongly biased to report motion in the most frequently pre-
sented directions when no stimulus was presented. That is, participants ‘hallucinated’
significantly more stimuli at the most presented directions (figure 5.6a-b).
The fact that participants report perceiving dots that are not present, more often
at the most frequently presented motion-directions provides strong evidence that
the statistics of the task have been correctly acquired. Hallucinations of the most pre-
sented directions (i.e. hallucinations at ±32 ±8 ) appear significantly more often than
at random directions after only 250 trials in controls (p=0.029, two-tailed signed-rank
test) and 400 trials in patients (p=0.019, two-tailed signed-rank test). It is interesting to
note however that while healthy controls and patients did not differ in the amount of
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Figure 5.6: Estimation responses in the absence of stimulus for each group (Controls
- A, C; Patients B, D). (A, B) The vertical grey lines correspond to all the estimated
motion directions when no stimulus was present (i.e. ‘hallucination’) pooled across
the whole group (A-controls, B-patients). The black line represents the fitted proba-
bility distributions of response for trials where participants report a seeing a stimulus.
The dotted line represents the fitted probability distribution for trials where partici-
pants reported a motion direction during the estimation but did not confirm seeing
a stimulus during the detection task. The dot-and-dash horizontal line depicts the fit-
ted probability distribution for all trials where motion direction was reported. (C-D)
Data from either side of the central motion are averaged together. The dashed vertical
line signals the position of the mode of the prior (i.e. ±32 ).
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‘random’-hallucinations (i.e. over all directions; ns., two-tailed MC permutations test —
difference of medians), patients made significantly fewer hallucinations of the most pre-
sented direction than controls (p=0.0174, two-tailed MC permutation test - difference of
medians). In fact, 66% of patients made 3 or less hallucinations of the most frequently
presented directions, of which 50% made no hallucinations at all. By comparison, all
controls hallucinated stimuli at the most presented directions (i.e. 90% of controls
hallucinated between 3 to 14 times at ±32 ±8 ).
To ensure that the stimulus hallucinations at 32 ±8  were not the result of a strat-
egy, we analysed the subset of trials where participants made an estimation but did
not report seeing a stimulus. That is, on a large proportion of trials the presented
motion stimuli were moving in one of two directions. It is therefore possible that par-
ticipants could have developed a strategy to move subconsciously the estimation bar
towards one of these directions irrespective of their response in the detection-task. If
this were the case however, we would also expect the ‘no-stimulus’ estimation distri-
butions to be biased towards the most frequently presented directions for trials were
participants did not detect a stimulus. This response-bias could be ruled out since
participants were not significantly more likely to move the estimation bar closer to
the frequent directions on trials where they did not report seeing a stimulus (i.e. all
except 1; figure 5.6a-d see "PDF estimated only"). These results largely replicate those
of Chalk et al. (2010) and Gekas et al. (2013).
Finally, we found that the participants’ hallucinations at 32 ±8  correlated signif-
icantly with the neuropsychological assessment of the GAF (r
2
=0.532, p=0.0131, MC
permutation test) as well as the PANSS total (r
2
=-0.498 p=0.035, MC permutation test)
and PANSS positive symptoms scores (r
2
=-0.586 p=0.0077, MC permutation test).
Together these findings suggest that the more severe their symptoms were (as mea-
sured with the GAF and PANSS), the less ‘hallucinations’ participants made during
the task. We found no relationship between the daily-dosage of anti-psychotics (Chlor-
promazine equivalent; Andreasen et al., 2010) and the total amount of hallucinations
at 32 ±8  (ns.; MC permutation test).
5.9 discussion and interpretation
In summary, our results replicate previous findings of Chalk et al. (2010) both in the
patient and control groups. The performance of both groups show that participants
implicitly learn the statistics of the motion stimuli and that those expectations mod-
ify their perception. All participants display an attractive estimation bias towards the
frequently presented directions and reduced estimation variability for these direc-
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Figure 5.7: (A, B) Participants learned prior distribution of presented motion direc-
tions as predicted by the Bayesian model ‘Bayes_dual’ (plain line and light-gray
area). The probability distribution of perceptual hallucinations when simulating the
task with the Bayesian model ‘Bayes_dual’ (dotted line and dark-grey area).
tions. They also show faster reaction times and higher detection rates for the most
frequently presented directions. Finally, they tend to ‘hallucinate’ the expected direc-
tions in absence of stimuli.
Patients were not qualitatively, nor quantitatively different from controls in these mea-
sures used to assess learning of the task statistics. However, we found that patients
and controls differed in two ways. First, patients with schizophrenia displayed sig-
nificantly poorer contrast discrimination thresholds and slower reactions times than
controls. Second, we found that patients reported significantly less ‘hallucinations’ of
the most frequently presented motion directions than healthy subjects. The amount
of hallucinations of the most frequently presented directions correlated significantly
with the GAF, PANSS total and positive scores, suggesting that the better they usually
fare in neuropsychological tests, the more participants experience expectation-driven
hallucinations at the task.
5.9.1 Bayesian interpretation of ‘hallucinated’ dots
An emerging conceptual model of schizophrenia suggests that the disorder would
stem from deficits in Bayesian inference. For example, it has been proposed that the
recurrent complex visual hallucinations (Collerton et al., 2005) seen in psychotic pa-
tients could be explained in terms of deficits in the Bayesian integration of perceptual
priors and likelihoods (Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Corlett et al., 2009a; Adams et al.,
2013).
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Figure 5.8: Model Comparison using the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). The
BIC score is evaluated for each model and substracted by the BIC score evaluated
for the simple ‘Bayes’ for each participant. Values greater than zero indicate that the
simple ‘Bayes’ model was better at describing the behaviour of the participant.
Our paradigm is well suited to assess whether patients show deficits in probabilis-
tic inference either due to deficits in acquisition of the sensory priors, deficits in the
use of these priors, or due to less uncertainty in the encoding of sensory informa-
tion. Indeed, we found that participants’ performances at our task can be accurately
described by a Bayesian model where participants learn an approximation of the
stimulus statistics in the form of a perceptual prior and combine it with sensory in-
formation. Both the perceptual biases and ‘hallucinations’ in absence of stimulus can
be understood as the signature of this prior. Moreover, our paradigm allowed for the
first time to directly measure the acquisition of a perceptual prior in individuals suf-
fering from schizophrenia. Our results suggest that the perceptual priors acquired by
our controls and medicated patients are identical (figure 5.7a,b).
However, while patients seem to have learnt the statistics of motion-direction just
as well as controls, they reported fewer ‘hallucinations’ of the most frequently pre-
sented directions. These results concur with previously reported findings suggesting
that chronic schizophrenia patients are less sensitive to expectation-driven illusions
(e.g. the Hollow-mask illusion) than controls (Tschacher et al., 2006; Dima et al., 2009;
Crawford et al., 2010; Williams et al., 2010; Keane et al., 2013). Finally, we find that the
strength of positive symptoms correlated negatively with the participants’ sensitivity
to hallucinations of the motion stimulus (i.e. the stronger the symptoms, the fewer
the hallucinations). Similar findings have been reported in studies of the hollow-mask
illusion in schizophrenia patients (Keane et al., 2013).
It is intriguing however that the influence of the prior is similar to that of controls
for the estimation task but different for the detection task. To reconcile these results,
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we considered different hypotheses:
First, it is possible that chronic patients might consistently use a model of the task
that is simpler than the Bayesian model. We explored this possibility by assessing
whether response-bias models could better account for the performance of patients
that have fewer expectations-driven hallucinations. To do this, we used a systematic
model comparison approach named the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). We
found that patients were better described by the Bayesian model than by any other
model (figure 5.8), suggesting that fewer hallucinations in our task are not due to the
use of a different strategy by these patients.
Second possibility, chronic patients might overestimate the accuracy of their sen-
sory integration (the likelihood), as described by (Adams et al., 2013). This would re-
sult in perception driven mostly by sensory information when no stimuli are present,
therefore seeing no stimulus when nothing is presented. However, this model should
result in weaker perceptual biases in patients compared to controls. This was not the
case in our study.
Finally, we posit that chronic patients might have developed a heightened percep-
tion threshold requiring higher amount of evidence (i.e. stronger posterior) in order
to perceive a stimulus or make a decision about the presence of a stimulus. In fact,
patients require higher stimulus contrast and integrate information over longer peri-
ods of time before responding (slower reaction times during the estimation task). We
hypothesize that it is a possible adaptation strategy used by patients to overcome re-
sponding to stimuli that are not truly present (i.e. recurrent complex hallucinations).
That is, because patients have formerly been exposed to hallucinations, they might
now demand heightened evidence to consciously report perceiving or perceive stim-
uli that might not truly be present.
This hypothesis deserves more investigation but at this stage it seems compatible
with our results. This could be further explored using psychophysical tasks where
the prior is given explicitly to the participants (Speechley et al., 2010; Wolpert et al.,
2011). However, it is worth noting that this approach might prove difficult if patients
are truly impaired when given explicit learning tasks (Gold et al., 2009).
5.10 limitations and future work
Our study was limited in a few ways. First, the sample size used in this chapter
might appear relatively small (21 subjects) for an ordinary clinical study in psychia-
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try, but it is actually quite typical for psychophysics. Second, the patient group that
was presented in this chapter was relatively well at the time of testing (PANSS scores)
and displayed IQ levels that are not typical of the general schizophrenia population
(van Os and Kapur, 2009). Higher IQ levels have recently been shown to result in
better performances in visual perceptual tasks (Melnick et al., 2013). As a result, it
is possible that our sample might not be entirely representative of the general pop-
ulation of patients, or patients currently undergoing a psychotic episode. To palliate
this limitation we are currently performing the same motion-task in first episode psy-
chosis, chronic schizophrenia patients and healthy controls through a collaboration
with Philip R. Corlett at Yale University.
At a later stage, it would be interesting to explore whether pharmacological models
of schizophrenia (e.g. acute Ketamine or Amphetamine administration) yield similar
results to those observed in first episode psychosis. We can only speculate, although
according to the existing literature (Corlett et al., 2007b, 2011) we might expect learn-
ing to be altered in this population resulting in increased amounts of hallucinations
that are not driven by expectations. It is also possible however that learning of visual
statistics might be unscathed, in which case we would predict a large increase in the
amount of expectation-driven hallucinations due to an increased top-down signalling
of the prior on perception.
5.11 conclusions
In line with studies finding no implicit learning deficit in schizophrenia (Kéri et al.,
2000; Danion et al., 2001; Marvel et al., 2005; for review see Gold et al., 2009), we
find that patients’ performances suggest that they correctly acquired the statistics of
the stimuli in our task. First, in contrast with studies that assay explicit statistical
inference in context with cognitive symptoms such as learning and decision-making
(i.e. usually believed to involve frontal regions), here we measured implicit statistical
learning of visual stimuli that could be embodied in visual processing areas rather
than frontal cortices (Kok et al., 2013). In fact it is worth noting that, while patients
with schizophrenia are generally impaired in explicit learning, these appear relatively
spared in implicit learning tasks that do not require integrating information after each
trial (Gold et al., 2009). Secondly, our patient sample was relatively well at the time of
testing and might not be representative of patients experiencing full-blown psychosis
(i.e. chronic medicated schizophrenia; mean illness duration 14.72±2.73 years). Our
patient sample displayed no significant differences with the control group in terms
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of positive-symptom scales and current IQ.
Finally, both patients and controls preferentially hallucinated stimuli at the most
frequently presented directions when no stimulus were present, strongly suggesting
that they correctly acquired the statistics of the task. Moreover, in line with recent
studies (Keane et al., 2013), patients appeared to be less sensitive to expectation-
driven perceptual ‘hallucinations’ than controls, suggesting that they may have a nor-
mal top-down vs. bottom-up signalling but a heightened perceptual threshold, requir-
ing higher amounts of evidence in order to perceive a stimulus. In agreement with
Keane et al. (2013), we also found that the amount of expectation-driven perceptual
‘hallucinations’ were predictive of positive-symptom severity or delusion ideation in
chronic schizophrenia.
6
D I S C U S S I O N
In this thesis we investigated whether impairments in reinforcement learning and
Bayesian inference could explain the cognitive and positive symptoms observed in
schizophrenia. In chapter 2, we first presented a comprehensive survey of the com-
putational literature of schizophrenia, reviewed the advances and predictions made
by computational models and highlighted potentially promising research avenues. In
chapter 3, we used a reinforcement model of a rodent analogue of the Iowa Gambling
Task (IGT) to assay whether maladaptive decision-making can arise from abnormal
prediction-error signalling. In chapter 4 we used an optimal inference model of a spa-
tial working memory in an (abductive) attempt to find which hypotheses are most
likely to account for a generalised cognitive deficit in psychosis. Finally, in chapter 5,
we used a psychophysical task and Bayesian model of perceptual inference to inves-
tigate whether chronic schizophrenia patients were impaired in statistical learning
and perceptual inference. We first re-introduce briefly the results found in this thesis
and elaborate on whether each study individually support the general hypothesis
that cognitive deficits and positive symptoms could be explained by impairments in
reinforcement learning and Bayesian inference.
6.1 main findings & interpretation
First, in a comprehensive survey of the computational efforts made in the field of
schizophrenia, we reviewed promising models supporting competing hypotheses of
schizophrenia’s aetiology, namely the dopamine hypothesis, the glutamate hypothe-
sis, the GABAergic hypothesis, the disconnection hypothesis and finally the Bayesian
Brain hypothesis. None of these computational studies could account for the whole
range of deficits and symptoms observed in schizophrenia. However, models support-
ing the dopamine hypothesis were found to collectively account for the wide range
of cognitive deficits observed in patients. Specifically, computational models of DA
function were able to make relatively strong mechanistic predictions as to how a de-
ficiency of DA signalling could lead to generalised cognitive deficits. Namely, these
models suggested that cognitive deficits could stem from either:
1. A weak signal-to-noise ratio due to low D1r activation in prefrontal cortices
(dlPFC) involved in working-memory.
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2. Excessive striatal D2r activation leading to impairments in prediction-error sig-
nalling, known to be instrumental for associative learning, decision-making and
goal-directed behaviour.
Both of these systems were investigated in this thesis using a spatial working-memory
task known to assay working memory impairments in psychosis (Pantelis et al., 1997;
Hutton et al., 1998; Joyce et al., 2002; Wood et al., 2003; Badcock et al., 2005; Pantelis
et al., 2009), and a rodent analogue of the IGT (where schizophrenia patients have
previously been shown to be impaired; Dunn et al., 2006; Sevy et al., 2007; Kim et al.,
2009) that relies on associative learning for task completion.
However, two other types of models were able to make predictions that are worth
mentioning here. First, a biophysically realistic model of working-memory using
bump-attractors networks (Murray et al., 2012) recently provided compelling evi-
dence that an imbalance between glutamate excitatory and GABAergic inhibition
may lead to working-memory deficits. Specifically, the authors found that a disinhi-
bition from GABAergic inhibitory neurons due to an NMDAr hypofunction lead to a
less precise encoding of information and an increased susceptibility to corruption by
distractor that is similar to the information already encoded. Secondly, computational
models supporting the disconnection hypothesis were able to account for the late
adolescence onset of the disorder (Hoffman and McGlashan, 1997; McGlashan and
Hoffman, 2000). Specifically, this hypothesis argues that during the maturation of the
PFC (late adolescence), weak synapses are pruned away to improve global efficiency.
In schizophrenia, these models predicted that the maturation process lead to an over-
pruning of frontal cortices, leading to both cognitive and positive symptoms. We
suggested that both the glutamatergic and GABAergic hypotheses could account for
this disconnection syndrome. Namely, that weaker synapses could emerge following
a prefrontal NMDAr hypofunction, leading to an over-pruning during adolescence
(Greenstein-Messica and Ruppin, 1998). Alternatively, since GABAergic inhibition is
essential to  -band rhythms, inefficient GABAergic inhibition in schizophrenia would
result in an asynchrony between cortical areas (Spencer, 2009), leading to a long-range
functional disconnection syndrome.
It becomes evident from this review however, that it is difficult to observe a coher-
ent picture from this computational literature which could account for all the deficits
and subtleties observed in schizophrenia. Especially, while we found that the gluta-
mate and GABAergic hypothesis appear complementary and could potentially ex-
plain a disconnection syndrome, dopamine dysfunction still remains the most preva-
lent monoamine deficit leading the the positive symptoms observed in schizophrenia
(Howes and Kapur, 2009; Howes et al., 2012; Howes and Murray, 2013). However,
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pharmacological and behavioural studies investigating the effects of NMDA receptor
blockade have suggested that it may lead to strong changes in midbrain DA neurons
(e.g. Jentsch and Roth, 1999). It is therefore possible that an NMDAr hypofunction
could account for the disconnection syndrome (late adolescence onset of the disor-
der) and secondary Dopaminergic dysfunction observed in schizophrenia, providing
a over-arching theme throughout this literature.
Finally, we compared the empirical support gathered by each hypothesis and found
that the Bayesian Brain hypothesis has received relatively little support and empiri-
cal investigation with the exception of studies investigating illusions (e.g. Dima et al.,
2009; Keane et al., 2013) or explicit statistical learning (e.g. Huq et al., 1988; Speechley
et al., 2010). This hypothesis is argued to be able to account for both cognitive and pos-
itive symptoms in schizophrenia. Specifically, it is thought that deficient probabilistic
learning would lead to an incorrect acquisition of the statistics of the world resulting
in deficits of cognition and delusion-like beliefs (Corlett et al., 2009a; Fletcher and
Frith, 2009; Frith and Friston, 2012). In turn, these incorrect expectations would lead
to deficits in perceptual inference, explaining away the hallucinations experienced
by patients with schizophrenia. We investigated this hypothesis using a psychophys-
ical task known to assay statistical learning and perceptual inference mechanisms in
healthy controls.
6.1.1 Associative learning & maladaptive decision making
In our first study, we used a reinforcement model of a rodent analogue of the Iowa
Gambling Task (IGT) to assay whether maladaptive decision-making could arise
from aberrant prediction-error signalling. Particularly, in this study we found that
in a healthy population of animals, one third of these would prefer the most disad-
vantageous option (Rivalan et al., 2013), similar to the preference of patients with
schizophrenia at the IGT (Dunn et al., 2006; Sevy et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2009). Fur-
thermore, it was found that these poor decision-makers exhibited behavioural traits
such as risk-seeking, cognitive inflexibility and excessive reward sensitivity, suggest-
ing that the traits might be responsible for the poor decision-making performances.
We implemented an optimal reinforcement learning algorithm of the RGT, that we al-
tered in an attempt to investigate whether these behavioural traits could be modelled
as a disruption of the prediction-error signal and lead to the maladaptive decisions.
In this computational study we found that:
1. An aberrant prediction error signalling may lead to maladaptive decision mak-
ing in the proportion of healthy rats that are poor decision makers.
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2. The formalism used to describe the behavioural traits appeared to be valid
since the parameters implementing the behavioural traits correlated with their
experimental counterpart.
Interestingly, when we investigated how the prediction-error disruptions led to mal-
adaptive decisions, we found that abnormal prediction-errors led to the acquisition
of incorrect values (over-valuation) for disadvantageous options. That is, abnormal
prediction-error led to the acquisition of an incorrect model of the task outcomes,
resulting in decisions that appeared optimal according to the agent internal model
but were in fact maladaptive according to the real outcomes of the task.
In schizophrenia, patients have been shown to be impaired at the human equivalent
of the task (IGT; Dunn et al., 2006; Sevy et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2009). Specifically,
patients with schizophrenia appear to exhibit behavioural traits that are similar to
these modelled in our task, namely inflexibility to changes in the environment (as
measured by the WCST; e.g. Weinberger et al., 1988; Elliott et al., 1995) and reward
sensitivity (Kim et al., 2009). Furthermore, patients have consistently been shown to
display prediction-error signalling deficits (Corlett et al., 2007b; Murray et al., 2008;
Romaniuk et al., 2010; Gradin et al., 2011). As a result we could argue that, similarly
to the previous computational efforts of Smith et al. (2004, 2005, 2007) which illus-
trated how aberrant prediction-error signalling can lead to conditioned-avoidance or
latent-inhibition deficits in animal models of psychosis (rats), our study illustrates
how aberrant prediction-error signalling could lead to an incorrect acquisition of the
values of the world (false task model/beliefs) resulting in maladaptive decision mak-
ing. Although it might be incorrect to argue that rats have delusions, if we loosen
the definition of a delusion to false or erroneous beliefs, then our model can illustrate
how prediction-error disruptions eventually lead to the acquisition of false beliefs (in-
correct values for the task at play). Specifically, the definition of a false belief in this
context has some resemblance to delusions in that it is a belief that is not supported
by objective logical evidence, but is nonetheless continuously pursued and reinstated
due to a subjective erroneous internal interpretation of the agent, and as a result is
relatively impermeable to contradiction (delusion; Corlett et al., 2009b).
6.1.2 Working memory & cognitive deficits
In our second study we assessed spatial working memory deficits in first episode psy-
chosis, chronic schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and family relatives of DISC1 translo-
cation carriers. First we wanted to investigate whether different working-memory
impairments could be identified in this heterogeneous psychiatric population. Simi-
larly to previous studies using the same spatial working memory task (Pantelis et al.,
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1997; Hutton et al., 1998; Joyce et al., 2002; Wood et al., 2003; Badcock et al., 2005;
Pantelis et al., 2009), we found significant impairment of working memory in chronic
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and family members. Although, we did not observe
an association between translocation status and working memory performances in
family members (Gasperoni et al., 2003; Porteous et al., 2006). Interestingly however,
our extended data analysis suggested that these groups require more time to solve a
set in earlier trials and that this difference cannot be accounted for by the number of
errors performed by patients. A recent study using Ketamine (a NMDAr antagonist)
in time perception tasks tend to suggest that glutamatergic processes might account
for the increased reaction times observed in schizophrenia (Coull et al., 2011).
Secondly we used an optimal inference model of spatial working memory in an (ab-
ductive) attempt to find which most commonly debated hypotheses of schizophrenia
were most likely to account for the generalised cognitive impairments observed in
these groups. Interestingly, we found that our computational analysis reinforced pre-
vious suspicions, namely that working-memory maintenance was responsible for the
generalised cognitive deficits observed in schizophrenia (Reichenberg and Harvey,
2007). Specifically, the same computational model was found to account for the poor
performances of patients with bipolar disorder and family relatives of DISC1 translo-
cation carriers. We suggest however that further investigations are required to iden-
tify the possible neurobiological substrates responsible for these working-memory
deficits. Specifically, according to the existing computational hypotheses available,
two theories prevail, namely the WM gating hypothesis (Cohen et al., 1996; Durste-
witz et al., 1999; Braver et al., 1999; Braver and Cohen, 1999, 2000; Durstewitz et al.,
2000a,b; Frank et al., 2001; Durstewitz and Seamans, 2002; Gruber et al., 2006; O’Reilly
and Frank, 2006; Todd et al., 2008; Badre and Frank, 2012) and the cortical microcir-
cuit imbalance (Loh et al., 2007; Cano-Colino and Compte, 2012; Murray et al., 2012).
The former theory suggests that abnormal dopaminergic transmission to the dlPFC
leads to a failure to gate and maintain information in memory when faced with dis-
tractors, while the latter suggests that excitatory/inhibitory imbalances at the level of
cortical microcircuits lead to shallow bump-attractor states that are prone to disrup-
tion.
In light of recent findings suggesting that working-memory deficits are predictive of
delusional ideation both in psychotic patients and in the general population (Broome
et al., 2007; Freeman et al., 2008; Garety et al., 2013), scientists have posited that
working-memory deficits could explain deficits in explicit statistical learning (Broome
et al., 2007). That is, during explicit statistical learning, patient might require the
use of working-memory in order to integrate information over time. Since working-
memory appears to be deficient in schizophrenia, the explicit acquisition of statistical
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information would in turn be impaired, as found in the beads task (Broome et al.,
2007; Garety et al., 2013). It appear therefore possible, that working-memory impair-
ments might be central to explicit statistical learning deficits, which have been linked
to —and hypothesised to result in— delusional ideation (Broome et al., 2007; Garety
et al., 2013).
6.1.3 Statistical learning & perceptual inference
Finally, in our third and last study we investigated implicit statistical learning and
perceptual inference in schizophrenia. Specifically, scientists have posited that delu-
sions and hallucinations might stem from an incorrect Bayesian inference mechanism
(Friston, 2005b; Corlett et al., 2009a; Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Frith and Friston, 2012;
Adams et al., 2013; Jardri and Deneve, 2013). In this framework, hallucinations are
argued to arise from either an incorrect acquisition of expectations (statistical learn-
ing) or an imbalance between learnt statistics and sensory information (Fletcher and
Frith, 2009). To test this hypothesis, we used a psychophysical task previously devel-
oped by Chalk et al. (2010) and known to induce the rapid acquisition of a motion
stimuli. In this task, healthy individuals were previously found to implicitly acquire
the statistics of the stimulus. This learning then influenced perception such that the
motion stimuli were perceived as being more similar to the most frequently pre-
sented stimuli than they really were (i.e. estimation biases) and participants reported
perceiving the most frequently presented stimuli in absence of visual stimuli (i.e. il-
lusion/’hallucinated’ dots). The goal of this study was to investigate whether patients
with schizophrenia could implicitly acquire the statistics of a visual stimuli and to
observe how these acquired expectations affected their perception.
Interestingly, consistent with previous studies (Kéri et al., 2000; Danion et al., 2001;
Marvel et al., 2005; for review see Gold et al., 2009), we found that the patients’
performances suggested that they correctly acquired the statistics of the stimuli in
our task. That is, participants appeared not to be impaired in the implicit acquisi-
tion of visual statistics, and performed similarly to healthy controls at the task. This
is in contrast with previous studies demonstrating impaired statistical learning in
schizophrenia (Huq et al., 1988; Speechley et al., 2010; Averbeck et al., 2011; Evans
et al., 2012; Joyce et al., 2013). However it is worth mentioning that these tasks typ-
ically assay explicit as opposed to implicit statistical learning. That is, in explicit
learning tasks patients would be actively engaged in the acquisition of probabilistic
information, which might involve cognitive processes such as working-memory to
maintain and update information over time (Broome et al., 2007). In contrast, implicit
statistical learning of visual stimuli could be embodied directly in visual processing
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areas rather than frontal cortices (Kok et al., 2013), and therefore be void of deficits
triggered working-memory. These findings are also consistent with reviews suggest-
ing that while patients with schizophrenia are generally impaired in explicit learning,
they appear relatively spared in implicit learning tasks that do not require integrating
information after each trial (Gold et al., 2009).
Finally, we found that both patients and controls preferentially ‘hallucinated’ stimuli
at the most frequently presented directions when no stimulus were present, strongly
suggesting that they correctly acquired the statistics of the task. Moreover, in line with
recent studies (Keane et al., 2013), patients appeared to be less sensitive to expectation-
driven perceptual ‘hallucinations’ than controls.To explain this phenomenon, we spec-
ulated that patients might have developed a heightened perceptual threshold, requir-
ing higher amounts of evidence in order to perceive a stimulus. This is consistent
with our findings, namely that patients are generally slower during the estimation
task, suggesting that they might integrate information over a larger period of time
in order to reach a higher confidence in the perceived stimuli. This is only specula-
tive however, and further investigation is required to replicate and confirm this effect.
Interestingly however, in agreement with Keane et al. (2013), we also found that the
amount of expectation-driven perceptual ‘hallucinations’ were predictive of positive-
symptom severity. This would tend to suggest that the perceptual mechanisms inves-
tigated in our task may be similar to those leading to hallucinations in schizophrenia.
That is, although not directly supporting the hypothesis of a perceptual inference
deficit in psychosis, our results appear at least compatible with previous studies
suggesting that perceptual inference is different to that of controls in schizophrenia.
Further work is required in order to investigate precisely how patients differ from
controls. Specifically, using psychophysical tasks were the prior is explicitly given to
the participants (Acerbi et al., 2014), one could investigate the suboptimal inference
mechanisms that might be present in psychotic patients and are not dependent on
prior statistical learning.
6.2 general limitations
In this thesis, we identified some issues and limitations that are worth mention-
ing. First and foremost, we found that IQ levels were highly predictive of working-
memory performances. This is an issue that is often mentioned in the working-
memory literature (Piskulic et al., 2007). In our study, while we did observe signifi-
cant differences in working-memory for the family members, current IQ was found
to account for all the performance differences of that group. This would tend to
suggest that no significant difference in performance truly existed between family
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members and healthy controls, and that instead these difference stemmed from the
lower current-IQ of the family members.
We want to express caution regarding this interpretation. In fact, measures of current
IQ are computed from a composite of standardized cognitive tests used to assess "in-
dependent" cognitive processes, one of which being working memory. Furthermore,
although these tests are designed so as to assess independent components, tasks
that assay planning and reasoning will always require use of working memory to
some degree. That is, part of the IQ score of every participant will be reflected by
their intrinsic performances in working memory. We would argue as a result that
using IQ as a covariate for a measure or performance in working memory might be
inappropriate. To circumvent this issue, scientists typically attempt to match the de-
mographic variables of the groups of interest in order to measure an effect between
similar types of populations (IQ, age, education, etc.). However, since mental illnesses
such as schizophrenia appear to result in an average IQ drop of about 10 points fol-
lowing the disease onset, one needs to be careful so as to select a sample that will be
representative of the psychiatric population.
Secondly, it is worth mentioning that while there is a scientific consensus suggest-
ing that working memory is deficient in schizophrenia (e.g. Gold et al., 2009; Forbes
et al., 2009), the specificity of these memory impairments are highly debated (Kapur
et al., 2012). For example, scientists argue for a deficit of working-memory capacity
(e.g. Gold et al., 2009, 2010), others for deficits of encoding (e.g. Lee and Park, 2005),
others suggest a deficit in memory manipulation (e.g. Fletcher and Honey, 2006) and
also a deficit of memory maintenance (e.g. Reichenberg and Harvey, 2007). It appear
therefore critical that future studies attempt to isolate and investigate systematically
and independently the different aspects of working-memory that might be impaired.
6.3 future work
A couple of extensions from the studies presented in this thesis could potentially
yield interesting insights on schizophrenia and its mechanisms. First, using the re-
inforcement learning model of the the rodent gambling task presented in Chapter
3, one could attempt to model the behaviour of patients with schizophrenia at the
human equivalent of the task (IGT). Specifically, patients with schizophrenia appear
to exhibit behavioural traits that resemble these modelled in our study, namely cog-
nitive inflexibility, reward sensitivity and risk seeking. It would be interesting to test
whether the behavioural traits formalised in the model for rodents translate to be-
havioural equivalents in humans. Particularly, using the IGT, one could use a ques-
tionnaire at regular intervals throughout the task (as has been done previously) to
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investigate the subjective valuation of options by the patients. If the patients appear
to incorrectly overvalue disadvantageous choices in the questionnaire (as predicted
by the model), this would provide compelling evidence suggesting that a disruption
of prediction-error lead to the acquisition of an incorrect internal model of the task.
Such a study could also be performed using functional neuroimaging so as to provide
a quantitative measurement of the impairment of prediction-error present in patients
during the task. The degree of disruption of prediction-error measured at the task
could then be compared to that predicted by the model.
Secondly, one could investigate the probabilistic inference mechanisms that are present
in schizophrenia by removing the need for statistical learning. Particularly, using a
psychophysical task such as in (Acerbi et al., 2014), where the prior is explicitly pre-
sented to the participants, one would be able to study how patients with schizophre-
nia combine probabilistic information. Specifically, one would be able to investigate
whether patients with schizophrenia combine probabilistic information optimally,
and whether this differs from that of healthy controls. Finally, one would be able
to distinguish whether deficits of probabilistic inference in schizophrenia stem from
impairments in the acquisition of statistical information or whether it results from a
suboptimal combination of probabilistic information.
6.4 conclusions
In this thesis, we investigated whether impairments in reinforcement learning and
Bayesian inference could account for the cognitive and positive symptoms observed
in schizophrenia. First, we illustrated that impairments in prediction-error signalling
can lead to maladaptive decision making through an incorrect acquisition of the val-
ues of the environment. We further suggested that an aberrant prediction-error sig-
nalling led to the acquisition of an incorrect model of the task outcomes, resulting
in decisions that appeared optimal according to the agent’s internal model but were
in fact maladaptive according to the real outcome of the task. We then argued that
this has some resemblance to delusions, in that it is a false belief that is not sup-
ported by logical evidence but will be continuously pursued and reinstated due to an
erroneous subjective internal model of the world. Secondly, our model comparison
analysis suggested that a deficit of working-memory maintenance accounted best for
the performance deficits observed at a spatial working memory tasks in patients with
chronic schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and family relatives of DISC1 translocation
carriers. As recently suggested (Broome et al., 2007; Garety et al., 2013), working mem-
ory appear to be linked with failures in statistical learning and delusional ideation.
This has led scientists to suggest that working memory might be required in order
6.4 conclusions 141
to perform explicit statistical learning (Broome et al., 2007), and that an impairment
of working-memory maintenance could explain deficits in integrating explicit sta-
tistical information over time (Broome et al., 2007; Garety et al., 2013). Finally, we
demonstrated that patient with chronic schizophrenia do not show implicit statisti-
cal learning deficits of a motion stimuli and established that patients have identical
estimation biases and perceptual inference mechanisms to that of healthy controls.
However, we found that patients appear to make less expectation-driven ‘hallucina-
tions’ of the motion stimulus when no stimulus was presented, and that the number
of these ‘hallucinations’ appear to correlate with positive symptom severity. This led
us to suggests that positive symptoms in schizophrenia might be compatible with a
deficit of perceptual inference, but that further work is required to investigate the im-
plications of this finding. It is worth mentioning however that one might argue that
since patients tend to ‘hallucinate’ less than controls in our task, they are in essence
more ‘optimal’ in terms of perceptual inference than controls. However, as Teufel et al.
(2013) recently argued, it is the combination of the prior and likelihood that lead to
optimal perception so as to disambiguate noisy sensory evidence, even if this some-
times leads to perceptual illusions. As a result, a lack of illusions or ‘hallucinations’ in
our task should rather be seen as evidence for a deficit of perceptual inference rather
than evidence for a more optimal inference than that of controls.
Finally we conclude that impairments in reinforcement learning and Bayesian infer-
ence appear to be able to account for the positive and cognitive symptoms observed
in schizophrenia, but that further work is required. Specifically, while our studies
addressed individual components such as associative learning, working memory,
implicit learning & perceptual inference, we cannot conclude that deficits of rein-
forcement learning and Bayesian inference can collectively account for symptoms
in schizophrenia. We argue however that our studies provided evidence that impair-
ments of reinforcement learning and Bayesian inference are compatible with the emer-
gence of positive and cognitive symptoms in schizophrenia.
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Abstract
Although poor decision-making is a hallmark of psychiatric conditions such as attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder,
pathological gambling or substance abuse, a fraction of healthy individuals exhibit similar poor decision-making
performances in everyday life and specific laboratory tasks such as the Iowa Gambling Task. These particular individuals may
provide information on risk factors or common endophenotypes of these mental disorders. In a rodent version of the Iowa
gambling task – the Rat Gambling Task (RGT), we identified a population of poor decision makers, and assessed how these
rats scored for several behavioral traits relevant to executive disorders: risk taking, reward seeking, behavioral inflexibility,
and several aspects of impulsivity. First, we found that poor decision-making could not be well predicted by single
behavioral and cognitive characteristics when considered separately. By contrast, a combination of independent traits in the
same individual, namely risk taking, reward seeking, behavioral inflexibility, as well as motor impulsivity, was highly
predictive of poor decision-making. Second, using a reinforcement-learning model of the RGT, we confirmed that only the
combination of extreme scores on these traits could induce maladaptive decision-making. Third, the model suggested that
a combination of these behavioral traits results in an inaccurate representation of rewards and penalties and inefficient
learning of the environment. Poor decision-making appears as a consequence of the over-valuation of high-reward-high-risk
options in the task. Such a specific psychological profile could greatly impair clinically healthy individuals in decision-making
tasks and may predispose to mental disorders with similar symptoms.
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Introduction
Several mental disorders related to poor executive functioning,
such as substance abuse, pathological gambling, attention-deficit
hyperactivity-disorder or mania, share common deficits and
behavioral traits. Impulsiveness, risk taking [1] or inflexible
behavior [2,3,4,5], are often present, suggesting that they may
jointly contribute to pathological behavior. Poor decision making
is a hallmark of these mental disorders as these patients are
commonly impaired in the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). This task
measures the capacity to balance risks and gains and to resist
immediate gratification in order to receive a larger long-term gain
[6]. Interestingly, within a healthy population, a subset of
individuals described as impulsive and sensation seekers display
poor decision making in this task [7], supporting the notion that a
continuum may exist between normality and pathological
conditions. Accordingly, neuropsychological characteristics lead-
ing to poor decision making in healthy individuals are probably
shared by clinical poor decision makers, and could be a potential
risk factor for developing related mental disorders [8,9].
We have developed a single-session Rat Gambling Task (RGT)
that reproduces the IGT principles [10,11,12]. In this uncertain
and conflicting situation, individuals without prior knowledge of
the outcomes must gradually learn that the less immediately
rewarding options are also less risky and more advantageous in the
long term.
Using lesion studies, we have recently shown that good
performances in the RGT depend of the functional integrity of
several areas of the prefrontal cortex [12]. Like humans, a majority
of rats are good decision makers (good DM) and choose the best
options, whereas a minority prefers the worst options. These inter-
individual differences are stable over time, specific to decision-
making processes and reproducible across groups [11]. We
previously showed that, like humans, rats that are poor decision
makers (poor DM) are risk-prone and more sensitive to reward
than good DM [11]. However, although these traits were clearly
associated with poor decision making in the RGT, they were not
sufficient to dissociate good from poor performers individually, as
some good DM were also risk-takers and/or higher reward
seekers. Therefore, additional factors, such as inflexibility and
impulsivity, could be involved in combination with these traits.
Here, we present an analysis of how inter-individual differences
in clinically relevant behavioral traits may contribute to poor and
good decision making in the RGT. We show that a combination of
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several independent behavioral and cognitive characteristics in
one individual, namely risk-proneness, motivation for reward,
motor impulsivity and behavioral inflexibility, has a cumulative
effect and is highly predictive of performance in the RGT. To
quantitatively explore the impact of these traits on learning and
decision-making, we developed a computational model of the
RGT based on the Temporal Difference (TD) learning algorithm
[13,14,15]. The basic TD framework was extended to take into
account risk seeking, reward seeking and cognitive inflexibility and
to estimate those behavioral traits in individual rats. The model
provides a possible explanation of their impact on learning and
decision-making performances in the RGT.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
All procedures were conducted in strict accordance with the
2010-63-EU and with approval of the Bordeaux University
Animal Care and Use Committee (Permit number: 5012087-A).
Behavior
Subjects. Male Wistar Han rats (n = 29; Charles River, France)
were 12-13 weeks old at the beginning of the experiment. They
were housed in groups of four in a temperature (23uC) and
humidity-controlled room (60%) on an inverted 12 hr light/dark
cycle (lights on at 20:30). Tests were conducted during the dark
phase of the cycle. A week before the beginning of the
experiments, animals were handled every day. Rats had free
access to food and water except during impulsivity and decision-
making tests during which they were moderately food deprived
(95% free feeding weight). The configuration of the apparatus and
the order of testing were chosen to minimize any possible
interference between protocols (see Figure 1 for order and
duration of tests). The whole behavioral testing phase lasted 6
months (178 days).
Decision-making. The RGT requires successive choices
among four options in an operant cage [10,11]. Two of the four
options are associated with a higher immediate gain, but are
disadvantageous in the long run due to higher unpredictable
penalties (time-outs). The experiments were performed in twelve
polyvalent conditioning boxes (Imetronic, Pessac, France;
28630634 cm). Boxes were equipped with four nose-poke holes,
dimly illuminated within the hole with a white LED. These holes
were located on a curved wall on one side of the box, equidistant
to a food magazine situated on the opposite wall. Each hole was
equipped with an infrared detector connected to an external
dispenser delivering food pellets (45 mg, formula P, Sandow
scientific, USA). Data collection was automated using a control
software (Imetronic, Pessac, France) running on a computer
outside the testing room. At least thirty minutes before each
session, the rats were placed in the light-attenuated and
temperature-controlled (23uC) experimental room.
Training: During the training phase, the rats learned to
associate two consecutive nose-pokes in one of the four illuminated
holes with the delivery of one or two food pellets in the magazine.
First, the rats had to associate a single nose-poke in any of the four
illuminated holes with the delivery of one food pellet in the
magazine. After a nose poke, only the selected hole remained
illuminated, but all were inactivated until the rat collected the food
reward. This procedure continued daily until rats obtained 100
pellets within a session (30 min cut-off). Then two consecutive
nose-pokes in the same hole were required to obtain food, to
ensure that the selection of the hole was a voluntary choice. After
reaching the same criterion, rats were submitted to two final 15
min training sessions. In the first session, two pellets were delivered
after a choice was made (maximum 30 pellets). This session
habituated the rats to the quantity of pellets which could be
obtained during the test. A second session followed, delivering only
one pellet at a time (maximum 15 pellets). The number of reward
deliveries was reduced to avoid reduction of sampling and the
development of a preference for a hole. The training phase usually
lasted 5-7 days and tests were performed the following day.
Test: Rats could freely choose between four nose-poke holes (A-
D) during a one-hour test session (or max. 250 pellets obtained).
Choices C and D vs A and B led to the immediate delivery of one
vs two pellets, but choices A and B could be followed by longer,
unpredictable penalties (222 s and 444 s time-outs) compared to
choices C and D (12 s and 6 s). Penalties occurred at a low
probability (J) for choices B and C, and at a high probability (K)
for choices A and D (Figure 2). During the penalty, all lights were
switched off and nose-poke holes were disabled, but the chosen
hole remained illuminated to facilitate association between each
choice and its consequences. A brief extinction of this light (1 sec)
signaled the end of the time-out. The theoretical maximum gain
was the same for advantageous choices C and D, and five times
higher than for disadvantageous choices A and B.
Good and poor decision makers were differentiated on the basis
of the percentage of advantageous choices (.70% and ,30%
respectively) during the last 20 minutes of test. The remaining rats
Figure 1. Order and duration of behavioral tasks. The number of days (d) of each behavioral testing phase (below arrow) and inter-test periods
(grey zones) are indicated. RGT: Rat Gambling task, FI-EXT: multiple fixed-interval/extinction schedules, Emerg. Task: Light-dark emergence task,
FCN16: Fixed consecutive number 16 cue schedule, DDT: Delay discounting task.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0082052.g001
Figure 2. Principle of the Rat Gambling Task. Rats can nose-poke
among four different holes (A, B, C and D) in an operant cage, to earn
food reward (1-hour test). The selection of one option is immediately
rewarded, but can also be followed by a penalty (time-out) of variable
duration, according to different probabilities. Two options (C, D) are
equally more advantageous than the other two (A, B), which are equally
disadvantageous in the long term.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0082052.g002
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were undecided with intermediate scores (between 30% and 70%
advantageous choices) [10,11,12]. The mean latency to collect
food pellets after a choice was taken as an indicator of the rats
motivation for the food reward [11].
Behavioral flexibility. In a second stage, the contingencies
for A-B and C-D were spatially reversed to assess behavioral
flexibility [11]. To reduce spatial preferences related to the
previous experience in the RGT, animals were first given a new
training session (100 pellets or 30 min cut-off) during which only
one hole at a time, pseudo-randomly, was illuminated and
operating at a time, each nose-poke delivering 1 pellet. The test
in reversed condition was done the following day, in the same
conditions as the RGT, except that options A-B and options C-D
were spatially exchanged.
Performances were calculated as the mean percentage of
choices for the preferred contingency during the RGT. Behaviors
were differentiated on the basis of the time course of choices and
flexibility. The observed behaviors were classified into three
categories: flexible behavior, with progressive reversion towards
the new location of their favorite options (.60% of choices during
last 20 min), undecided behavior (choice between 40% and 60%)
and inflexible behavior with perseveration of previously learned
choices (,40% of choices).
Impulsive actions: anticipatory hyperactivity and
perseveration. The multiple Fixed-Interval/Extinction sched-
ules of reinforcement (FI-EXT) was performed during a single
session in operant chambers equipped with one lever. The
chambers used for this test were different from the ones used in
the RGT [16]. Two periods of fixed-interval schedule of
reinforcement (FI) alternated with two periods of extinction
(EXT) (FI-EXT-FI-EXT). Impulsive responses corresponded to
lever presses during frustrating periods where no reward was
available.
The apparatus consisted of eight sound-insulated light-tight
outer chambers each containing a two lever conditioning box
(Imetronic, Pessac). The boxes (32632622 cm) were constructed
from white plastic panels with a Plexiglas door. They were
equipped with a fan providing a background noise. Each box was
permanently illuminated by a diffuse 2 lux light source located in
the middle of the ceiling (house light). The floor consisted of 5 mm
diameter stainless steel bars spaced 1.5 cm apart. Two stainless
steel levers protruded horizontally 1 cm from the wall situated at
the left of the door, 16 cm apart and 6 cm above the grid floor. A
tray was situated centrally on the opposite wall. Food pellets
(45 mg, formula P, Sandow scientific, USA) were delivered in the
tray by a food dispenser. A program (Imetronic, Pessac) controlled
the chambers and collected the data on a computer situated
outside the testing room.
Training and test: During FI, the house light was on and the
first lever press after a designated time-interval was reinforced by a
food pellet. A light above the lever was on when the pellet was
available until the rat visited the tray. During EXT (5 min), the
house light was off and no pellet was delivered. During each
session, the FI and EXT components operated twice in
alternation. Rats were first trained with four sessions with a 30s
FI-EXT schedule. Then, rats were trained for four sessions on a 1
min FI-EXT schedule followed by three sessions with a 2 min FI-
EXT schedule. A maximum of 7 pellets per FI (14 pellets in total)
were delivered during the 1 and 2 min FI conditions. Finally, rats
were tested for four sessions on a 1 min FI-EXT schedule to assess
adaptability to a change for a shorter FI phase. This latter
condition has been chosen for analysis.
Data measure: The mean number of lever presses during each
FI and each EXT conditions was recorded. As previously
described [16], data from the initial FI after the start of the
session, as well as that from the first interval following the first
EXT were excluded because the behavior during these intervals
might deviate from those during the other intervals. The total
mean number of lever press, the number of visits to the empty tray
as well as the speed in collecting pellets were also measured for FI
and EXT.
Impulsive actions: premature responses. The Fixed
Consecutive Number of 16 lever press schedule (FCN16) measures
behavioral inhibition in operant chambers by testing the rat’s
ability to carry out a long chain of sequential lever presses before
obtaining a reward [17]. The schedule required a fixed minimum
number of 16 responses on one lever (FCN lever), signaled by a
cue light, before a response on the second lever (Reinforcement
lever) resulted in the delivery of one food pellet. Impulsivity was
reflected by the proportion of prematurely ended chains of presses
on the FCN lever. These chains reset the count and were not
rewarded. Chains longer that 16 responses were scored as
perseveration.
The operant chambers used for FCN16 testing were similar to
the ones used for the FI-EXT schedule, except that they had 2
levers situated on the wall opposite to the food magazine. A cue
light above the right lever was also added. The reinforcement
lever, much less used than the FCN lever, was the one previously
used in the FI-EXT schedule.
Training: On the first day, only the reinforcement lever was
available and every press resulted in the delivery of a food pellet in
the tray. The rats quickly obtained at least 100 pellets within 40
min (criterion). The following days, both levers were available and
the light above the FCN lever was turned on and rats were
required to press the FCN lever first and then to press the
Reinforcement lever to obtain food (FCN1). The cue light was
switched off when the rats had completed the number of
consecutive presses required on the FCN lever to obtain food.
The cue light signaled the completion of the response requirement
to avoid confounds related to time estimation [17].
This cue light was turned on again when rats visited the tray. If
the chain was shorter than the number required, the rat had to
start a new chain. If the chain was longer, it had no consequence,
and the pellet was delivered when the rat pressed the reinforced
lever. When 100 pellets were obtained within a session (40 min
cut-off), the FCN requirement was progressively increased to 2, 3,
5, and then 8 and 12 using a less strict criterion (45-min cut-off and
at least 70 pellets) to avoid overtraining. Rats that failed to reach
the criterion in FCN5 after 20 training sessions were excluded
from this task. Training under FCN12 lasted a minimum of two
consecutive 30-min sessions until rats had reached a stable level of
performance.
Test: Rats were tested using the same procedural conditions as
in training but with a FCN requirement of 16 lever presses
(FCN16) during three consecutive sessions (30 min or 100 pellets
cut-off). A rewarded chain of lever presses corresponded to 16 or
more lever presses executed on the FCN lever before pressing the
reinforced lever.
Data measure: Only data from the third session of FCN16 were
analyzed because they revealed the largest inter-individual
behavioral differences between good and poor decision makers.
Impulsivity in this task is reflected by a low percentage of rewarded
chains (,70%). Among rewarded chains, some were just as long as
necessary (16 presses) and reflect high response efficiency, whereas
some others exceeded the number of presses required and reflect
low response efficiency. Thus, response efficiency was estimated by
the number of FCN lever presses divided by the total number of
food pellet consumed. The number of sessions needed to reach the
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test phase (learning score) and response rate (total number of each
lever responses per min) were also considered. The distribution of
the mean number of chain of lever presses according to their
length was analyzed.
Impulsive choice: delay discounting. The Delay Dis-
counting Task (DDT) measures impulsive choice in an operant
chamber by assessing the preference for an immediate small
reward (one pellet, when pressing one of the levers) over a larger
one delivered after a delay (5 pellets, when pressing the other
lever). The delay preceding the delivery of the larger reinforce-
ment was progressively increased between sessions.
The operant chambers were the same as those used for the
RGT, except that the curved wall was replaced by a straight one
equipped with two levers facing the food magazine on the opposite
wall. The house light, two cue-lights above the two levers and one
cue light in the tray of the food magazine were available and could
be turned on and off depending of the procedure.
Training: During training, a press on the right lever (L1)
resulted in the immediate delivery of one food pellet whereas a
press on the left lever (L5) readily delivered five pellets. Given that
the rats were previously trained in the FCN16 schedule that also
used two levers (the previous FCN lever being now the L1 lever), a
training period was conducted in order to obtain stable
performances with no interference from previous requirements.
This training period lasted until the rats made more than 70% L5
selections with less than 15% variation in this score on 2
consecutive sessions (in total, 3 sessions were necessary). Whenever
an operant lever press was made, a light above this lever was
switched on for 1s. Three seconds after food delivery, the
magazine light was turned on for 60s, during which time
additional presses were without consequence (time-out). The end
of this time-out and the beginning of a new trial was signaled by
turning off the food magazine light as well as the house light. The
duration of the time-out was adjusted such that the duration of
each trial was the same whichever lever was chosen.
Test: During the test phase, a press on L1 immediately delivered
one food pellet, and was followed by a 60s time-out, whereas a
delay was inserted between L5 pressing and the delivery of the five
pellets. During this delay, the light above L5 lever remained on
until the pellets were delivered, then a time-out (60s minus the
length of the delay) immediately followed food delivery. The delay
was fixed for a given daily session and increased progressively over
the days by 10s from 0 to 40s according to a criterion of stability:
scores over two consecutive sessions should not vary by more than
10%. All sessions ended when 100 pellets had been delivered.
Data measures: Percentage of L5 choice, total mean number of
lever presses, and presses during the delay and time-out periods
were measured. These parameters were calculated for each delay
as the mean of the last two stable sessions.
Risk taking. The light-dark emergence test allows assessment
of spontaneous risk taking behavior in rats [11]. Exiting from a
dark, safe compartment to a brightly illuminated one is a risky and
stressful situation for a rat. This test was performed in a box
(40640635 cm) with two small equal compartments that limit
exploratory behavior. An aperture (12631 cm) enabled the rats to
pass from one compartment to the other. One was completely
enclosed by black opaque plastic sides, with a lid of the same
material, while the other was white, had no lid, and was
illuminated (560 lux). The rat was placed in the illuminated
compartment facing the wall opposite the door. Rat was free to
explore the two compartments of the apparatus during a single 10
minute session. Rats were tested in the middle of the dark phase
between 10:00a.m and 1:00p.m.
Data measures: From rat first entrance in the dark box, the
latency to emerge from this compartment to the illuminated one
was recorded (600s cut-off). Risk assessments were evaluated by
number of body stretching and by head protruding in the light
compartment, with at least the hind limb remaining in the safe
compartment. Because these two parameters are correlated with
the number of visits of the extremity of the open arms of an
elevated plus-maze, which is the more risky area of this task (see
[11]), we considered them as a measure of risk-taking. Proportions
of visits and time spent in the dark compartment (%) were also
measured.
Analysis of individual differences. For each test, the
proportion of rats with scores above or below the median of the
whole population was recorded. These measures were used to
compare good and poor DM subgroups and to identify behavioral
parameters that could discriminate between the two groups. The
scores measured in each of the four individual tasks in which good
and poor DM differed were ranked and then summed across the
four tasks to produce a global index for each rat.
Statistical analyses of behavioral data. Student’s t-tests
were used to compare subgroup scores in the RGT (mean 6
s.e.m.) with indifference level. Comparisons of scores between
good and poor decision making groups were made using the non-
parametric Mann-Whitney test (U). Correlations between scores
were evaluated using the non-parametric Spearman correlation
test (Statistica, Statsoft 7.1). Comparisons of proportions of
individuals were conducted using the non-parametric Fisher exact
test (StatXact 9).
Computational model
Temporal Difference learning model. The environment
of the RGT was modelled using a Markov decision process. The
four possible choices (actions) in the task lead to different rewarded
states s (i.e. high reward ‘r = 2 food pellets’ for choices A & B or a
low reward ‘r = 1 food pellet’ for choices C & D). Each of these
states is then followed by a probabilistic transition to the penalty
associated with the reward state s (penalty transition probabilities
are K, J, J, K for the A, B, C and D states respectively).
Penalties correspond to time-outs during which no food can be
obtained. In the absence of penalties, rats obtain and consume on
average one food pellet in nine seconds (depisode = 9 s). Therefore,
time-outs of duration dtimeout(s) can be expressed in terms of a gain
loss (in units of food pellets) equivalent to an immediate penalty
defined as:
plty sð Þ~ dtimeout sð Þ
depisode
ð1Þ
This results in penalty values of 250, 225, 24/3, 22/3 food
pellets for the states A, B, C, and D respectively.
The reward received after taking action a in state s is described
by a state-action pair value Q(s,a), which gradually comes to reflect
the ’goodness’ of selecting action a when in state s [22224]. In this
framework, the agent learns the value corresponding to each state-
action pair Q(s,a) by updating its expectations of the reward Q(s,a)
towards the reward received the last time action a was chosen in
state s. This updating is based on the prediction error between the
predicted reward for the state-action pair Q(s,a) and the reward
actually received r:
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Q st,atð Þ/Q st,atð Þza rtz1{Q st,atð Þð Þ ð2Þ
where a is the learning rate parameter, rt+1 is the reward
received after choosing action a, Q(st,at) is the current estimate of
the value of choosing action a in state s at time t [23]. This learning
process causes Q(s,a) to gradually approach the real value of
choosing action a. No temporal discounting parameter was
introduced in this model as individual trials were considered to
be independent each of them leading to immediate reward
consumption as well as possible penalties.
Learning model with behavioral traits. We have
extended this basic framework to account for risk seeking, reward
seeking, and cognitive inflexibility.
Modeling cognitive inflexibility. The cognitive inflexibility trait
is modelled for simplicity by adjusting the learning rate parameter
a: a is split into two separate components, an initial learning rate
parameter a 0 and an exponential decay with time constant t0,
which gradually reduces the learning rate across the session:
a/a0:e
{ tt0 ð3Þ
Parameter a0 is comprised between 0 (no learning) and 1.
Parameter t0 determines how quickly the agent stops learning and
becomes insensitive to the reward prediction error. Each rat is
described by particular values of a 0 and t0 and is thus
characterised by a unique learning rate profile. Individuals with
low a0 and/or low t0 describe rats that are inflexible. A further
global index of flexibility is given by the integration of a over time.
We are aware that recent modelling studies have suggested using a
state-splitting mechanism [18,19] to account for the commonly
observed rapid recovery of performances during re-instatement of
learned contingencies after extinction. However, our experiments
did not address the recovery of the initial RGT conditions after the
reversal. Therefore, implementing the state-splitting mechanism
would have greatly increased the model complexity (i.e. number of
free parameters) without improving the fit to the data.
Modeling reward seeking behavior. The reward seeking trait is
introduced as a modulation of the magnitude of the actual rewards
rt by a multiplicative weight:
rt/v:rt ð4Þ
Values of v . 1 correspond to the agent representing the
reward values as higher than they really are. It was shown
experimentally that poor decision makers were able to perform
optimally, similar to the good decision makers, in a penalty-only
version of the RGT. Therefore, sensitivity to penalty was left
constant across animals. In the RGT, rewards are equal to either
one or two. Therefore, modelling reward seeking as a multipli-
cative weight on the true reward provides the simplest way to
describe the transformation from objective to subjective reward
values [20].
Modeling risk seeking. Following previous work [21], the
behavioral trait of risk seeking (or risk aversion) is implemented
by adding a positive (or negative) component to the reward that is
proportional to the risk level of the action. We define the risk level
associated with an action a as the standard deviation of penalty











where n denotes the number of times the action a was taken
from the start of the session and plty s,að Þ is the average of past
penalties:




plty si,að Þ ð6Þ
Therefore, the combination of reward seeking and risk seeking
is modelled replacing the reward by:
rt/v:rtzr:splty st,að Þ ð7Þ
where r controls the strength of the risk seeking trait and is
unique to each individual rat. A positive value denotes risk-seeking
while a negative value corresponds to risk aversion. We choose to
model risk in this form, in contrast to some other methods
[22,23,24], as the present form requires only one parameter and
allows learning to reach larger asymptotic values in risky
situations.
Final learning model. The resulting model is a TD learning
algorithm where risk seeking and reward seeking traits affect the
value of rewards, while cognitive inflexibility controls the rate of
learning. Putting all the traits together, the learning rule is:
Q(st,at)/Q(st,at)z
a0:e




All actions values are initialised to zero prior to learning.
Decision-making. Actions are selected according to a Softmax
process, by assigning a probability of selection to each available










where e is a temperature parameter which controls the amount
of exploration. A high level of exploration is imposed to all subjects
during the first 10 min of simulation to ensure that all the options
are initially sampled (by analogy with the behavioural procedures).
Parameter estimation & model fitting. The performance of this
model during the RGT is fitted to the performance profile of each
individual rat using Maximum Likelihood, in order to extract a set
of parameters that best describes the rat’s behavior (i.e. a set of
four parameters influencing learning a 0, t, v, r and one
parameter influencing the exploration/exploitation trade-off e):
ĥmle~argmax‘ hjx10, # # # ,x60ð Þ ð10Þ
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where ‘ hjx10, # # # ,x60ð Þdenotes the likelihood of the data under
the model, h are the model parameters, and x10 to x60 are the
experimental performance levels (percentage of advantageous
choices) of the rat over successive 10 min blocks. The likelihood is
computed by running the RGT model 50 times for a given set of
parameters. Using the performance profiles extracted for each
model iteration, we calculate the probability distribution of getting
an advantageous choice at every 10 minutes time-bin. The
maximum likelihood is the set of parameters that gives the highest
probability of resulting in the observed rat performance profile at
each of the 10 minutes time-bin.
Model comparison. We used the Likelihood Ratio Test and the
Bayesian Information Criterion to test whether simpler models
including only 1 or 2 behavioral traits could be as predictive of
poor decision making as the full model.
Data analysis. The significance of the observed correlation
coefficient between the experimental measures and the modeled
behavioral traits was tested using Monte Carlo permutations.
Monte Carlo permutation test. This method performs random
permutations to mix the paired values (i.e. modelled trait
parameter values and the experimental analogue values) and
measure the new correlation coefficients for each new permuta-
tion. Doing so a large number of times (i.e. 100000 iterations)
provides a distribution of correlation coefficients for random
permutations of values so as to test the null hypothesis.
Group correlation measure. This correlation measure was used
to assess whether the model parameters and experimental
measures agreed on the classification of individual rats as having
a low or high score for each trait. For each behavioral trait, rats
received a score of ’-1’ (lower than median value for the behavioral
trait) or ’+1’ (higher than median). This was done both for the
experimental measures and the estimated parameters. The
correlation coefficient between the experimental and theoretical
pairs of scores was then computed and the p-value was extracted
using the Monte Carlo permutation test.
Individual correlation measure. We also measured whether the
estimated model parameters correlated with the experimental




Decision-making in the RGT. The RGT measures, across
successive trials, the ability to make the most advantageous
choices. In this task, the contingencies associated with a higher
immediate gain are disadvantageous in the long run due to higher
unpredictable penalties. Decision-making could not be properly
measured in six rats because they immediately demonstrated a
preference without sampling the different options at the beginning
of the test. These rats were discarded from the analysis. Three rats
did not display preference for any particular option (undecided
subgroup). Because of the small size of this group they were also
discarded from our analyses. Among the remaining rats (n = 20),
behavior during the test was not influenced by prior spatial
preference: proportions of individuals with analogous choices
during training and testing did not significantly differ from chance
(Chi-square test, x2 = .438; p = .33; ns).
As observed previously, typical good and poor decision makers
can be distinguished within a normal group of rats. Because this
task measures a preference between two kinds of options, two
subgroups can be easily distinguished, as shown by the bimodal
distribution of RGT scores (see meta analysis on Figure 3). Good
DM first choose randomly and then gradually orient most of their
choices toward the advantageous options (Figure 4A). By contrast,
poor DM sample the different options and rapidly orient their
choices toward the disadvantageous options (within 10 minutes).
During the last 20 minutes, percentages of choices for advanta-
geous options could be divided into two main subgroups: a
majority of good DM (n = 14; 61%, with scores above 70%) and a
minority of poor DM (n = 6; 26%, with scores below 30%) that
preferred the disadvantageous options (n.b. scores for the
remaining undecided subjects were 38%, 54% and 63%).
Decision-making and reward seeking. Poor DM showed
a shorter latency to collect their reward than good DM, as
previously observed [11] (Figure 4B). All poor DM scores (100%)
were below the median vs 36% for good DM (Fisher exact test,
p = .032; group medians, 1.12 and 1.26 s respectively; U = 16, p
= .07). However, the global activity of the two groups, reflected by
the total number of visits to the nose poke holes, did not
statistically differ (median scores: 1025 and 857 for good vs poor
DM respectively; U = 20, ns).
Behavioral flexibility. Reversing contingencies in the RGT
measures the rats’ adaptation when advantageous/disadvanta-
geous outcomes are spatially exchanged. Persistence to choose the
same location reveals cognitive inflexibility (flexibility ,35%),
whereas shifting choices reflects detection of the change and
behavioral flexibility. All poor DM vs only a third (36%) of good
DM were inflexible (Fisher exact test, p = .014; Figure 4C). Among
the remaining good DM, 36% gradually reoriented their choices
toward the new location of advantageous options, and 28%
distributed their choices between all options (Figure 4D).
Decision-making and risk seeking. In the light-dark
emergence test, poor DM took more risks than good DM. They
emerged more rapidly from the dark compartment than good DM
(medians, 35 and 416 sec respectively; U = 13.5, p,.02). A
majority of poor DM (83%) vs 36% of good DM had a score below
the median. Poor DM also made much fewer risk assessments than
good DM before the first exit (100% vs 29% below the median;
Fisher exact test, p = .0007; Figure 4E). The median number of
risk assessments were 1.5 and 11.2 for poor vs good DM
respectively (U = 1.5, p,.001). Poor DM also tended to make
Figure 3. Meta analysis of the RGT data. This analysis is based on
12 distinct experiments (n = 228) using the same protocol. It reveals a
bimodal distribution of RGT scores (% of favourable choices during the
last 20 min) with a majority of good decision makers (good DM, with
scores above 70%), a minority of poor decision makers (poor DM, with
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more visits to the bright compartment than good DM (U = 20.5,
p,.07).
Decision-making and impulsivity. Impulsivity is a multi-
factorial trait encompassing both impulsive actions (inability to
delay a response, i.e. premature responses, or to withhold a
response, i.e. anticipatory hyperactivity and perseveration) and
impulsive choices (inability to wait for a delayed greater benefit)
[25].
Impulsive actions: premature responses and compulsive-like
behavior. The FCN16 measures response inhibition through the
ability to complete a long sequence of lever presses on a first lever
(FCN lever) before moving on to another lever (reward lever) that
provides a reward [17,26]. Both groups learned the task at the
same rate (learning scores, U = 36, ns). Poor DM did not exhibit
any deficit in inhibitory control (i.e. premature switches to the
reward lever). The chain length distribution curve of both good
and poor DM showed a peak for the optimal chain length (Figure
5A). Both groups predominantly performed rewarded chains (i.e.
of length . = 16, Figure 5A-insert). However, poor DM made a
higher proportion of long chains of responses (.16), leading to a
lower response efficiency (Figure 5B) (U = 8, p,.01). The
occurrence of very long chains of presses was occasional. For
instance, the number of chains longer than 22 presses was 1% of
the total number of chains for good DM, and 3% for poor DM.
However, all poor DM displayed at least one such very long chain
during the test vs only 6 out of the 14 good DM. Moreover, whilst
the number of presses on the FCN lever did not differ between
groups (U = 28, ns), poor DM were more active on the
reinforcement lever (U = 18, p,.05), making short bursts of
presses instead of a single press. These perseverative behaviors, not
accompanied by an attempt to collect the reward even when a
clear signal announces its availability, are reminiscent of excessive
and compulsive behavior. All poor DM had scores on or above the
median vs 43% for the good DM, which had scores below the
median (Fisher exact test p = .018) (Figure 5C).
Impulsive actions: anticipatory hyperactivity and perseveration.
The FI-EXT task assesses reward anticipation and sensitivity to
context during frustrating periods without reinforcement [16,27].
Lever press activity is measured either during a delay before a
lever press can deliver the reward (FI) or during an extinction
phase (EXT) where no reward can be obtained (light house off).
During the 1-min FI and 5-min EXT, 83% of poor DM had a
Figure 4. Animal’s performance on the Rat Gambling Task (RGT), RGT-reversed version and the light-dark emergence test. Grey lines
represent the median used to compute proportions of high and low scores in good and poor decision makers (DM). (A) Time-course of advantageous
choices (%) of good and poor DM on the RGT and individual scores during the last 20 min of good (n = 14) and poor (n = 6) DM. (B) Relationship
between individual RGT scores and the mean latency to collect food pellets (one missing value) during the RGT. (C) Relationship between individual
RGT scores and flexibility (final scores in the RGT-reversed version). (D) Time-course of advantageous choices of flexible (FG), undecided (UG) and
inflexible (IG) good DM and inflexible (IP) poor DM groups on the RGT-reversed version. Comparison with the indifference level, dotted line, t-test: *
and u p,.05 at least. (E, F) Relationship between individual RGT scores and (E) the number of risk assessments before the first emergence in the risky
compartment, or (F) the individuals’ sum of the score ranks for each behavior.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0082052.g004
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Figure 5. Decision-making and impulsivity. Good and poor decision makers (DM) performances in the (FCN16) Fixed Consecutive Number of 16
lever press schedule (A-C), in the multiple fixed-interval (FI) and extinction (EXT) schedules (D-F) and in the (DDT) delay-discounting task (G-H). Grey
lines represent the median used to compute proportions of high and low scores in good and poor DM. (A) Frequency distribution (%) of chain length
in the two groups. Optimal chain length (16) is indicated by the vertical dotted line. Inset: Percentage of rewarded chains for good and poor DM
(Mean 6 SEM). (B,C) Relationship between individual scores in the RGT and (B) response efficiency or (C) the number of reinforcement lever presses.
(D,E,F) Relationship between individual scores in the RGT and (D) the mean number of lever presses during the 1-min FI or (E) during the 5-min EXT. (F
top panel) Mean number of lever presses of good and poor DM during one 1-min FI component as a function of time. (F lower panel) Mean number
of lever presses during the 5-min EXT component as a function time. (G) Percentage of choice for the large, delayed reinforcement as a function of
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motor activity equal to or higher than the median score, vs 43% for
the good DM (Figure 5D and 5E). Overall, poor DM tended to
perform more lever presses than good DM both during FI,
(medians, 178 and 98 respectively; U = 23, p = .1) and during
EXT (medians, 111 and 55; U = 21, p = .08), suggesting both
anticipation and perseveration. Both groups exhibited the typical
pattern of activity during each interval of the FI, namely a
progressive increase in rate as reinforcement availability ap-
proached, with poor DM reaching a score 1.5 times higher than
good DM. During EXT, poor performers exhibited both a larger
and longer episode of increased activity (Figure 5F). The latency to
collect rewards did not significantly differ between groups (U
= 31.5), nor did the number of visits to the empty tray (U = 35 and
30, ns). The mean number of lever presses during FI and EXT
were positively correlated (r = .69, p,.001).
Impulsive choice: delay discounting. The DDT assesses the
ability to tolerate a delay when a choice between an immediate
small reward and a delayed larger reward is given. It indicates for
each individual the subjective value of the large reward as a
function of the delay and the delay at which both rewards are
perceived to be of equal value. Under the no-delay condition, good
and poor DM preferentially chose the larger reward (Figure 5G)
and poor DM overall performed more lever presses than good DM
(U = 16, p,.05, Figure 5H). When the delay increased, both
groups shifted to the immediate reward at the same delay,
suggesting that they displayed similar reward discounting and
tolerance to delay (Figure 5G).
Correlation between behavioral parameters. As shown
in Table 1, no correlation was observed between reward-seeking,
risk seeking and behavioral flexibility. A positive correlation was
found between impulsive actions and perseverative responses in
different experimental contexts. These parameters (except FI
activity) were positively correlated with risk taking, and were
independent from inhibitory control capacities (FCN schedule)
and impulsive choice (DDT). We decided to model all indepen-
dent traits (risk, reward and flexibility) excluding motor impulsivity
since impulsivity/perseveration measures were correlated with risk
seeking (see Table 1).
A combination of behavioral traits is highly predictive
of poor decision-making. Poor DM consistently displayed
above median scores for each of the following behaviors (Table 2),
except one poor DM missing motor impulsivity): motor impulsiv-
ity/perseveration, risk proneness, reward seeking and behavioral
inflexibility. They obtained a lower global index when these
behavioral traits were combined (sum of the ranks) compared to
good DM (Figure 4F). By contrast, no good DM ever expressed
high scores for more than two of these particular behaviors. Thus,
in healthy individuals, the combination of these traits more than
any particular one was highly predictive of poor decision making
in the RGT. The association of cognitive inflexibility and risk
taking behavior or motor impulsivity was never observed in good
DM and thus may be a particularly relevant combination of risk
factors for impaired decision-making.
Computational analysis
The TD model was fitted to each rat’s performances in the
RGT to estimate the five free parameters describing each rat: two
parameters for cognitive inflexibility, one for risk seeking, one for
reward seeking and one for the exploration of the environment (see
Methods). Partial models with fewer parameters were also tested
(see below).
Decision-making in the RGT. The model was able to
reproduce the distinct performance profiles observed during the
RGT session for poor and good DM (Figure 6A). This suggests
that differences in risk-proneness, reward seeking behavior and
cognitive inflexibility can collectively account for the variability of
performance profiles observed experimentally. Moreover, based
on the performance of the rats during the RGT, the model could
successfully predict the performance profile of all poor DM and of
half of the good DM during reversal conditions (Figure 6D).





Reward-seeking RGT mean latency to
collect food
1 -
Behavioral flexibility RGT-reversal flexibility index (%) 2 0.09 -
Risk-taking Emergence Mean latency
to emerge
3 0.11 0.22 -
Task number of risk
assessments
4 20.24 0.11 ***0.69 -





6 0.14 20.36 **20.51 *0.45 20.10 -
FI total lever presses 7 0.22 0.02 20.28 20.34 0.09 ***0.68 -
EXT total lever presses 8 20.08 20.07 **20.5 20.52 0.07 **0.53 ***0.69 -
DDT total lever presses
(training)
9 0.2 20.18 **20.61 20.53 0.22 **0.5 0.40 **0.57 -
Impulsive choices DDT 20s-delayed
choice (%)
10 20.23 0.12 20.26 20.22 **0.5 20.10 20.056 20.19 0.07
The three behavioral processes included in the model, reward and risk seeking, behavioral flexibility, were unrelated. Impulsive actions and perseverative responses in
different experimental contexts were positively correlated. These parameters (except FI activity) were positively correlated with risk taking, and were independent from
inhibitory control capacities (FCN schedule) and impulsive choice (DDT). Significant correlations are shown in bold. RGT: rat gambling task; FCN16: fixed consecutive
number schedule of reinforcement; FI: fixed- interval; EXT: extinction: DDT: delay discounting task. Pearson’s correlation test; *, p,.05; **, p,.01; ***, p,.001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0082052.t001
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Decision-making and flexibility. Cognitive inflexibility was
implemented as a gradual decrease of the learning rate over the
course of the experimental session controlled by two parameters
a0, the initial learning rate and t0 the decay (see Methods). The
initial learning rate parameter a0, extracted from a fit of the RGT
session alone was positively correlated with the experimental
measure of flexibility during reversal (r = .3303, group correlation
MC permutation test p = .0266). The model predicted an
inflexible learning behavior in all modeled poor DM (poor
DMm) (Figure 6C), as observed experimentally (Figure 4C). When
both the RGT and reversal conditions were used to estimate all
model parameters, all flexibility parameters (a0, t0 and the area
under a) correlated positively with the experimental measure of
flexibility (e.g. for a r = 2.73, MC permutation test p = .0002, see
Figure 6D).
Decision-making and reward seeking. Reward seeking
behavior was modeled by allowing the perceived magnitude of the
rewards to be greater than the actual reward. In the model,
consistent with experimental data (Figure 4B), all poor DMm
except one showed high reward seeking, whereas less than 29% of
modeled good DM (good DMm) showed this trait (Figure 6B). The
reward seeking parameter estimated from the model correlated
significantly with the corresponding behavioural measure of
reward sensitivity (r = 2.4014, MC permutation test p = .0479,
see Figure 7E).
Decision-making and risk seeking. Risk seeking was
implemented by adding a risk-related reward contribution [28] to
the actual rewards (see Methods). In the model, as in the
experiments (Figure 4E), poor DMm were characterized by higher
levels of risk sensitivity than good DMm (Figure 6E). The risk
parameter extracted from the model significantly correlated with
the two behavioural measures of risk seeking (i.e. mean latency for
the first visit in the light compartment and risk assessments, r =
2.5370 and 2.5555; MC permutation test p = .0043 and p
= .0051 respectively, see Figure 7F).
Combination of behavioral traits. Finally, when all the
different behavioral traits are taken into account (Figure 6F), poor
DMm exhibited a combination of high levels for the modeled
behavioral traits as observed in behavioural measures. The global
index (sum of the ranks of each behavior) of each modeled rat was
highly correlated with the global index derived from experimental
measures (r = .7420, MC permutation test p = .0003, see Figure
7C). Furthermore, similarly to the experimental data (Table 2 and
Figure 6H), the model showed that the combination of high
cognitive inflexibility, reward and risk seeking is particularly
discriminative of poor DMm (Figure 6G), since good DMm almost
never expressed more than one of those traits (Table 3).
Influences of combined behavioral traits on Learning. To
understand why good and poor DM show different choice
preferences, we analysed how well good and poor DMm evaluated
advantageous and disadvantageous actions. The Q-values repre-
senting the valuation of each choice at the end of the RGT session
were extracted for all rats, using the TD-learning model.
Figure 7B illustrates the mean Q-values assigned to the
disadvantageous choices (A & B) and advantageous choices (C &
D) by poor and good decision makers. Poor DMm vastly over-
estimated the value of all states rather than just disadvantageous
options. The over-estimation was more important for disadvan-
tageous choices in comparison to the advantageous ones. By
contrast, good DMm stopped exploring disadvantageous choices
early in the RGT session due to their negative value.
In the model, high scores in risk seeking, reward seeking or
inflexibility lead to an altered estimation of the true value of all
states. High scores in a combination of traits lead to a shift in the
valuation of the state-action pairs, where disadvantageous choices
appear to be more valuable than advantageous ones.
Comparison with simpler models. Model comparison was
also performed in order to address whether simpler models with
fewer behavioural traits could have accounted for the experimen-
tal data just as well. We tested simpler versions of our model with
either only one or two behavioural traits and compared the fit of
these models to the experimental data. We used the Likelihood
Ratio Test and the Bayesian Information Criterion to assess the fit
of the models while penalizing for added complexity. The
likelihood ratio test revealed that the full model (including reward
sensitivity, risk seeking and cognitive inflexibility) was significantly
better (p,0.0001) than any other simpler model, suggesting that
all behavioral traits are necessary to describe the experimental
data. Similar results were obtained using the Bayesian Information
Criterion (See Figure 7A).
Discussion
Like the IGT in humans, the RGT probably involves a number
of cognitive processes, and separating their relative contribution is
a challenge. However, our purpose was not to focus on one specific
executive function involved in choice, but rather to identify the
whole complex phenotype sustaining poor decision making in
Table 2. Summary of individual behavioral profiles of poor and good DM.
Poor decision makers Good decision makers
rats 3 8 32 15 28 9 subjects (%) 2 4 24 33 6 31 1 17 19 29 12 30 27 26 subjects (%)
motor impulsivity/persev. X X X X X 83 X X X X X X X 43
X X X X X X X X X X X
risk-taking X X X X X 83 X X X X X 14
X X X X X X X X X X
reward-seeking X X X X X mis. 100 X X X X X 36
inflexibility X X X X X X 100 X X X X X 36
Number of high scores 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
Motor impulsivity/perseverative responses correspond to high activity scores in both fixed-interval (FI) and extinction (EXT) schedules of reinforcement. Risk taking is
indicated by a short latency to emerge and a low number of risk assessment in the dark-light box test, reward seeking by a short latency to collect food in the RGT, and
inflexibility by performance in the RGT reversed condition. A cross indicates a high score (with respect to the median) for a given parameter. Last line shows the total
number of high scores displayed by each rat. Proportions of subjects demonstrating high score in each group are also given. Mis. : missing value.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0082052.t002
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Figure 6. Model’s performance on the RGT, reversal conditions and estimates of individual behavioral levels when fitted to the
experimental performance profile of each rat. Grey lines represent the median used to compute proportions of high and low scores in good
and poor decision makers (DM). (A) Simulated time-course of advantageous choices (%) of good and poor DM on the RGT. (B) Relationship between
simulated individual RGT scores and the estimated reward seeking parameters during the RGT + Reversal. (C) Relationship between simulated
individual RGT scores and the estimated flexibility parameters affecting the learning rate. (D) Simulated time-course of advantageous choices of
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conflictual and risky situations, as observed in real life. Indeed, a
complex interplay between independent behavioral domains is
more likely to reflect the complexity of human phenotype and
disorders [29,30,31].
In the present study, we confirm this hypothesis as we establish a
clear link between separate behavioral traits in a normal sample of
rats and decision-making in the RGT. Although each trait
considered separately has a poor predictive value, both the
behavioral and the modeling analyses indicate that poor decision
making can be accurately predicted when these traits are
considered in combination.
While integrating multiple cognitive abilities, the RGT offers
the advantage to assess the time-course of the decision making
process within a single session. It is particularly suitable for
identifying inter-individual differences in decision making, and
notably for identifying poor decision-makers because choices are
made readily and lead to two opposed decisions: either a
preference for advantageous options or a preference for the
disadvantageous ones [11]. As shown by the meta-analysis of
several experiments in the RGT, these behaviors are reproducible.
Importantly, poor decision-making does not result from a slower
learning. We have previously shown that repeating the RGT on
three consecutive days does not change the rats’ preferences (data
not shown). Additionally, acquiring information about the value of
the options separately before the test does not change the behavior
of poor and good decision-makers, nor does it change their relative
numbers [11].
We show that poor decision making is expressed by individuals
presenting excessive scores for a combination of behavioral and
cognitive traits: risk taking, higher reward seeking behavior, motor
impulsivity and behavioral inflexibility, expressed simultaneously.
This contrasts with good DM which present a wider range of
scores and only express up to two of these characteristics (Table 2).
The various traits that we examined were largely independent
flexible (FG), undecided (UG) and inflexible (IG) good DM and inflexible (IP) poor DM groups on the RGT-reversed version. (E) Relationship between
simulated individual RGT scores and the estimated risk seeking parameters. (F) The sum of the simulated score ranks for each modelled behavior. (G)
3-D representation of model parameters for the simulated traits of individual rats. (H) 3-D representation of behavioral measures of the behavioral
traits of individual rats.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0082052.g006
Figure 7. Model comparison and correlations between estimated parameters and behavioral traits. (A) Bayesian Information Criterion
scores for each model (a low score is better). Models based on two traits fare uniformly better than models based on a single trait. Models with two
traits including cognitive inflexibility have better scores than equivalent or simpler models. The model with all three simulated traits provides the best
fit to the data even when penalizing for the increased model complexity (number of free parameters). (B) Learned Q-Values for advantageous and
disadvantageous choices by both Good and Poor DM. Bars represent the mean Q-values assigned to the disadvantageous choices (A & B; dark-
grey) and advantageous choices (C & D; light-grey) averaged over all poor or good decision makers at the end of an RGT session. Error bars
represent 95% CI around the mean Q-value for all the rats of the population of interest. Poor decision makers vastly over-value disadvantageous
choices in comparison to advantageous choices. (C-F) Scatter plot illustrating the correlation between: (C) The sum of ranks for all the behavioral traits
measured experimentally (x-axis) and those estimated by the model (y-axis); (D) The measure of cognitive inflexibility (x-axis) and the estimated
inflexibility parameter (area under a; y-axis); (E) The measured reward sensitivity (x-axis) and the estimated reward sensitivity (y-axis). (F) The
measured risk seeking (latency to emerge in light compartment; x-axis) and the estimated risk-seeking parameter (y-axis). All estimated parameters
correlated significantly with their behavioral counterpart.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0082052.g007
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from one another. A noteworthy exception was the relationship
between motor impulsivity/ perseveration and risk taking (see
Table 1).
Poor DM are characterized by risk and reward seeking, which
have been found to be associated with trait dominance in rats and
humans, and could be necessary for the development and
maintenance of social structure [32,33]. Interestingly, risk and
reward seeking, in combination with impulsivity, are hallmarks of
poor decision making related mental disorders such as ADHD
[34], personality disorders, substance abuse [28,35], pathological
gambling [36] or mania [37]. Poor DM are also characterized by
behavioral inflexibility as well as perseverative and compulsive-like
behaviors. Their inflexibility was particularly noticeable in the
RGT reversal procedure, which requires redirecting choices on
the basis of new response-reward contingencies [38], but also in
the FCN schedule with perseverative responses. Indeed, persev-
erative responses in the FCN have similarly been observed
following amphetamine administration (0.8 mg/kg), in a similar
procedure [39]. These effects of the psychomotor stimulant are
likely to reflect compulsivity, especially at this dose, given that only
low doses of amphetamine (0.25 mg/kg) are known to reduce
impulsivity in this task [17,26], whereas higher doses (0.5 mg/kg
or above) increase impulsive responses. Perseverative behavior,
typically observed after acute administration of psychostimulants
[39], inflexible and compulsive behavior can be seen in drug
addiction [40,41], pathological gambling [2] and in obsessive-
compulsive disorder (OCD) [1]. Inappropriate compulsive behav-
iors [25] may result from attributing excessive incentive value to
reward associated stimuli [42,43]. This could explain bursts of
activity on the reinforcer level in the FCN schedule, as well as
hyperactivity in the FI-EXT schedule. Compulsive behavior could
also result from a quicker switch from initial voluntary goal-
directed behavior to an habitual, automatic process with loss of
control, as observed in drug addiction and OCD [44,45].
Interestingly, poor decision-makers do not have more impulsive
tendencies compared to good DM in terms of intolerance to
delayed gratification and of inhibitory control. Still, we cannot
exclude that more demanding tasks (e.g. the stop-task [46]) could
reveal differences in inhibition between both phenotypes. More-
over, the higher sensitivity of poor DM may have influenced the
performance in this task. However, a recent meta-analysis also
concluded that inhibition and decision-making in the IGT are
dissociated [47].
Previous studies have shown that individual behavioral traits
can be related to maladaptive behavior in animal models of mental
disorders (i.e. novelty-seeking in depression [48]; impulsivity,
novelty preference in drug self-administration [49,50,51]). How-
ever, the cumulative effect of several symptoms in one individual,
as systematically observed in mental disorders [1], has rarely been
considered in an animal model [29]. Here, we show that a
complex phenotype is highly predictive of poor decision-making,
since it only describes poor performers. Each of the traits identified
participates to this phenotype that leads to the inability to adapt to
the situation because of a distorted representation of the balance
between reward and risk, and an inflexible/compulsive behavior
precluding readjustment of behavior. This complex phenotype
reflects well the relevance of the concept of ‘‘domain-interplay’’ to
explore the basis of maladaptive behavior [29,30]. Although we
cannot conclude that the different observed phenotypes observed
represent innate or acquired differences, it is noteworthy that
dominant rats are natural risk takers and display increased
motivation for food reward [32,33], two characteristics of poor
decision makers in the RGT. This social parameter could be well
related to performance in the RGT, a hypothesis that remains to
be elucidated.
Recent experiments based on lesion studies have shown that
good performances in the RGT depend of the functional integrity
of the prefrontal cortex, notably the prelimbic, cingulate and
orbitofrontal cortices [12]. Moreover, the brain networks differ-
entially activated during adaptive and maladaptive decision-
making reveal striking differences that can be related to the
behavioral and cognitive traits identified (manuscript submitted)
[52].
Building on the expanding literature indicating that behavioral
traits such as risk seeking affect learning and the prediction error
signal [20,53], we used a reinforcement learning model of the
RGT to investigate the relationship between the traits and the
decision making performances. First, we used the model to address
whether the behavioral traits could collectively account for the
variety of performances observed in the decision-making task (i.e.
Can excessive behavioral traits lead to poor and/or undecided
decision-making?). Secondly, we used the model to explore the
interaction between the behavioral traits on learning and decision-
making (i.e. How and why do excessive traits lead to poor decision-
making?). The computational model, based on a TD-learning
algorithm [54,55,56] was modified to include the behavioral traits
of risk seeking, reward sensitivity and behavioral inflexibility.
The model reveals how risk seeking, reward sensitivity and
behavioral inflexibility jointly contribute to the learning and the
decision-making process. The model of the RGT fits the
experimental data very closely (Figure S1), and demonstrates that
behavioral traits of high risk seeking, high reward seeking and
cognitive inflexibility can be derived from the performance of
individuals in the RGT. Importantly, all the parameters used to
model the behavioral traits successfully correlated with the
experimental measures for each trait, validating the assumptions
made during the implementation. This suggests that the mathe-
matical formalization of all the behavioral traits and their
independent influence on learning in the RGT were valid.
Interestingly, we found that individual traits were insufficient to
Table 3. Summary of individual modeled behavioral traits of poor and good DM.
Poor decision makers Good decision makers
rats 3 8 32 15 28 9 subjects (%) 2 4 24 33 6 31 1 17 19 29 12 30 27 26 subjects (%)
risk-taking X X X X X X 100 X X X X X X X 50
reward-seeking X X X X X 83 X X X X X X X 50
inflexibility X X X X X X 100 X X X X 29
Number of high scores 3 2 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1
Same representation as in Table 2 for modeled behavioral traits: risk taking, reward seeking and inflexibility parameters.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0082052.t003
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lead to poor performances at the task (Table 3). Rather, poor
decision-making required specific combinations of at least two of
the behavioral traits, namely inflexible learning and risk seeking or
inflexible learning and reward seeking. This suggests that single
excessive behavioral traits may be compensated for in good
decision makers. Yet, such potential compensatory processes may
fail when a combination of traits are involved.
Importantly, the computational study is based on the assump-
tion that a failure in decision-making occurs through an altered
internal representation of the values in the environment (Figure
7B), as is customary in computational modeling of psychopathol-
ogy [57,58]. We investigated the difference in valuation of the
different choices by poor and good decision makers. Surprisingly,
we found that poor DMm vastly over-estimate the value of all
choices, but especially those corresponding to disadvantageous
options. According to their inflated valuation of disadvantageous
choices, poor DM appear to behave optimally according to their
inaccurate value-map of the environment, rather than sub-
optimally according to the objective outcome of the task. Our
findings are in line with recently suggested mechanisms of
psychopathology such as addiction [53].
Our model accounts for the role of behavioral traits in learning
and decision-making, using a basic TD-learning framework using
minimal assumptions. Other formalisms such as win-stay loose-
shift, Bayesian models or more elaborate TD models could also be
explored [18,19,20,22,23,24]. However, the present model offers a
straightforward way to implement the traits of interest and allows a
quantitative assessment of the impact of individual differences on
the overall decision-making performances. In particular, we show
that simple models incorporating fewer discriminative traits have
less predictive value than the full model. More biologically
targeted versions of this model could be developed [59,60,61]
and investigated with regard to the cortical- subcortical interplay
specific to good and poor DM [52].
In conclusion, poor decision making in the RGT is predicted by
a complex phenotype of cumulated behavioral and cognitive
characteristics including risk seeking, reward seeking and inflex-
ibility, combined with motor impulsivity and perseverative/
compulsive-like behaviors. This approach, based on the identifi-
cation of high scores for these behavioral traits expressed
spontaneously and in a comparable way as to those observed in
the clinic, demonstrates that rat behavior can reliably model
dimensions found in humans [8,62]. This work emphasizes the
need to use ‘‘integrative’’ animal models to mimic the complexity
of the clinically relevant phenotype [30]. Our findings are also in
line with the recent proposal by Robbins et al. [31] to undertake a
more objective description of psychiatric disorders through
predisposing traits and neurocognitive endophenotypes, thereby
explaining the high level of comorbidities between mental
disorders. By integrating multiple behavioral measures, combined
with computational modeling, our work provides a promising
framework for revealing the neuropsychological determinants of
poor decision-making as a potential risk factor for developing
related mental disorders [8,9] and for exploring its neurobiological
substrates.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Models’ best fit to individual rat performanc-
es. Each graph shows the performance of the rat (dashed-line) in
terms of % of advantageous choices (y-axis) over time (x-axis). The
model mean performance (continuous line) and standard deviation
(grey area) is represented on the same graph for each rat.
(TIF)
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Background: Recent models of schizophrenia suggest that positive-symptoms 
stem from learning deficiencies resulting in distorted internal statistical 
models of the world (Fletcher & Frith 2009). In line with these assumptions, 
schizophrenic patients have shown to be impaired in statistical learning and 
probabilistic inference in decision-making tasks (Averbeck et al. 2011).  
 
Aim: We here ask whether schizophrenic patients are also impaired in more 
implicit/perceptual forms of probabilistic inference, such as visual statistical 
learning. We used a motion task known to induce rapid implicit learning of 
the statistics of the stimuli (Chalk et al. 2010). In controls, this learning 
influences perception in two ways: 1) motion stimuli are perceived as being 
more similar to the most frequently presented stimuli than they really are 
(estimation biases); 2) in absence of visual stimuli, participants sometimes 
report perceiving the most frequently presented stimuli (hallucinations). Such 
behaviour is consistent with the participants acting as Bayesian observers and 
combining learned perceptual priors with sensory evidence. We investigated 
whether schizophrenic patients would differ in their acquisition of the 
perceptual priors and how such priors would impact their perception. 
 
Method: 11 medicated chronic schizophrenic patients (mean illness duration 14.72 
±2.73 years) and 10 controls were recruited and participated in a single task-
session lasting 40 min.  
 
Results: Although patients were slower than controls, their estimation and 
detection performances were similar. In particular, patients showed similar 
acquisition of perceptual priors, approximating the stimulus statistics. This 
suggests that patients had no statistical learning deficits in our task. 
Intriguingly, however, patients made significantly fewer ‘hallucinations’ of 
the most frequently presented directions than controls. The total amount of 
‘hallucinations’ correlated negatively with symptom severity (PANSS Total 




An increasingly popular idea in neuroscience is that perception and decision-making can be well 
described using probabilistic inference (a.k.a. “Bayesian”) models (Friston, 2012; 2010; Knill and 
Pouget, 2004). According to the “Bayesian Brain Hypothesis”, the brain learns internal statistical 
models of the environments (“expectations”), which are used in situations of uncertainty to 
disambiguate perceptual inputs and guide decisions. For example, statistical and perceptual learning 
studies have repeatedly shown that the visual system continuously extracts and learns statistical 
regularities of the environment automatically and without awareness (Series and Seitz, 2013). 
Expectations have been found to modulate and interact with a variety of sensory modalities such as 
vision (Chalk et al., 2010; Gekas et al., 2013; Series and Seitz, 2013; Sterzer et al., 2008), audition 
(Davis and Johnsrude, 2007; Remez et al., 1981), touch (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998), and even 
complex sensations such as pain (Colloca and Benedetti, 2005; Voudouris et al., 1990) and emotions 
(Petrovic et al., 2005). 
 
Weiss et al. (Weiss et al., 2002) were the first to use this framework to successful describe perceptual 
illusions in healthy individuals. In this study, illusions result from the brain’s attempts to interpret 
sensory inputs based on its internal models and expectations. For example, Weiss et al. (Weiss et al., 
2002) demonstrated that a large number of visual motion illusions could be explained in terms of an ‘a 
priori’ expectation for “slow speeds”. Multiple studies have since found that healthy subjects do indeed 
quickly learn that statistics of their environment and combine these statistics with sensory evidence 
resulting in behaviour akin to that of an ideal Bayesian observer (Chalk et al., 2010; Gekas et al., 2013; 
Weiss et al., 2002), for reviews see (Fiser et al., 2010; Knill and Pouget, 2004; Series and Seitz, 2013) 
This framework is known to result in optimal perception when the inputs match the environment 
statistics but can result in biases when stimuli deviate from expected inputs (Gregory, 1980). A famous 
example of this is the “hollow mask illusion” where subjects perceive a face-mask as being convex, 
while it is in fact concave, presumably due to the very strong ‘a priori’ expectation that faces are 
convex objects (Gregory, 1997; 1968). 
 
Interestingly, schizophrenia is characterised by occurrences of abnormal percepts (hallucinations) and 
delusions (van Os and Kapur, 2009). Recently, a number of studies suggest that these symptoms could 
be understood in terms of deficits in probabilistic inference (Adams et al., 2013; Corlett et al., 2009a; 
Friston, 2005; Frith and Friston, 2012; Jardri and Deneve, 2013), for reviews see (Corlett et al., 2011; 
Fletcher and Frith, 2009). For example, an increasing number of studies report that schizophrenic 
patients show a deficit in integrating probabilistic information resulting in faster responses than healthy 
subjects, an effect called the ‘jumping-to-conclusions’ bias (Averbeck et al., 2011; Evans et al., 2012; 
Huq et al., 1988; Speechley et al., 2010). This bias is often measured using the ‘beads task’ (Huq et al., 
1988). Although these findings have not always been replicated (Heerey et al., 2008; McKay et al., 
2007), there is a growing body of evidence suggesting that schizophrenic patients are impaired in 
statistical learning and inference (Garety et al., 2013). Interestingly, while patients with stronger 
delusional symptoms fare worse at the task than those who do not (Huq et al., 1988; Speechley et al., 
2010), healthy subjects displaying delusional ideation also show similar impairments at the task 
(Freeman et al., 2008) suggesting a link between delusions and probabilistic inference. Following this 
probabilistic inference framework, if patients with schizophrenia are impaired in statistical learning and 
inference, their internal model of the world should be erroneous, resulting in abnormal beliefs or 
delusions. . In this context, it is also argued that hallucinations, as experienced by patients with 
schizophrenia, could be seen as a severe form of illusions resulting from an incorrect perceptual 
inference. That is, these hallucinations would arise either from an incorrect mapping between sensory 
information and expectations, an incorrect acquisition of the expectations, or an imbalance between 
learnt statistics and sensory information (Corlett et al., 2011; Fletcher and Frith, 2009).  
 
Interestingly, patients with schizophrenia have been found to be less susceptible to a large variety of 
perceptual illusions such as: the hollow-mask illusion (Dima et al., 2010; 2009; Keane et al., 2013), 
motion-induced blindness (Tschacher et al., 2006), illusory motion (Crawford et al., 2010), the size-
weight illusion (Williams et al., 2010) and the Ebbinghaus illusion (Horton and Silverstein, 2011), 
reinforcing the idea that patients might suffer from deficits in probabilistic learning or perceptual 
inference. However, these perceptual studies tend to measure patients’ susceptibility to illusions that 
are driven by pre-existing expectations. Therefore, the authors could not check whether the perceptual 
priors responsible for the illusion in healthy subjects had also been correctly acquired in patients. As a 
result, these studies were unable to discriminate whether the reduced illusory percepts seen in patients 
stem from weaker expectations, a failure to acquire the perceptual prior altogether, or from an overall 
reduction in sensory uncertainty.  
 
Following earlier work from Sterzer et al. (Sterzer et al., 2008), a recent study found that delusional 
ideation correlated with the magnitude of expectation-driven illusions in healthy controls (Schmack et 
al., 2013). That is, in line with previous studies on perceptual illusions in schizophrenia (Crawford et 
al., 2010; Dima et al., 2010; 2009; Keane et al., 2013; Tschacher et al., 2006; Williams et al., 2010), the 
authors found that the stronger the delusions of healthy controls, the less likely these were to have their 
percepts affected by expectations (Schmack et al., 2013). To our knowledge however, no study has 
looked simultaneously at the implicit acquisition of expectations (i.e. probabilistic learning) and the 
influence of these priors on perception (i.e. perceptual illusions) in the context of a perceptual task in 
schizophrenia. 
The current study therefore investigates visual statistical learning in patients with schizophrenia. We 
used a previously developed motion task (Chalk et al., 2010) that is known to induce the rapid 
acquisition of the statistics of the stimuli. In this task, subjects need to report the direction of motion of 
a cloud of dots (estimation task) and whether they have perceived the dots or not (detection task; on 
some trials no stimulus are presented). Unknown to the participants, two directions of motion are more 
frequently presented than others. In healthy individuals, we found that subjects implicitly and 
unconsciously learn those stimulus statistics. This learning influences perception such that: 1) motion 
stimuli are perceived as being more similar to the most frequently presented stimuli than they really are 
(i.e. estimation biases); 2) participants report perceiving the most frequently presented stimuli in 
absence of visual stimuli (i.e. illusion/’hallucinated’ dots). Bayesian modelling can be applied to 
individual performance to monitor the acquisition of the statistics of the stimuli (perceptual prior). 
 
Using this task, we here aim to address whether patients with schizophrenia can acquire correctly the 
statistics of the motion stimuli and to assay how these perceptual priors are used in perception.  
 
 




Twenty-one male subjects (11 Chronic Schizophrenic patients; 10 Healthy Controls) with normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision were recruited from the outpatient clinic of the Royal Edinburgh Hospital 
(Participants demographics – Table1). Patients’ diagnoses were assigned by experienced clinicians 
based on standardised interviews (Structured Clinical Interview for the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders; DSM IV-R). All participants gave informed written consent and did not 
receive monetary compensation for participation. The study was approved by the Psychiatry and 
Clinical Psychology subcommittee of the Lothian research ethics committee.  
 
The two groups did not differ in age, pre-morbid IQ or current IQ. All patients were medicated (90% 
on atypical anti-psychotics, 50% of these were also on mood stabilisers). Patients were well at the time 
of testing and did not differ from controls on the PANSS positive, general and total symptoms scale 
(PANSS = Positive and Negative Symptom Scale). Significant differences were found between the two 
groups on the negative symptom scale and the global assessment of functioning. 
 
!




2.2. Apparatus & Stimuli 
 
Motion stimuli consisted of a field of dots with a density of 2 dots/deg2, moving coherently (100%) at a 
speed of 9°/s. Dots were contained within a circular annulus with minimum and maximum diameter of 
2.2° and 7° respectively. Using coherent motion direction and speed of 9°/s ensures that motion 
discrimination per se should not differ significantly between patients and control groups (Chen et al., 
2005; 2006). Stimuli were generated using the Matlab programming language with the psychophysics 
Toolbox (Brainard, 1997), displayed on a Dell P790 monitor running at 1024x768 at 100 Hz. The 
display luminance was calibrated and linearized using a Cambridge Research Systems Colorimeter 
(ColorCal MKII). The background luminance was set to 5.2 cd/m2. Participants viewed the display in a 




Each trial was composed of two tasks arranged as follows (Figure 1a); First, participants were 
presented with a fixation point (0.5° diameter) for 400 ms. With the fixation point still on-screen, the 
motion stimulus (field of dots) was displayed along with a red bar extending from this fixation point. 
During the presentation of the field of dots, participants were required to estimate the direction of 
motion by aligning the red bar into the perceived direction of motion (Estimation task). The angle of 
this bar was randomized at each trial and participants were instructed to focus their gaze on the fixation 
point throughout the estimation task. The display then cleared when either the participant clicked the 
mouse to validate their choice (estimation) or when 3000 ms had elapsed. After the estimation, a 200 
ms delay was enforced before the detection screen was presented. The new screen was divided in two 
equal areas reading ‘Dots’ and ‘No Dots’, giving the participants a two-alternative forced choice (2-
AFC). Subjects were required to move the cursor to the right or the left to indicate whether they 
detected dots or not and click to validate their choice (Detection task). The cursor then flashed green or 
red for correct or incorrect responses respectively. No time-outs were enforced during the detection 
task. Finally, the screen was cleared for 400 ms before a new trial began. Every 20 trials, subjects were 




Figure& 1:& (A) Experimental procedure. Participants were presented with a fixation point followed by 
the motion stimulus and a response bar (red bar) that they were instructed to align to the perceived 
motion-direction. The screen was cleared either when participants clicked to validate their estimation 
or 3000 ms had elapsed. A new screen appeared with a two-alternative forced choice task (2-AFC), 
requiring participants to indicate whether they perceived the dots during the estimation task. (B) 
Probability distribution of the motion directions. Unknown to participants, the distribution of motion 
direction was bimodal (i.e. stimuli appeared most often at ±32° around a central direction). The central 




Participants each conducted 567 trials (i.e. lasting approximately 40 minutes vs. 60 minutes in Chalk et 
al. (Chalk et al., 2010)) with opportunities for breaks every 170 trials (i.e. every 10-15 minutes) to 
prevent fatigue. Stimuli were presented at four different randomly interleaved contrast levels. The 
highest contrast level was 1.7 cd/m2 above the 5.2 cd/m2 background. There were 167 trials at zero 
contrast and 67 trials at high contrast. Contrasts of other stimuli were determined using a 4/1 and 2/1 
staircase on detection performance (García-Pérez, 1998). Throughout the experiment, there were 90 
trials with the 2/1 staircase and 243 trials with the 4/1 staircase. For the two stair-cased contrast levels, 
on a given trial, the direction of motion could either be 0°, ±16°, ±32°, ±48°, and ±64°, with respect to 
a central reference angle. This central reference angle was randomised for each participant.  
Unbeknownst to participants, we manipulated their expectations about which motion directions were 
most likely to occur by presenting stimuli moving at ±32° more frequently than others (resulting in a 
bimodal distribution, Figure 1b). At the highest contrast level, 50% of trials were at ±32° and 50% 




Data analysis of the estimation task was performed on confirmed trials only (i.e. trials where 
participants validated their choice with a click on both detection and estimation tasks). Since the 
presented directions were symmetrical around a central reference angle, results were averaged for 
stimuli moving on either side of the reference angle. The first 130 trials were excluded from the 
analysis to allow the staircases to converge to stable contrast levels (see Figure 2c-d). Out of the 
original 21 participants, one had mean absolute estimation error greater than 30° at the highest contrast 
levels and was therefore discarded from analysis. Responses from high contrast stimuli were used as a 
performance benchmark to ensure that participants were performing the task. These trials were 
excluded from the analysis. 
 
In the estimation task, the variance of participants' direction-estimates was large. As in previous work 
(Chalk et al., 2010; Gekas et al., 2013), we hypothesized that these resulted from random estimations 
on a proportion of trials, thus increasing substantially the variance of motion-direction estimates. To 
account for this, we fitted the individual estimation responses to the following distribution: 
 
1−α( ) ⋅V µ,κ( )+α 2π  
 
where ‘α’ is the proportion of trials where the participant makes random estimates, and ‘V(µ,κ)’ is the 
circular normal (i.e. von-Mises) distribution with mean ‘µ’ and width ‘1/κ’, given by: 
 
V µ,κ( ) = e
κ ⋅cos θ−µ( )
2π ⋅ I0 κ( )
 
 
Parameters were chosen by maximising the likelihood of generating the data from the distribution. 
Participants’ estimation means and standard deviation were taken as the circular mean and standard 
deviation of the von-Mises distribution. This parametric approach allows for more consistent and 
significantly smaller variances across participants, motion directions, and contrasts, than merely 
averaging over trials, without compromising the qualitative aspect of the results (Chalk et al., 2010; 
Gekas et al., 2013). In trials were no stimulus was presented, we reconstructed the probability 
distributions of participants' responses over motion directions using Kernel Density Estimation (i.e. 
KDE) across each group. The KDE is a non-parametric method used to estimate the probability density 
function from discrete measures of a random variable. To do so, a kernel that defines the form of the 
probability density function (e.g. Gaussian kernel) is placed at each of the observed measurement. 
Then, all the individual kernels are summed to create the probability density function of the random 
variable (motion direction). In our case, we used a circular normal kernel since our random variable is 
circular. As is customary for KDE, the variance of the kernel is estimated from the data using the 
MSNI method (i.e. minimum of standard deviation and interquartile range improved). This method has 
proven to be robust against over-smoothing (Silverman, 1986) as well as providing adequate fit to 




3.1. Detection performances and contrast levels 
Participants’ detection performance was monitored to adapt the stimulus contrast to each participant’s 
just noticeable difference (JND – contrast sensitivity). Using 2/1 and 4/1 staircases, we ensured that the 
individual detection performances would converge to 70.4% and 84.1% respectively (Levitt, 1971).  
Contrast staircases converged to stable luminance levels after about 130 trials for both groups (figure 
2b,c); Controls converged to a stable luminance level of 0.48 cd/m2 (±0.06) after 130 trials, while 
patients converged to 0.68 cd/m2 (±0.07) after 51 trials. These results confirm previous findings 
(Skottun and Skoyles, 2007) suggesting that schizophrenic patients display significantly poorer 
contrast-sensitivity in comparison to controls (t(18)=3.42,  p<0.01).  
 
































































Figure& 2:& Comparison of contrast discrimination between the two groups. (A) Controls' averaged 
stimulus contrast, relative to background contrast for the 4/1 (plain line) and 2/1 (dashed line) 
staircased contrast levels. (B) Patients' averaged stimulus contrast, relative to background contrast for 
the 4/1 (plain line) and 2/1 (dashed line) stair-cased contrast levels. For all figures, results are averaged 
across all participants. Error bars denote standard error. 
3.2. Statistical learning 
 
First, we investigated whether participants acquired the statistics of the stimulus. To do so, we looked 
at patterns suggestive of statistical learning in each group, namely attractive biases towards the most 
frequent directions, decreased reaction times and improved detection performance for the most 
frequent directions (Chalk et al., 2010).  








































































































Figure& 3:& Effect of expectations on estimation biases, detection performance and reaction times 
between Controls (plain line) and Patients (dotted line). (A) Participants' mean bias in the perceived of 
motion-direction as a function of the true motion direction presented. (B) Standard deviation of 
participants' estimated motion-directions as a function of the presented of motion-direction. Results 
were averaged over all participants in each group; error bars represent within-subject standard error. 
The vertical dashed lines correspond to the most frequently presented motion-direction (i.e. ±32°). (C) 
Reaction times during the estimation task as a function of motion direction. (D) Proportion of motion 
directions that were detected by the participants as a function of the presented motion direction. ** & 
*** denotes p<0.05 and p<0.01 respectively. 
Estimation performance 
 
To investigate whether the participants’ perceived motion-directions were biased, we measured the 
difference between the true motion-direction and the motion direction reported by the participants. 
Figure 3a displays the average estimation bias plotted against the true motion-direction for each 
population (i.e. plain lines for controls, dotted lines for patients). Estimates at ±16° and ±48° were 
respectively positively and negatively biased towards stimuli moving at ±32°, while estimates at ±32° 
(i.e. on the vertical dashed line) were unbiased. This indicates that for both groups, estimations were 
biased towards ±32°, the most frequent directions. These results replicate findings by Chalk et al. 
(Chalk et al., 2010) and Gekas et al. (Gekas et al., 2013) in control subjects. Overall, there was a 
significant effect of motion-direction on the estimation bias for controls (F(1,4)=6.12, p<0.001; One-
way ANOVA) and patients (F(1,4)=8.27, p<0.001; One-way ANOVA). The estimation bias at ±16° and 
±48° was significantly different from the bias at ±32° for patients (p<0.001 and p<0.001 respectively, 
paired t-test) and at ±48° vs. ±32° for controls (p<0.05, paired t-test). Together, these results confirm 
that participants perceived the most frequently presented motion-direction correctly but tended to 
perceive other motion directions as being more similar to the most frequent directions than they really 
were.  
 
We also investigated whether the standard deviation of estimated motion-directions changed as a 
function of the presented motion-direction. In accordance with previous work (Chalk et al., 2010; 
Gekas et al., 2013), we found that the mean standard deviation was smaller at ±32° than at other 
directions (figure 3b). Although there was no significant effect of motion-direction on the estimation 
standard deviation for both controls (ns., Kruskal-Wallis H test) and patients (ns., Kruskal-Wallis H 
test), the standard deviation at ±32° was significantly lower than the median standard deviation at the 
other motion-directions (Controls: p=0.033, Patients: p=0.046, one-tailed MC permutation test – 
difference of medians). These results indicate that participants’ estimations were more accurate for the 
most frequently presented directions than for other directions, consistent with the idea that participants 





Next we examined whether participants’ expectations influenced their performances at the 2-AFC 
detection task. To do so, we measured the fraction of trials where participants’ reaction times were less 
than the stimulus presentation time (i.e. <3s during the estimation) and where they correctly responded 
“dots” during the detection task (figure 3d). We observed a common pattern across participants, 
whereby stimuli were more often detected at the most frequently presented directions than at other 
directions. Controls were more likely to detect stimuli moving in the most frequently presented motion 
directions 78.1%±1.5 versus 65.3%±1.4 detected for all other directions (p<0.001, two-tailed paired t-
test).  Similarly, patients were significantly more likely to detect stimuli moving at ±32° (73.2%±1.8) 
in comparison to all other motion-directions (64.2%±3.2; p<0.01, two-tailed paired t-test). Overall, 
there was a significant effect of motion-direction on the fraction detected, both for controls 
(F(1,4)=11.36, p<0.001, one-way ANOVA) and patients (F(1,4)=4.72, p<0.005, one-way ANOVA). 
Patients and controls did not differ at detecting motion-direction at the mostly presented direction 
(±32°; ns., two-tailed independent samples t-test). These results indicate that, in terms of detection 
responses (hit rates), similar benefits of statistical learning were present in both patient and control 
groups. 
 
Another measure that reflects how easily participants detected stimuli is their response reaction time 
during the estimation task. To do so, we measured the elapsed time between the stimulus presentation 
and the estimation response of the participant (i.e. mouse click). A general pattern was observed across 
participants, whereby the mean reaction time at the most presented direction was shorter than at all 
other directions (figure 3c). For trials where controls correctly detected a stimulus, their reaction time 
was significantly reduced for the most frequently presented motion-direction relative to other motion 
directions (201±4.2 ms at ±32° versus 214±5.2 ms over all other motion-directions; p<0.005, two-
tailed signed-rank test). Similarly, patients were generally faster at detecting and responding to stimuli 
presented at the most frequented motion directions (217±7.4 ms at ±32° vs. 225±6.5 ms over all other 
motion-directions; p=0.019, two-tailed signed-rank test). There was no significant effect of motion 
direction on participants' reaction time (Controls: ns.; Patients: ns., Kruskal-Wallis H test). However, 
although patients were generally faster for the most presented motion direction in comparison to other 
directions, they were significantly slower than controls at the estimation of motion direction (p=0.014; 
two-tailed rank sum  test). Slow reaction time is a hallmark of schizophrenia that has been documented 
thoroughly in the literature in simple reaction-time tasks using visual and/or auditory stimuli 
(Nuechterlein, 1977).  
 
 
3.3. Perceived motion in absence of visual stimuli (‘hallucinations’)  
 
Finally, we investigated whether the acquired statistics about the motion stimulus affected the 
participants’ perception on trials where no stimulus was presented but where participants reported both 
a motion-direction and seeing a stimulus. We refer to this effect as “hallucinations”. The 
“hallucinations” in our perceptual task are of course different in terms of content and complexity to the 
visual hallucinations observed in psychosis (Collerton et al., 2005). However, studying these has the 
potential to shed light on perhaps similar perceptual mechanisms at play between illusions and 
hallucinations. On average participants “hallucinated” the stimulus on 17.9±4.77 trials for controls and 
14.60±5.87 trials for patients, corresponding to 13.8±4% and 11.3±4% of trials where no stimulus were 
presented (ns.; two-tailed MC permutation test – difference of medians). Interestingly, for this subset of 
trials, participants' estimation responses varied significantly with motion-direction, with a clear peak at 
the most frequently presented motion-directions (±32°; Controls: p=0.002 – Patients: p=0.019, two-
tailed signed-rank test). This suggests that participants did not make random “hallucinations” of the 
stimulus but rather hallucinated preferentially the most presented motion directions.  
 
To quantify the probability ratio that participants made estimates that were closer to the most 
frequently presented motion directions relative to other directions, we multiplied the probability that 
participants estimated within 8° of these motion-directions by the total number of 16° bins: 
 
Prel = p θestimate = ±32 ±8( )( ) ⋅Nbins  
 
This probability would be equal to 1 if participants were equally likely to estimate within 8° of ±32° as 
they are to estimate within the other 16° bins. We found that the median value of ‘Prel’ was 
significantly greater than 1 for both groups, indicating that participants were strongly biased to report 
motion in the most frequently presented directions when no stimulus was presented (i.e. hallucinated 
significantly more stimuli at the most presented directions; figure 4a-b). 
 
The fact that participants report perceiving dots that are not present, more often at the most frequently 
presented motion directions provides strong evidence to suggest that the statistics of the task have been 
acquired. Hallucinations of the most presented directions (i.e. hallucinations at ±32°±8°) appear 
significantly more often than at random directions after only 250 trials in controls (p=0.029, two-tailed 
signed-rank test) and 400 trials in patients (p=0.019, two-tailed signed-rank test). It is interesting to 
note however that while healthy controls and patients did not differ in the amount of ‘random’-
hallucinations (i.e. over all directions; p>0.05; MC permutations test, difference of medians), patients 
made significantly fewer hallucinations of the most presented direction than controls (p=0.0174, two-
tailed MC permutation test – difference of medians). In fact, 66% of patients made 3 or less 
hallucinations of the most frequently presented directions, of which 50% made no hallucinations at all. 
By comparison, all controls hallucinated stimuli at the most presented directions (i.e. 90% of controls 
hallucinated between 3 to 14 times at ±32°±8°).  
 
To ensure that the stimulus hallucinations at 32°±8° were not the result of a strategy, we analysed the 
subset of trials were participants made an estimation but did not report seeing a stimulus. In fact, on a 
large proportion of trials the presented motion stimuli were moving in one of two directions. It is 
therefore possible that participants could have developed a strategy to move subconsciously the 
estimation bar towards one of these directions irrespective of their response in the detection-task. If this 
were the case, we would also expect the ‘no-stimulus’ estimation distributions to be biased towards the 
most frequently presented directions for trials were participants did not detect a stimulus. This 
response-bias could be ruled out since participants were not significantly more likely to move the 
estimation bar closer to the frequent directions on trials where they did not report seeing a stimulus (i.e. 
all except 1; Figure 4a-d see “PDF estimated only” line). These results largely replicate those of Chalk 
et al. (Chalk et al., 2010) and Gekas et al. (Gekas et al., 2013).  
 
Finally, we found that the participants' hallucinations at 32°±8° correlated significantly with the 
neuropsychological assessment of the GAF (r2=0.532, p=0.0131, MC permutation test) and the 
PANSS total (r2=-0.498 p=0.035, MC permutation test) and PANSS positive symptoms scores (r2=-
0.586 p=0.0077, MC permutation test). These findings suggest that the more hallucinations 
participants make, the less severe the symptoms were (as measured by the PANSS and the GAF). 
Similar results were found in healthy controls using bi-stable perceptual illusion tasks and measuring 
delusional ideation in these healthy participants (Schmack et al., 2013). We found no relationship 
between the daily-dosage of anti-psychotics (Chlorpromazine equivalent; (Andreasen et al., 2010)) and 
the total amount of hallucinations at 32°±8° (ns.; MC permutation test). 
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Figure 4:!Estimation responses in the absence of stimulus for each group (Controls - A, C, E; Patients 
B, D, F). (A, B) The vertical grey lines correspond to all the estimated motion directions when no 
stimulus was present (i.e. hallucination) pooled across the whole group (A-controls, B-patients). The 
black line represents the fitted probability distributions of response for trials where participants report a 
seeing a stimulus. The dotted line represents the fitted probability distribution for trials where 
participants reported a motion direction during the estimation but did not confirm seeing a stimulus 
during the detection task. The dot-and-dash horizontal line depicts the fitted probability distribution for 
all trials where motion direction was reported. (C-D) Data from either side of the central motion are 
averaged together. The dotted vertical line in black signals the position of the mode of the prior (i.e. 
±32°). (E-F) Participants learned prior distribution of presented motion directions as predicted by the 
Bayesian model ‘Bayes_dual‘ (plain line and light-gray area). The probability distribution of 
perceptual hallucinations when simulating the task with the Bayesian model ‘Bayes_dual‘ (dotted 





In summary, our results replicate previous findings of Chalk et al. (Chalk et al., 2010) both in the 
patient and control groups. The performance of both groups show that participants implicitly learn the 
statistics of the motion stimuli and that those expectations modify their perception. All participants 
display an attractive estimation bias towards the frequently presented directions and reduced estimation 
variability for these directions. They also show faster reaction times and higher detection rates for the 
most frequently presented directions. Finally, they tend to ‘hallucinate’ the expected directions in 
absence of stimuli. 
Patients were not qualitatively, nor quantitatively different from controls in these measures used to 
assess learning of the task statistics. However, we found that patients and controls differed in two 
ways.  First, patients with schizophrenia displayed significantly poorer contrast discrimination 
thresholds than controls and slower reactions times. Second, we found that patients reported 
significantly less ‘hallucinations’ of the most frequently presented motion directions than controls. The 
amount of hallucinations of the most frequently presented directions correlated significantly with the 
GAF, PANSS Total and Positive scores, suggesting that the more participants hallucinate at the task, 
the better they usually fare in neuropsychological tests..  
 
 
4.1. Bayesian interpretation of ‘hallucinated’ dots 
 
An emerging model of schizophrenia suggests that the disorder would stem from deficits in Bayesian 
inference. For example, it has been proposed that the recurrent complex visual hallucinations (RCVH; 
(Collerton et al., 2005)) seen in psychotic could be explained in terms of deficits in the Bayesian 
integration of perceptual priors and likelihoods (Adams et al., 2013; Corlett et al., 2009b; Fletcher and 
Frith, 2009).  
  
Our paradigm is well suited to assess whether patients show deficits in probabilistic inference, either 
due to deficits in acquisition of the sensory priors, deficits in how these priors are used, or due to less 
uncertainty in the encoding of sensory information. Indeed, we found that participants performance at 
our task can be well described by a Bayesian model where participants learn an approximation of the 
stimulus statistics in the form of a perceptual prior and combine it with sensory information. Both the 
perceptual biases and ‘hallucinations’ in absence of stimulus can be understood as the signature of this 
prior. Moreover, our paradigm allowed for the first time to directly measure this prior in individuals 
suffering from schizophrenia. Our results suggest that the acquired priors are similar in controls and 
medicated patients with schizophrenia (figure 4c-d). 
 
However, while patients seem to have learnt the statistics of motion-direction just as well as controls, 
patients reported fewer ‘hallucinations’ of the most frequently presented directions. These results 
concur with previously reported findings suggesting that chronic schizophrenic patients are less 
sensitive to expectation-driven illusions (e.g. the Hollow-mask illusion) than controls (Crawford et al., 
2010; Dima et al., 2009; Keane et al., 2013; Tschacher et al., 2006). Finally, we find that the strength 
of positive symptoms correlated negatively with the participants’ sensitivity to hallucinations of the 
motion stimulus (i.e. the stronger the symptoms the fewer the hallucinations). Similar findings have 
been reported in studies of the hollow-mask illusion in schizophrenic patients (Keane et al., 2013).  
 
It is intriguing however that the influence of the prior is similar to that of controls for the estimation 
task but different for the detection task in absence of stimulus. To reconcile these results, we 
considered different hypotheses: 
 
 First, it is possible that chronic patients might consistently use a model of the task that is 
simpler than the Bayesian model. We explored this possibility by assessing whether simpler 
phenomenological models (for a description see (Chalk et al., 2010)) could better account for the 
performance of patients that have fewer expectations-driven hallucinations. To do this, we used a 
systematic model comparison approach named the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) that enables 
to compare models using a quantitative measure based on the fit to the data and the model complexity. 
We found that patients were better described by the Bayesian model than by any other model (Figure 
5), suggesting that fewer hallucinations in our task are not due to the use of a different strategy by 
patients.  
 
 Second possibility, chronic patients might overestimate the accuracy of their sensory 
integration (the likelihood), as described in (Adams et al., 2013; Jardri and Deneve, 2013). This would 
result in perception driven mostly by sensory information when no stimuli are present, therefore seeing 
no stimulus when nothing is presented. However, this model should result in weaker perceptual biases 
in patients compared to controls. This was not the case in our study. 
 
 Finally, chronic patients might have developed a heightened perception threshold requiring 
higher amount of evidence (i.e. stronger posterior) in order to perceive a stimulus or make a decision 
about the presence of a stimulus. In fact, patients require a higher stimulus contrast and to integrate 
information over longer periods of time before responding (slower reaction times during the estimation 
task). We hypothesize that it is a possible adaptation strategy used by patients over time to overcome 
responding to stimuli that are not truly present (i.e. recurrent complex hallucinations). That is, because 
patients have formerly been exposed to hallucinations, they might now demand heightened evidence to 
consciously report perceiving stimuli that might not truly be present. This hypothesis deserves more 
investigation but at this stage it seems compatible with our results. 
 
This hypothesis could be further explored using psychophysical tasks where the prior is explicitly 




In line with studies finding no deficit in implicit learning in schizophrenia (Danion et al., 2001; Kéri et 
al., 2000; Marvel et al., 2005), for review see (Gold et al., 2009), we find that patients’ performances 
suggest that they correctly acquired the statistics of the stimuli in out task. First, in contrast with studies 
that assay explicit statistical learning and inference in context with cognitive symptoms (i.e. in learning 
and decision-making, usually believed to involve frontal cortical regions), here we measured implicit 
statistical learning of visual stimuli that could be embodied in visual processing areas rather than 
frontal cortices (Kok et al., 2013). As a review of cognition in schizophrenia recently highlighted (Gold 
et al., 2009), while patients are generally impaired in explicit learning, they appear relatively spared in 
implicit learning tasks that do not require integrating information after each trial. Secondly, our patient 
sample was relatively well at the time of testing and might not be representative of patients 
experiencing full-blown psychosis (i.e. chronic medicated schizophrenics; mean illness duration 
14.72±2.73 years). Our patient sample displayed no significant differences with the control group in 
terms of positive-symptom scales and current IQ.  

































































Figure& 5:& Model& comparison& using& the& Bayesian& Information& Criterion& (BIC).& The& BIC& score& is&
evaluated&for&each&model&and&subtracted&by&the&BIC&score&evaluated&for&the&simple&‘Bayes’&model&for&
each& participant.& Values& greater& than& zero& indicate& that& then& simple& ‘Bayes’& model& was& better& at&
describing&the&behaviour&of&the&participant.&
 
Finally, both patients and controls preferentially hallucinated stimuli at the most frequently presented 
directions when no stimulus were present, strongly suggesting that they correctly acquired the statistics 
of the task. Moreover, in line with recent studies (Keane et al., 2013), patients appeared to be less 
sensitive to expectation-driven perceptual ‘hallucinations’ than controls, suggesting that they may have 
a normal top-down vs. bottom-up signalling but a heightened perceptual threshold, requiring higher 
amounts of evidence in order to perceive a stimulus. In agreement with Keane et al. (Keane et al., 
2013) and Schmack et al. (Schmack et al., 2013), we also found that the amount of expectation-driven 
perceptual ‘hallucinations’ were predictive of positive-symptom severity in patients or delusion 
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